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JAPANESE GEOPOLITICS AND THE GREATER
EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE.

The American University, Ph.D., 1964

Political Science, international law and relations

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JAPANESE GEOPOLITICS AND
THE GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE

by

Yung-Hwan Jo

Submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
International Relations and Organization

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PREFACE

This is a study of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere with emphasis on the influence of geopolitical thought in the formation of its concept. It is therefore a rather technical study of one aspect of Japanese diplomacy. Practically no studies have been made concerning the influence of geopolitics on Japanese foreign policy.

It is not the purpose of this study to attack or defend the geopolitics or the concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere at any stage of its development, but rather to understand it.

The principal data used in preparing this work are: (1) Various records of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East; (2) microfilmed archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1868-1945; (3) materials written by Japanese geopoliticians as well as Haushofer; and (4) letters from authorities in the different aspects of this work. In order to make this study as objective as possible, an effort was made not to lose sight of the multidisciplinary approach. In the main comparative and analytical methods were followed. However, there was some resort to the descriptive and historical methods when they served as essential preliminaries to the over-all approaches

employed in this research.

Finally, the writer wishes to express his appreciation to the following persons: (1) Members of the Committee, i.e., Lord Lindsay of Birker (chairman), Dr. Ralph L. Powell, Dr. Millidge P. Walker and Dr. Ssu-yü Teng for their many valuable suggestions that have been incorporated in the final version; (2) Mr. Andrew Kuroda (Japanese Section, the Library of Congress), Dr. Sung Yoon Cho (Far Eastern Law Library, the Library of Congress) and Mr. John Taylor (the National Archives) for their kind assistance in locating and gathering the materials used in preparing this work; (3) several Japanese authorities on the subject especially Col. Susumi Nishihara for their goodness to answer his questions; (4) his colleague, Dr. Tom J. Hillmon for proof-reading the entire manuscript; and (5) lastly but not the least, his wife, Syliva for typing the entire manuscript. None of these persons are responsible for any illogicality in views and inaccuracy in content, as the responsibility for all facts and opinions in this work rests with the writer.

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NOTE ON FOREIGN TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Practically all German and Japanese terms used in this study are translated into English in a subsequent parenthesis except such familiar words as geopolitik and Nippon and except when the translations are already rendered in preceding sections.

The romanized Japanese terms in the text are translated into English as well as Japanese language which combines kanji (Chinese ideographs) and kana (Japanese syllabaries). In the bibliographical data all the cited works written in Japanese such as most of the CAJMFA archives were translated with kanji and kana; IMTFE documents were, however, excluded since they are translated texts. Japanese names appearing in this study are given in the usual English order, that is with the surname last in footnotes.

Among the following abbreviations, "GEACPS" is frequently used throughout the text and the remaining abbreviations are used in footnotes and bibliography.

CAJMFA: Checklist of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 1868-1945 (Microfilmed for the Library of Congress 1949-1951).

IMT: Documents of the International Military Tribunal.

SP: Special Studies.

IMTFE: International Military Tribunal, Far East.

GEACPS: Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

CHRONOLOGY OF JAPANESE EXPANSION*

1861-76	Bonin and Kuriles Islands
1875-79	Ryukyu Islands
1891	Volcano Islands
1894-95	Formosa and the Pescadores from Sino-Japanese War
1904-05	Karafuto from Russo-Japanese War plus control of China Sea, South Manchuria and Korea
1905-10	Annexation of Korea
1914	Carolines, Marianas and Marshalls and Shantung interests from War with Germany
1915	"Twenty-one Demands" made upon China
1931-33	Manchuria (Manchukuo) and Jehol
1937 on	More of China including Hainan
1939	Spratly and Paracel Islands
1940-41	French Indo-China
1942 (July)	Philippines, Burma, Siam, Malaya and East Indies and New Guinea (Arakon Yomes to Solomon Island)

*Cf. Appendix B and pp. 241-243 of this manuscript. During three-quarters of a century Japan expanded from original territory of 148,756 sq. mi. (73,000,000 pop.) to about one and a half million sq. mi. (150,000,000 pop.). See G. E. Pearcy, R. H. Fifield and Associates, World Political Geography (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1948), p. 388; and W. Gordon East and O. H. K. Spate (ed.), The Changing Map of Asia (London: Methuen & Co., 1958), p. 415.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps by accidents of history or geography, a "have" nation enjoys a far more favorable balance between population and natural resources than a "have-not" nation. The resulting discrepancy between the rich and the poor nations tend to "heightens the difference between (their) respective attitudes and ways of life."¹ Hence, some environmental factors can be easily related to some attitudes and decisions which, in turn, may comprise a state's foreign policy.²

Yet policy-makers' interpretation of the natural environment in terms of their country's power relations could be a more important determinant of foreign policy than the environment itself. In the words of Jean Gottmann,

World politics in this century have proven that geography can be exploited by a policy, at least as much as policies are "dictated" by geography. What counts in policy-making is how the policy-maker views the environment, and to what use he wants to put it.

¹Edwin O. Reishauer and John K. Fairbank, East Asia: The Great Tradition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 6.

²See Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, James N. Rosenau, editor (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961), pp. 106-107.

The most stubborn facts are those of the spirit, not those of the physical world.³

This should not mean, however, that certain enduring features of a country's foreign policy can be explained without due reference to its geographical factors.⁴ Although the technological revolution has almost made man master of his natural environment, he still remains "nature-limited" if not "nature-directed." Thus, the geographical environment may not be the decisive but rather a limiting factor of a country's strategic situation.⁵

A conceptual analysis of "geopolitics" would contribute to the understanding of international politics since geopolitical points of view have had a "real impact upon the foreign policies of contemporary states."⁶

³Jean Gottmann, "Geography and International Relations," World Politics, January, 1951, p. 163.

⁴For instance, one of the most permanent factors of Russian foreign policy has been her geographic conditions, such as location, topography and natural resources. Also, despite our discord with de Gaulle's nuclear policy, the geographic location of France alone would make it strategically unwise to exclude France from the NATO. See also Stanley Hoffman (ed.), Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 203.

⁵Ladis K. D. Kristof, "The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IV, No. 1 (March, 1960), pp. 16-17.

⁶Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Principles of International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 74.

What has made the "geopoliticians" speak about the doctrine of "Erdgebundenheit of political development?"⁷ Why has this doctrine of "the earth relation" (dependence) of man and politics been so abused?

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Establishment of the so-called Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere (abbreviated as GEACPS⁸) was Japan's declared aim of World War II. This goal manifests a "geopolitical" concept of territorial imperialism as well as Japan's traditional ideology of expansion.

The purposes of this study are (1) to examine the hypothesis that the GEACPS was a formulation by Japanese policy-makers out of geopolitical concepts developed by and borrowed mostly from Germany, reinforced by the Japan-centric ideology of expansion, and used in interpreting the pressing conditions in and around the Japanese empire; (2) to engage extensively in an objective analysis of various theories advanced for the establishment of the GEACPS. By so doing, the study will reveal Japan's "organic"⁹ concept of dominance towards the peoples of East Asia; and (3) to compare

⁷From the official definition of Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, quoted in K. Haushofer, Nihon (Japan), trans. by Norio Sasaki (Tokyo: Dai-ichi shobo, 1943), p. 3.

⁸This abbreviation will be used throughout the text.

⁹This concept was expressed in terms of "organic

nationalism," was showing some semblance of articulation by the late 1930's.

An examination of the subject indices of several textbooks widely used in American colleges and universities in modern political history of the Far East would reveal how little attention is paid to the topic of the GEACPS-Japan's version of "Manifest Destiny" or "Monroe Doctrine."⁹

A few studies have been made concerning the influence of German geopolitics on German foreign policy,¹⁰ but

¹⁰Out of eight such textbooks examined by the writer, two fail to include the term, GEACPS. Only in one of them can one find a touch of conceptual analysis (Paul M. A. Linebarger, Djang Chu, and Ardath W. Burks, Far Eastern Governments and Politics (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1954), pp. 262-263, 435-438), and in another a brief explanation of the GEACPS in terms of autarky (Harold M. Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times, Sixth Edition (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1959), pp. 645-650). If similar examinations were conducted in Japan, none of the sampled books would fail to mention the topic of the GEACPS. More than half of them would contain some conceptual analysis of the GEACPS and in a few of them one would find an exposition of the GEACPS in terms of geopolitical arguments. This opinion was reinforced from the writer's reading of Japanese books, especially articles in such standard post-war references as Ajiya Rekishi Jiten (An Encyclopedia of Asian History) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1960), Sekai Taihyakka Jiten (World Great Encyclopedia) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1957), Nihon Rekishi Tai Jiten (The Great Dictionary of Japanese History) (Tokyo: Kawate Shobo Shinsha, 1958) and Seijigaku Jiten (An Encyclopedia of Political Science) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1963).

¹¹See G. W. Sonntag, "The Other Side of Coin, Heartland and Mirror of Journal of Geopolitics before 1933" (unpublished Master's thesis, The University of Maryland, College Park, 1962); Donald H. Norton, "Karl Haushofer and His Influence on Nazi Ideology and Foreign Policy" (Ph.D. dissertation in the process of completion, Clark University, Worcester, Mass.); Edmond A. Walsh, Total War: A Footnote to History (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1945); Hans

(ge=earth in Greek). Geopolitics is distinguished from political geography¹⁵ in that the former become the "art" of practical politics based upon the "science" of the latter. Professor Weigert defines geopolitics as "political geography applied to national power politics and its actual strategy in peace and war."¹⁶ Whittlesey distinguishes geopolitics from political geography by saying that geopolitics "transcends the rigid limitations of science to reach into the art of government."¹⁷

Many other students of geopolitics try to define geopolitics by way of differentiating it from political geography. Exponents of geopolitics assert that it is "concerned with dynamic relations whereas political geography is descriptive of static situation."¹⁸ "Geopolitik bears the same relationship to political geography as does astrology to astronomy."¹⁹ "It is a modern version of

¹⁵In this study, the political phase of human ecology-- a part of political geography-- is treated, in a broader sense as one of the geopolitical schools of thought.

¹⁶Hans W. Weigert, Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 14.

¹⁷Derwent Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1942), p. 79.

¹⁸H. M. Clokie, "Geopolitics -- New Science or Old Art?" Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. X, No. 4 (November, 1944), p. 493 and 502.

¹⁹Sidman P. Pool, "Geopolitik-Science or Magic," The Journal of Geography, Vol. XLIII No. I (January, 1944), p. 1.

marginal growths, e.g., Gibraltar, Hong Kong, and Singapore; raumliche und zeitliche Selbstbestimmungstreiben, striving for self-determination in terms of space and time.²⁶

Although there is no evidence that the Japanese had included "Geo-Psychology" or "Geo-Medicine" in their study of Munich geopolitics, some resemblance to Geo-Jurisprudence appears in the discussion of international law on the part of Japanese geopoliticians.²⁷ In Japan, geopolitical jargons similar to those listed by professor Walsh flourished but only within the confines of geopoliticians.

After its importation from Germany, much of Japan's geopolitics was developed as a theory of dynamic force, and political technique, based upon the viewpoint of the needs of the Japanese empire; it was therefore natural that the factors and principles which concerned Japan was not in the same order of importance as in Germany. But it is of interest to note that Japanese geopolitics, as expressed in the concept of the GEACPS, centered around a number of subjects that were also familiar to the Munich school of Haushofer.

²⁶Edmund A. Walsh, "Geopolitics and International Morals" (in Compass of the World: A Symposium on Political Geography, ed. by Hans W. Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson. New York: The Mcmillan Co., 1944), p. 25.

²⁷Masatoshi Matsushita, "Greater East Asia International Law," Contemporary Japan, Vol. XI, No. 12 (Dec. 1942), pp. 1712-1719; and Akira Ozawa, "Toa Kyodo-tai no Rinan to Kokusaiho" (The Ideal of East Asia Cooperative Body and International Law), Chuo Koron, February, 1939, pp. 50-63.

The ideas of (1) Pan-regionalism,²⁸ (2) Lebensraum, (3) Autarky and Grossraumwirtschaft, (4) the organic state and the dynamic boundary, (5) "balance of power" and military security, (6) sea-power versus land-power — received considerable attention in Japanese literature. Thus, in this study the term "Japanese geopolitics" will be used for any one or a combination of these six cardinal principles as expressed from Japanese Weltanschauung.

The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere. The six words, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, are the English translation of six Chinese ideographs expressing the Japanese aim behind World War II, namely, Tai- To- a- Kyo- Ei- Ken (大東亜共榮圈). It was defined in a Japanese source as a policy advocating;

The solidarity, or the union, of neighboring states sharing in greater or smaller degree common racial and cultural origins and enjoying geographical propinquity, to be founded by their voluntary agreement for the purpose of assuring their common safety and promoting their mutual happiness and prosperity.²⁹

Information based on reliable sources of post-war Japan indicates that the ideology of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere can be analyzed in three categories.

²⁸ Japanese version of regionalism was expressed in phrases such as: "Toa Kyodo Tai" — East Asia Cooperative Body, "Toa (Bunka, Seiji, Keizai) Sogo Tai" — East Asia (Cultural, Political, Economic) Mutual Body, "Toa Renmei" — East Asia League or Federation, and "Toa Burokku" — East Asia Bloc.

²⁹ The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere (Tokyo: The Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, 1941), p. S.

(1) Tradition of pan-Asiatic expansion since Meiji Restoration which was later expressed by ultranationalistic expansionists as "Hakko Ichiu"-- Spiritual tie; by Ishiwara Kanji as "Toa Renmei"-- East Asian League; and by the Geopoliticians of Showa Kenkyukai as "Toa Kyoto Tai"-- East Asia Cooperative Body.³⁰ (2) Geopolitical theories which find their expression in such terms as Autarky, Lebensraum and Grossraumwirtschaft for the Greater East Asia; and "Chien"-- earth (soil)-relation; and "Ketsuen"-- blood-relation of Yellow races.³¹ (3) New Order in East Asia based on Konoye's Three Principles, i.e., friendly relations, economic collaboration, and anti-Communism.³² These same sources recognize that the "New Order" in East Asia, which was officially proclaimed in 1938 two years before the GEACPS, was based on similar foundations as the GEACPS except that the latter included more territories.

³⁰Shiro Nohara, "Tai Toa Kyo-ei Ken (The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere)," Ajiya Rekishi Jiten (As Encyclopedia of Asian History) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1960), Vol. VI (6), pp. 51-52; See also Ahari Nakatsuka, "Tai Toa Kyo-ei Ken (The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere)," Nihon Rekishi Tai Jiten (Great Dictionary of Japanese History) (Tokyo: Kawate Shobo Shinsha, 1958), p. 45.

³¹"Tai Toa Kyei Ken (The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere)," Seijigaku Jiten (Encyclopedia of Political Science) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1954), p. 855; Nohara, op. cit., p. 52; see also Seiichi Imai, "Tai Toa Kyo-en Ken (The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere)," Sekai Taihyakka Jiten (World Great Encyclopedia) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1957), Vol. 18, p. 221.

³²Mitsuo Maehara, Hoichiro Noguchi, and Haijime Kobayashi, Dai Toa Kyo-ei-Ken No Min-Zoku (Tokyo: Rokumeikan, 1942), I, 31; The Japan Yearbook 1940-41 (Tokyo: The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, 1941), p. 157.

Interestingly enough, when and by whom the term "Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere" was originated is not clear even to Dr. Masamichi Royama,³³ one of the brain trusts of the Konoe Cabinet which announced publicly both "the New Order" and "the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere." The Outline of Fundamental National Policy (Kihon Kokusaku Yoko 基本国家方針) issued by the cabinet on July 26, 1940, contained the terms, "New Order of Greater East Asia," but not the words "the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere." But the latter was clearly used in the Talk of Foreign Minister Matsuoka (Gaiso Dan 外相談話) issued on April 1, 1940 by the Foreign Ministry.³⁴ Thus, according to Royama, it was not mistaken to regard both terms as synonymous, even though Matsuoka used the terms "Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere" in place of "New Order" (Shin Jitsujo 新秩序). The Foreign Minister was quoted to have said of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere:

The Foreign policy of our country henceforth must aim at establishing, on the basis of the great spirit of Kodo, the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere with Japan-Manchukuo-China at first forming a key part of it.³⁵

³³Masamichi Royama, Toa to Sekai- Shin Jitsujo heno Ronsaku (East Asia and World- Theoretical Guide to New Order Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1941), pp. 360-361.

³⁴This was also confirmed from the letter of Colonel Susumi Nishihara, January 9, 1963.

³⁵Royama, Loc. cit.

The Outline, to which the Talk of Matsuoka was referred, is a contraction of the lengthy Ten Year Plan of Integrated National Policy (Sogo Kokusaku Junen Keikaku

綜合國策十年計画), drafted in June 1940.³⁶

With regard to the territorial boundary, it is noteworthy that the "New Order of the Greater East Asia" the term used in the Outline- confines its territorial scope to the Japan-Manchuria-China area³⁷ whereas the "Joint Economic Sphere of the Greater East Asia"- the term used in the Ten Year Plan- embraces, in addition, Eastern Siberia, Inner and Outer Mongolia, the Southeast Asian Countries, India and Oceania (大東洋).³⁸

Arturo Tolento, the first prize winner of an essay contest held in 1943 by the Osaka Daily for non-Japanese Asiatics on the topic of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, defined the term as "a federation of independent states for a common ideal of the territory, the material wealth, the civilization and the culture of the Orient."³⁹

³⁶See Ikuhiko Hata, "Butsuin Shinghu to Gun no Nanshin-seisaku (March into French Indo-China and Military Policy of the Southward Movement)," Taiheiyo Senso heno Michi (Road to the Pacific War), Vol. VI, compiled by Nihon Kokusai Seijigaku-kai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyu-bu (Tokyo: Asai Shinbun-sha, 1963), pp. 166-168.

³⁷Taiheiyo Senso heno Michi, op. cit., Seperate Vol. on Materials, p. 321.

³⁸Ibid., p. 306.

³⁹Construction of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere (Osaka: The Mainichi Publishing Co., 1943), p. 7.

To the pro-Japanese, the attractive phrase "the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere" could mean that the ideas of economic cooperation and the mutual benefits were of great concern and that political hegemony was of small concern to the Japanese government.

Words such as "common" and "prosperity" used in Japanese white papers remained vague, ill-defined and flexible to meet the needs of the particular time and particular environment. The idea of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere was never fully developed. It was referred to not only as "Japan's New Order in East Asia" but also as the "Japanese Monroe Doctrine or Manifest Destiny," or "Asia for Asiatics."

The official title, "Dai-Toa-Kyo-Ei-Ken," can be literally translated only as "the Great(er) East Asia Co (or Mutual)-prosperity Sphere." A number of scholars, including some Japanese, maintain that Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere was a Japanese version of Hitler's "New Order," but most Japanese took pains to demonstrate that their "New Order" was in fact a modern economic and military elaboration of a concept long held in Japan.⁴⁰

⁴⁰Sir Frederick Whyte, The Rise and Fall of Japan (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1945), p. 32. See The Japan Yearbook (Tokyo: The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, 1943), p. 118.

CHAPTER II

THE MAINSPRINGS OF JAPAN'S NATIONALISTIC EXPANSIONISM

It is easy to establish the connection between Japan's nearness to the Asiatic continent and her traditional relations with Korea and China, and also between the paucity of Japan's natural resources and her quest for raw materials not found domestically. It can be argued that Japan's geographical environment is reflected in her Weltanschauung.

Much of the traditional forces discussed in this chapter reinforced Japan's appraisal of her geopolitical position in the world.

I. HAKKO ICHIU (八紘一宇)

The tenets of Japanese Shinto mythology, like various mythological and legendary tales in the West, lie outside of logic or scientific proof. Yet in the explanation of their application in formulation of Japanese domestic or foreign policies, one can find the clues to many of the peculiarities of Japanese political thought.¹ Here lies the justification

¹P. M. Linebarger, Chu Djang, and A. D. Burks, Far Eastern Governments and Politics China and Japan (second edition; Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 262-266; See also Frederick Whyte, Japanese

as well as an academic, if not practical, value for beginning this study with Hakko Ichiu, the basic ideal of Japanese diplomacy.

In the two oldest documents of Japanese history, namely, the Kojiki 古事記 (Record of Ancient Matters) and the Nihonshoki 日本書紀 or Nihongi (Chronicles of Japan) which were compiled about A.D. 720,² we find orally-transmitted legends, songs and traditions woven into the literary fabric. These documents seem to have been written under the conviction that the foundations of the Japanese state were religious and that an emperor of divine origin preceded the state which, in turn, preceded the people.³

According to the Nihongi, the phrase Hakko Ichiu originated in the following passage in an edict of the semi-legendary first emperor, Jimmu Tenno on the occasion of the

Purpose in Asia (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1941), p. 46; Yataka Nakada, "Myths and Legends in Japan and the South Seas" in Contemporary Japan, November 1941, Vol. X, No. 11, p. 1430.

²Saburo Ienaga. History of Japan (5th ed., Tourist Library 15; Tokyo: Japan Travel Bureau, 1961), p. 12; David H. James, The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), p. 29.

³Kokutai no Hongi (Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan: An Official Statements of National Policy) (trans. by John O. Gauntlett. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 60-62; Basil H. Chamberlain, Translation of "Ko-ji-ki" or "Records of Ancient Matters" (second edition; Kobe: J. L. Thompson & Co., 1932), p. 50. This translation was published with the permission of The Asiatic Society of Japan, Tokyo; also W. G. Aston (trans.), Nihongi: Chronicles of Japan from the Earlier Time to A.D. 697 (Transaction and Proceedings of the Japan Society: London, Supplement I; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1896), 1:109-137.

first accession to the imperial throne in 660.⁴

Above, I should then respond to the kindness of the Heavenly Powers in granting me the Kingdom, and below, I should extend the line of the Imperial descendants and foster rightmindness. Thereafter the capital may be extended so as to embrace all the six cardinal points, and the eight cords may be covered so as to form a roof.⁵

Hakko Ichiu, literally "eight cords under one roof," appears in the above paragraph, though "eight cords" (Hakko) is separated from "a roof" (Ichiu). The last sentence of the paragraph expresses a concept of organic whole of the Japanese world empire through such phrases as "the capital," "six cardinal points," and "eight cords." The "six cardinal points" stand for "north, south, east, west, zenith, and nadir covering the entire world."⁶ The "eight cords" (Hakko) simply means "everywhere," the number "eight" must be taken,

⁴D. C. Holtom, Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism: A Study of Present-Day Trends in Japanese Religions (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1943), p. 21; IMFFE, International Presecution (hereafter IPS), Narrative Summary of the Record, VI, 2665-2666; Proceedings 18, pp. 101-118. Although the Nihon Shoki is the first Japanese work in which Hakko appears, Warren W. Smith, Jr., the phrase occurred in a Han dynasty work, the Huai-nam tzu, tsu-bu-tsung edition (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1922), chuan I, 5a; shuan IV, 3b, 4a, cited from Warren W. Smith, Jr., Confucianism in Modern Japan: A Study of Conservatism in Japanese Intellectual History (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1939), pp. 239-240.

⁵Aston, op. cit., p. 131.

⁶Holtom, loc. cit. Hachi, eight; ko, thick cord or rope, direction, corner; ichi, one; u, house or home. Shin'ichi, Fujii, Tenno Seiji (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1944), p. 27.

according to Aston, as "many," or "several."⁷ "A single roof" is generally translated as one family, but its Chinese character also means the universe, hence the one world family.

Then, has the "eight corners of the world under one roof" given rise to harmony among nations? Such has not been the case in Japan. Internationalism in the West implies an association of separate, sovereign states, whereas one world-familism, which is the Japanification of the Confucian idea, is based on the doctrine of inequality⁸ as well as on the family-type solidarity. It is stated time and again in Japanese political writings that

the state is simply a gigantic patriarchal family. The Emperor is the adored father, the revered statesmen are the council of clan elders, and the people are the children, some having more honorable positions than others, but each being treated according to his due, all being cared for as beloved and homogeneous members of a single great family.⁹

Just as each member of a "national" family should be guided by the Emperor-father, the individual states would be subordinated to the good of the whole community of nations, even if this would curtail the sovereignty of perhaps all

⁷"...in many places in the old Japanese literature it (eight) must be taken in what I regard as its primary sense of 'many,' 'several'..." Aston, loc. cit.

⁸For detail see a section entitled "The Doctrine of National Inequality" in Chapter VI of this dissertation.

⁹Robert K. Reischauer, Japan: Government-Politics (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1939), p. 33.

the states. The nation that is worthy to exercise universal sovereignty among the nations is the one that follows "The Imperial Way," thereby realizing that politics is synonymous with ethics, and that to govern is to do the will of Heaven.¹⁰ Hence, "Japan is the sole nation qualified to convey to the world the blessings of the Way of the Sage-King, and on the realization of this ideal, mental equilibrium and moral calm will be restored to afflicted humanity."¹¹ This is an organic concept of internationalism based on the organic theory of the Japanese state, which in turn stems from the organic tie of the "Confucian" family.

Hakko Ichiu, which is a mystical concept expressing Japan-centric universalism, was the most celebrated phrase used as a symbol for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.¹² Geopoliticians,¹³ statesmen-civilian as well as military, and ultranationalists or moderates all used this expression as the ideal of Japanese

¹⁰ CAJMPA, SP 255, Basic Ideas of Political Science in Japan (Nihon seiji-gaku no kiso rinen). March, 1939. 169 p. Reel SP 147. pp. 115-117; Reischauer, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

¹¹ Chikao Fujisawa, Japanese and Oriental Political Philosophy (Tokyo: The Research Department of the Daito Bunka Kyokai, 1935), p. 169.

¹² Kyoto Daigokubu Kokushi Kenkyushitsu (compiled), Nihon kindaishi jiten (Dictionary of Japanese Modern History) (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1958), p. 507.

¹³ Saneshige Komaki, Nihon Chiseigaku sengen (Declaration of Japanese Geopolitics) (Tokyo: Hyaku Yo-sha, 1942), p. 158.

foreign policy. Indeed they would agree that Hakko Ichiu formed the ideological- if not intellectual- root of Japanese expansionism, although they would not deny that the implications of the term were too broad to specifically define the scope of its implementation.

In their diplomatic intercourse Japanese officials gave the mildest interpretation of Hakko Ichiu. It was translated into English as "universal brotherhood" in the negotiation between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassador, Nomura. Hakko Ichiu was cited in the preamble of the Axis Pact and in the Imperial Rescript, issued at the time of the conclusion of the pact.¹⁴ But, to the Allied Powers the term was a synonym for imperialism and another term for aggression.¹⁵ The Japanese defendants took pains to argue that Hakko Ichiu did not mean bold aggression and military exploitation but rather an international advocacy of moral unity in politics for the attainment of world peace and brotherhood.¹⁶

Now, then, did this lofty ideal come to serve to justify imperialism as a territorial concept? The instrument of "Ichiu-fying" Hakko was to be Kodo 皇道 (the Imperial

¹⁴IMTPE, Proceedings, p. 17024.

¹⁵The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere (Tokyo: The Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichi, 1942), p. 11.

¹⁶IMTPE, loc. cit.; Robert J. C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 185-186; Holton, op. cit., p. 23.

Way) which is similar to the Chinese concept of Odo 王道 (the Kingly Way). Mencius is said to have defined Odo (Wang-tao) as dispersing jin 仁 (benevolence) based on toku 徳 (morality),¹⁷ while the term Kodo was interpreted as "expanding into a love for humanity embracing the entire world as one family."¹⁸ The Imperial Way was viewed as a method to materialize the ideal of Hakko Ichiu for three alleged reasons: (1) The universal applicability of the Imperial Way was suggested in the alleged Imperial Rescript of divine Jimmu in 660 B.C., which used the term Kodo in connection with Hakko and Ichiu:¹⁹ (2) Kodo was superior to Hado 霸道 (the way of dominance) which was to rule through power as in the case of the Western states; (3) it was purer than the Chinese Kingly Way, as the Imperial Way symbolized the "unbroken line of emperors eternal."²⁰

From the foregoing, it would appear that when the Imperial Way was fully manifested or the doctrine of Hakko Ichiu realized, Japan would have secured her own Lebensraum and completed the construction of the GEACPS. Indeed, it

¹⁷Taira Shidehara, Dai Toa no Seiku (Growth of Greater East Asia) (Tokyo: Tokyo Deizai Shimpō Sha Shuppan Bu, 1941), pp. 18-19.

¹⁸Quotation from p. 317 of Yoshijiro Takasa's Dainihon Shochoku Kindai (interpretation of the Imperial Rescripts of the Great Japan) in IMFE, Proceedings 18105.

¹⁹IMFE, Judgement, Part B, Chapter IV, pp. 85-86, 146-49, 153-54; Butow, op. cit., p. 79.

²⁰Shidehara, loc. cit.

would have been a Japanese version of the world government. It was stated repeatedly, however, that the goal of Hakko Ichiu,²¹ Imperial Way, or Japanese foreign policy was to enable various nations and races including Japanese to secure their due (own) places and develop respective specific traits ("special characteristics of culture and racial soul"²²).²³

The Konoe cabinet, a chief promoter of the GEACPS, issued a statement on July 26, 1940 declaring that the "guiding national policy" of Japan was "to bring about world peace based on the spirit of our National Inauguration, the ideal on which the Empire is founded, namely, 'Ichiu-fication' of Hakko (Hakko wo Ichiu to suru 八紘一宇)."²⁴

According to Japanese geopoliticians Hakko Ichiu connoted the Japanese concept of geopolitics. It was argued that "less than twenty years ago Nazi Germany was able to grasp the sense of geopolitical and national life, whereas such geopolitical truth has existed in Japan for three

²¹According to Maeda, "this very goal was an embryo of Japanese geopolitics, even though our forefathers did not recognize as a study Japanese geopolitics implicit in 'Hakko Ichiu'." Toraichiro Maeda, Chiseironteki Shinko Nihonshi (New Study of Japanese History viewed from Geopolitical Theory. Tokyo: Nishodo, 1944), p. 3.

²²Holtom, op. cit., p. 23.

²³Education Minister Hashida's statement in INTFE, Proceedings pp. 23961-23962. See also p. 23955 and INTFE, Exhibit 2362.

²⁴INTFE, Proceedings p. 23960 and also INTFE, Exhibit 2720.

thousand years as a national faith."²⁵ Even though the origin of Japanese geopolitics can be traced to the concept of Hakko Ichiu, it cannot be denied that the latter was developed from the Chinese concept of Wang-tao (王 道 the Kingly Way). Thus, Warren Smith is partly correct to argue that GEACPS "was nothing more than an attempt to establish the independent existence of Asia, based on the Wang-tao idea of peace which had originated in Asia and "flowed into Japan for consummation."²⁶ But it seems that he has overlooked the contribution of the geopolitical school of thought in the Japanese scheme of the GEACPS.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JAPANESE EXPANSIONISM

Ever since the thirteenth century, a sentiment of "national consciousness" has been expressed in Japan.²⁷ Professor Reischauer conjectures that the early rise of Japanese national consciousness, when compared with the rest of Asia, was "partly the result of the clear-cut geographic and linguistic delimitations of Japan" and partly the

²⁵Maeda, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

²⁶Smith, op. cit., p. 240.

²⁷Hilary Conroy lists the following examples: The 'national' history of Chikafusa (ca. 1340), the nationalistic-sounding letters of Kanenaga to the Ming court (1370's), the ambitious schemes of Hideyoshi (1590's), the writing of the Mito school (from 1660) and Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801), and the antiforeignism of the Imperial party (1854-1867). See his "Japanese Nationalism and Expansionism," The American Historical Review, Vol. LX, No. 4. July, 1955, p. 821.

the feeling of inferiority of Japan in contrast with China which was superior in size, power, and prestige.²⁸

During the most part of the Tokugawa period, Japanese nationalism was expressed as rejection of intercourse with the West. But this type of nationalism was moderated by later Tokugawa reformers to "allow on the one hand for 'opening of the country' to the West as the only practical way of building up of Japan's strength against West,"²⁹ and on the other hand, for expanding Japanese influence over the Asia.

In pursuing the policy of expansion, Japan profited from the experience of China where, for over 500 years, the Chou Dynasty had carried on a continuous military and diplomatic struggle among its "feudal" states each seeking to secure sufficient power to reduce all the others. Finally, after many wars and reverses, the state of Ch'in was successful in absorbing these neighboring states into its empire as centrally administered prefectures. With this knowledge of the Chinese experience, Japan sought to reduce the states closest at hand:

To place herself in the most favorable position possible for that coming struggle for ultimate

²⁸ Edwin O. Reischauer, The U. S. and Japan (rev. ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 113.

²⁹ Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene (comp.), Sources of Japanese Tradition. Records of Civilization Sources and Studies No. LIV. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 603.

hegemony among the world's great states, which the analogy of ancient Asiatic history presents to the minds of her leaders as inevitable.³⁰

Against a background of nearly 3000 years of Japanese history, half a century of the Chinese warfare was nothing. There was a quality of timelessness in Japan's concept of the ultimate end, i.e., the world empire. It is argued by Professor Fairbank that the study of Chinese history inspired Japanese expansionists such as Tanaka and Doihara in their schemes for domination of China. A fact of history is that during "the last thousand years North China has been ruled more than half the time by alien invaders" such as the Mongols and Manchus, whose past glories Japanese militarists wanted to revive.³¹

The idea of Hakko Ichiu was not put into practice until the end of the sixteenth century when Hideyoshi Toyotomi, often called the Napoleon of Japan, set out to conquer the part of the world then known to the Japanese. Believing that the emperor was the omnipotent god who was destined to rule the world, and that foreign nationals who refused to accept his rule were actually rebels against divine authority, Hideyoshi attempted to place the emperor

³⁰Robert S. Ward, Asia for the Asiatics?: The Techniques of Japanese Occupation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), p. 2.

³¹John K. Fairbank, The United States and China (rev. edition; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 68.

on the throne of the world.³² More realistic reason for the interest shown by this conqueror in the Asiatic mainland could be found in the attempts by the Mongols to invade Japan from Korea.³³

Hideyoshi's plans extended beyond the conquest of Korea and China. They covered other Asiatic territories such as India, Persia, the islands of Liu Chiu, Formosa, the Philippines, and regions in the South Sea.³⁴ But he was killed before he could crush Korea, which he looked upon as a stepping stone in his world conquest.

Though this first experiment of expansion ended in a fiasco, the exploits of Hideyoshi have been glorified by the Japanese for more than three centuries.

In 1798, at a time when Japanese were forbidden by law to leave their country, Honda Toshiaki voiced one of Japan's earliest plans of imperialism in his work A Secret Plan for Governing the Country. In it he enunciated a program for "development of overseas possessions," and for "settlers of the proposed colonies." He proposed that Japan shake off Western encroachment by mastering its science and

³²The Tanaka Memorial: Japan's Dream of World Empire (edited, with an introduction by Carl Crow; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942), p. 5.

³³G. E. Percy, R. H. Fifield and Associates; World Political Geography (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1948), p. 377.

³⁴M. A. Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), p. 4.

thus emerge as the "England of the East." He wrote:

How may Japan become the greatest nation in the world? She should profit by the arts of civilization which she has learned during the 1,500 years that have elapsed since the time of the Emperor Jimmu. She should move her capital to the country of Kamchatka. (It is located at 51 N. Lat., the same as London, so the climates must be similar.) She should build a great stronghold on Saghalien... Once cities spring up in Saghalien and Kamchatka, the momentum will carry on to the natural development of the islands to the south, and the growing prosperity of these regions will raise the prestige of the Japanese government to new heights. This, in turn, will lead to the acquisition of the American islands, which are Japan's possessions manifestly.³⁵

Although Honda's analogy on climate was a serious mistake, his theory of colonization such as step-by-step territorial expansion, the order to follow in colonization, and the technique of making the natives look up to the Japanese ruling-officials as their own parents, etc., were in parallel with Japan's policies of expansion in East Asia.³⁶ In fact, the Pacific expansion including the South Seas as well as the technique of gradual colonization were the very policies pursued by the recent Japanese militarists in their campaign to establish the GEACPS.

Sato Nobuhiro (Shinen), another Tokugawa reformer, came forward with a more detailed program of reform than any others in the late Tokugawa and the early Meiji period.

³⁵ de Barry and Keene, The Japanese Discovery of Europe, pp. 170-178 quoted in Tsunoda, op. cit., p. 555.

³⁶ Ibid.

His imperialistic program of world union is worthy of note because of its basis. From his belief that the Kojiki is the true book of revelation and from his study of astronomy, Sato assumed that the "sun is the center of our universe, and so Japan, with the Sun-Goddess as its progenitrix, must be the sovereign land of the entire world."³⁷ His imperialistic program was also offered as a practical solution of the country's poverty in that "the law of vitality and fertility" demanded Japan's territorial expansion all over the world. "The world is one and is ruled by the simple principle of production and procreation;" it was, therefore, Japan's destiny as well as duty to produce and procreate so that she could become the first nation of the world.³⁸ Such a law bears resemblance to the contemporary geopolitical argument that the growing body of "living state" must secure more Lebensraum.³⁹

In an effort to devise a method for uniting the entire world in peace, he drew up Kondo Hisaku 近藤久 (Confidential Plan of World Unification) in which he reconciled Shinto legends of creation and the naturalistic

³⁷Tsunoda, op. cit., pp. 562-563.

³⁸Ibid., p. 564.

³⁹See INTFE, Proceedings in Kondoshoten shuppanbu (comp.), Sabakareru Seki no Rekishi (A History of Judged Century) (Tokyo: Kondo Shoten, 1950), p. 243.

cosmology of the Chinese⁴⁰ which had already been incorporated into Nihongi. Heaven, the key concept, "embraces both nature and the divine, so that the will of the Shinto gods is readily identified with the natural law (Heaven's law) of the Chinese and the West." Accordingly, world hegemony by Japan could be rationalized on three grounds: (1) "divine favor" in making Japan the geographical axis and basis of the world; (2) divine teaching of production and procreation ("a capacity for rational organization of the world's resources."); (3) a divine spirit and superior moral fiber of the Japanese.⁴¹

In order to put into effect such a divine mission, a clear knowledge of geography was required.

Let us now examine the situation of our country in terms of the geography of the countries of the world. It extends from 30 N latitude to 45 N latitude. Its climate is temperate, its soil fertile, and it is not without a variety of crops which produce abundant harvests. Facing the ocean on four sides, for convenience of ocean transportation it has no equal among the nations of the world. Its people, living on sacred land, are superior, excelling those of other countries for bravery and resoluteness. In truth they are fully capable of holding the reins of the world. From this position of strength they could majestically command the world in every direction, and by virtue of the awesome prestige of this Imperial Land they could readily subjugate the puny barbarians and unify the world under their control. Ah, how boundless have been the blessings of the creator on our Imperial Land!⁴²

⁴⁰For Chinese contribution toward Japan-centered Asianism, see IMTFE, Defense Summation, Introductory Statement, Defense Documents #3054, pp. 24-29.

⁴¹Sato Nobushiro, Keizai taiten (the Compendium of

Thus, it is interesting to note the study of geography was encouraged by some before the formal opening of Japan to the West. However, Japanese geopoliticians in the twentieth century apparently entertained some apprehensions for the natural geographic position of Japan, even though the spiritual preponderance of Japan in the form of its people and its land was echoed repeatedly in the arguments of Japanese militarists.

It can therefore be argued that the writings of the late Tokugawa reformers made some contributions to the development of expansionist ideology. It is important to note that Okawa Shumei, one of the chief formulators of Japanese Pan-Asianism, especially Manchurian expansion almost venerated the aforementioned Sato.⁴³

III. THE RISE OF THE PAN-ASIAN MOVEMENT

The early growth of nationalistic pan-Asianism in Japan had other roots than the ideological and historical ones discussed above. Japanese ultranationalists, indignant over the unequal treaties imposed on Japan by the United States, and a bureaucracy, hostile to the incoming liberal

Economics) XVIII, pp. 567-569 in Tsunoda, op. cit., pp. 575-576.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Okawa Shumei, Dai Toa Chitsujo Kensetsu (The Establishment of Greater East Asia Order) (Tokyo: Dai-ichi shobo, 1943), p. 9; INTFE, Exhibit 21SA, pp. 10-11. Also, CAJMF,

In 1901 the Genyosha leaders formed the Kokuryukai 黒龍会 (the Amur River Society, literally, Black Dragon Society). Taking its name from the Amur river, the Kokuryukai made propaganda for war with Russia in order to extend Japan's frontier to the Amur.⁴⁸ Kita Ikki, who stood above all extremists in contributing ideological weapons to the militarist dictatorship of Japan,⁴⁹ was backed by the Amur Society.⁵⁰ Both the anti-Western Amur Society and Confucius-oriented Kita had argued that Japanese policy of expansion in Asia was to be in the interests of all Asiatic countries. As it is the natural Confucian order of things that the masses are ruled by the elite, wise Japan should lead the masses of Asia.⁵¹ This self-appointed guardianship of Japan was repeatedly stated by Japanese militarists as well as by later geopoliticians.

According to Professor Conroy, the so-called "pure patriots" owed much to Sun Yat-sen in their formulation of pan-Asianism as against Westernism. It is argued that the Kokuryukai had had "the closest interchange of ideas".⁵²

⁴⁸Michael and Taylor, loc. cit.; Tsunoda, op. cit., p. 761.

⁴⁹Shonosuke Yamamoto, Nihon o Horoboshitamono- Gunbu Dokusaikato Sono Hokai no Katei (Those who Destroyed Japan- Dictation of the Military Authority and the Process of its Collapse) (Tokyo: Shoko Shoin, 1949), pp. 61-62.

⁵⁰Michael and Taylor, op. cit., pp. 478-479.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Kuzuu Yoshida, Toa Sensaku Shishi Kiden (Biographies

with Sun, who expounded the doctrine of

Wang Tao as the rule of right, opposed to Western rule of might...he credited Japan with the ability and the duty to lead the recovery of Asia.⁵³ ...The patriots also insist that he promised, in the days before the Chinese Revolution, that Manchuria would be left to Japan.⁵⁴

In its Secret History of the Annexation of Korea (Nikkan-gappo Hishi 日韓合併秘史) which the Amur River Society prepared for its thirtieth anniversary, it was emphatically and proudly pointed out that the society played a prominent role in achieving the annexation of Korea from 1905 to 1910.⁵⁵

Although the expansionist policies of these societies were not as fully implemented as expected from their continuous efforts to inflict pressure on the government, in the period between 1895 and 1910 Japan was able to claim title, without much Western opposition, to Formosa, the

of pioneer Exponents of East Asiatic Expansion) (Tokyo: Kokuryukai, 1933-1936), III, 723 and B. Nicolaevsky, "Russian, Japan and the Pan-Asiatic Movement to 1925," Far Eastern Quarterly, VIII (1949), 272-277 from Conroy, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

⁵³Sun Wen, "Dai Ajia Shugi no Igi to Nisshi Shinzen no Yuiitsu Saku" (The Meaning of Greater Asiaism and Friendship between Japan and China, the One and Only Policy), Kaizo, VII (1925), 213-228; Tozo Shimizu, "Dr. Sun Yat Sen's Pan Asiaism," Contemporary Japan, II (1933), 325-327 from Conroy, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

⁵⁴Kuzuu, op. cit., I, 651; II, 435-436, from Conroy, loc. cit. For Sun's statement on Manchuria see also Jansen, op. cit., p. 111.

⁵⁵Tsunoda, op. cit., pp. 762-763.

Pescadores, the Kuriles, southern Saghalin and Korea. In fact, most of the West approvingly looked on the modernized Japan's defeat of China, the sick man of Asia, while most of the Asian world experienced a thrill at the victory of Asiatic Japan over Russia of the "West."

Furthermore, Japan, as the symbol of success in modernization as well as in nationalism, had become "model, tutor, and leader to eager Asians everywhere." Thousands of students flocked to Japan. In the words of Professor Scalapino:

Likewise, Asian nationalist movements found in Japan a haven and source of support. Their leaders in exile wrote polemics, collected funds, and sometimes obtained official encouragement. Tokyo became a revolutionary center for the Far East. Japan was riding the crest-tide of the developing 'Asia for the Asians' movement.⁵⁶

IV. THE INFLUENCE OF KITA IKKI 少一 輝 AND OKAWA SHUMEI 大川 周明

In 1919 Kita Ikki wrote Nihon Kaiso Hoan Taiko 日本改造模案大綱 (An Outline Plan for the Reconstruction of Japan) which became the bible of revolutionary "National-Socialism" before the "Great East Asia War."⁵⁷

⁵⁶Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan," Foreign Policy in World Politics, Roy C. Macridis, editor (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 231.

⁵⁷I. I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Post-War Trends (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 3, n. 3.

His original programs of internal renovation was aimed at raising the living standards of the doubling population in the "small island, completely isolated in the Eastern Sea." This original outcry for socio-economic justice only for the Japanese masses, however, extended world-wide. After the domestic reorganization on the basis of Koku-tai (national polity) Japan, as an "international proletariat" would declare war, in the name of justice, to appropriate the land of "have-nations." In so doing Japan would take the leadership in a world federation that must come.

Its mission would be to acquire larger colonies for its increasing population and to liberate oppressed nations in Asia from their foreign masters. ...Japan's immediate goal would become the protector of Asian nations, and eventually hegemonic head of the world. ...Japan was to undertake a program of naval expansion to meet expected opposition from the U. S. and Great Britain, and to establish a great army against Russia.⁵⁸

The underlying assumption of Kita's theory of expansion is little different from the geopolitical arguments used by the Japanese policy-makers in the 1930's and 1940's. Both schools of thought argued that any nation has an inherent right to possess what was needed for its own survival and that the wealth of "rich" nations should be shared by the "pauper" nations.

Okawa Shumei was another prominent civilian in the

⁵⁸ CAJNFA, INT 251, Ikki Kita, Outline Plan for the Reconstruction of Japan (Nihon Kaizo Ho-an Taiko), 1933. (IPS Doc. No. 1434). Reel WT39, p. 114.

expansionist movement. A doctor of law and specialist in Oriental philosophy, at one time he taught at the Military Staff College⁵⁹ and worked for the general Staff Office as a German-Japanese translator.⁶⁰ He founded numerous rightists societies such as the Yusei Sha 義経会 (Society of Those Who Yet Remain, 1921), Kochi Sha 行動会 (Activist Society, 1932).⁶¹ He systematized expansionist philosophy and clothed it with the garb of mysticism. He maintained that Japan, the first created state, was given a divine mission to rule the world with the Empire's founding principle called Hakko Ichiu. In the inevitable war between the East and the West, the nations of Asia must be led by Japan which he advocated, must occupy Manchuria in order to absorb China later. Thereafter, Japan would assume leadership of the people of Asia, and eliminate the domination of the white race.⁶²

In Fukko Ajia no Sho-mondai 復興アジアの諸問題 (Various Problems in Reviving Asia), he recommended that Asia be revived by the noble Buddhistic ideals of Japan.

⁵⁹Yamamoto, op. cit., p. 63.

⁶⁰CAJMPA, INT 67, Various Problems in Reviving Asia (Fukko Ajia no Sho-mondai), July 30, 1922. (IPS Doc. no. 689). Reel WT18, p. 1.

⁶¹Morris, op. cit., p. 448, and Yamamoto, op. cit., pp. 80-92.

⁶²IMTFE, Judgment, I, pp. 86-90.

The people of New Japan must succeed to this fundamental aspiration, and take up a solemn and grand responsibility. And leadership of Asia, unification of Asia, is the only way to make the noble cause of justice prevail throughout the world. This is for the sake of Japan for the sake of Asia, and for the sake of all humanity. Dome, all Asia, strengthen Japan, and cooperate with Japan to realize the revival of Asia. This is my prayer night and day. But Japan of today by no means comes up to the noble ideals of Buddhism.⁶³

Some of the Asiatic races had splendid cultures when the Europeans were barbarians but the former lay prostrate before the latter for 300 years. He maintained that Japan, by defeating a "big" European country in the Russo-Japanese War, ~~awoke~~ Asiatic races including Turkey, India, Afghanistan and Persia⁶⁴ to their own strength. Even the aborigines of Java, "who are as gentle as sheep, have come to advocate the 'League of Yellow Races',"⁶⁵ he noted.

While Japan's sharp rise in her world prestige and her leadership in Asian nationalism had helped the cause of Japan's pan-Asian nationalists as well as the expansionist militarists, it soon aroused suspicion and resistance on the part of Asian nationalists as well as Western powers.

Shortly after the first World War the Japanese population reached sixty million, more than double the figure at the early Meiji era, while Japan moved into the ranks of

⁶³Okawa, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 24-28.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 16.

Industrial societies. This meant an abundance of cheap labor with greater emphasis on foreign trade and foreign lands. Hence, "increasing talk of Lebensraum was inevitable."⁶⁵

As the postwar era began, however, the influence of Western liberalism was strongly felt in Japanese intellectual circles, reflecting in the moderated foreign policy of Kijuro Shidehara, who wanted to avoid a "get tough" policy in China. Yet the relatively cautious tradition of Japanese foreign policy changed in the 1930 with the collapse of the "liberal era." The immediate reason seems to be the decision of the militarists to enforce the cautious government not to back down in spite of Western opposition to Japan's demands in East Asia. But the underlying basis of such changes seems to imply long ideological preparation provided by such expansionists as Kita Ikki and Okawa Shumei. This new "ideological dynamite" was covered up with new "scientific arguments" in the best "geopolitical" terminology.

⁶⁵Scalapino, op. cit., p. 233.

CHAPTER III

DEVELOPMENT OF GEOPOLITICAL SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN JAPAN

In 1930's and early 1940's "geopolitics" was a nomenclature which was widely used by the intelligentsia and journalists of Japan. Reportedly, even an elementary school teacher would have felt inadequate- if not antiquated- unless he had had a book or journal entitled "geopolitics" on his desk. This was also the period when Japanese intellectual circles showed enthusiasm for anything German.¹

I. INTELLECTUAL CLIMATE

To understand the development of geopolitics in Japan, it seems necessary to describe briefly the climate in which the study of geopolitics was carried out.

The accepted statement of the principles underlying

¹Hikari Watanabe, "Chiseigaku no Naiyo ni tsuite" (On the Contents of Geopolitics), Chirigaku Kenkyu (Geographical Research), Vol. I, No. 10 (October, 1942), p. 1169.

Prevalence of geopolitics in Japan can be illustrated by the following conversation between a geography professor and the guest he met on his voyage. After exchanging name-cards, "what is your special field?" asked the guest. When the professor answered, "in the field of geography," the guest continued "oh yes, in other words, the so-called 'geopolitics' which is popular these days?" See Ibid.

the educational system of Japan can be found in the "Imperial Rescript on Education," issued by the Emperor Meiji in 1890, a part of which says:

Always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should any emergency arise offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of our Imperial Throne, coeval with heaven and earth.²

"Confucian," militaristic and nationalistic emphasis on education developed from such statements. The doctrine of political absolutism was always surrounded with the sanction of State Shinto, which was traditionally a strong element of Japanese nationalism. The government therefore saw to it that scientific investigation of Japan's past history did not cast doubt on the Shinto mythology.³

At the time when the scholars in the West were freely applying the new modern scientific method, their Japanese counterparts were facing more and more intense censorship and control by the government.⁴ As set forth in the edu-

²General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Power, Civil Information & Education Section, Education Division, Education in Japan, February 15, 1946, pp. 6-7, also in its Appendix II, p. 111.

³Ibid., p. 31; John M. Maki, Japanese Nationalism in Transition (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), p. 16.

⁴Maki, loc. cit.; The Bureau of Educational Reform was established 21 July 1937. The Bureau had two divisions, a section of planning, and a section of guidance and direction. The planning section was responsible for the guidance and control of student thought. It was the vehicle of ultra-nationalism and the tool of the militaristic clique. The

cation laws, the Textbook Bureau in the Ministry of Education compiled and sanctioned all textbooks and teachers' manuals except those at the university level. Instructions were far more detailed on objectives and procedures for teaching courses in social sciences such as history and geography and also morals (Shushin).⁵ "Consciousness of the divine mission of Japan in Asia and in the world," and "admiration of... the military arts" were much emphasized themes in the Japanese books in social sciences.⁶

Immediately following V-J Day, the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers permitted the use of social science textbooks after deletion of those parts which disseminated the ideology of militaristic nationalism.⁷ However, upon careful examination of the official textbooks used in the courses of Morals, Japanese History and Geography, SCAP's Education Division ascertained that

Militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology was so inextricably interwoven with acceptable material that its deletion was not practical. This

guidance and direction section was responsible for supervising misguided students until their thoughts were no longer considered dangerous. It was a tool of the secret police; General Headquarters SCAP, op. cit., p. 38.

⁵Ibid., p. 32.

⁶Ibid., p. 8.

⁷Sekai Daihyakka Jitan (World Great Encyclopedia) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1957), XIX, 443. For a brief history of geographical education in Japan, see this book pp. 443 ff., and see also Nobuyuki Iimoto, "A General Idea of So-called Geopolitics," Review of Geography, Chirigaku Kyoron, v, 4-a (January, 1928), p. 77.

led to the issuance on 31 December 1945 of another directive to the Imperial Japanese Government, AG 000,8 (31 Dec. '45) CIE, directing that all courses in Morals, Japanese History, and Geography for which textbooks had been published or sanctioned by the Ministry of Education, be suspended.⁸

The system of requiring pre-war teachers to take a license examination conducted by the government had produced a tendency on the part of examinees to conform to the conventional answers or formula as expected by the system. This system tended to undermine the spirit of healthy skepticism or inquiry which is a sine qua non for the growth of scholarship. Thus, "learning" was degenerating to the form of routine exercises.⁹

Such was the environment in which the knowledge of social sciences were disseminated in Japan during 1930's and 1940's. Nevertheless, the senior scholars remained more than stooges of the government since they were frequently consulted by the latter. The Japanese military government had often sought after the wisdom of the outstanding scholars.¹⁰

⁸General Headquarters SCAP, op. cit., pp. 71-72.

⁹Koji Ihizuka, Chirigaku hihan- Shakaigaku no ichi-bumon to shiten chirigaku (Criticism on Geography- Geography as a branch of social sciences.) (Tokyo: Teikoku shoin, 1948), preface p. 3.

¹⁰In fact the Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who first used publicly the term the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, seemed to acknowledge his debt to them when he remarked to von Ribbentrop that the intellectuals of Japan "still exercised considerable influence." See Edmond A. Walsh, Total War: A Footnote to History (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1945), p. 42.

II. GEOPOLITICAL STUDY IN JAPAN

A Brief History. Importation of German geopolitik to Japan began more than a dozen years before the formal proclamation of the New Order in East Asia. As soon as the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik began its publication in 1924 it was imported to Japan and received the attention of a group of scholars, especially of geographers¹¹ and some political scientists.

In 1928, Professor Iimoto wrote an article on "A General Idea of so-called Geopolitics."¹² In 1930, Professor Ishibashi made an effort to explain geopolitics by distinguishing it from political geography¹³ which had been introduced in Japan a few decades earlier.¹⁴ Among the themes dealt with in the field of geopolitics, Kjellen's organic theory of State and nationalistic arguments in

¹¹Saneshige Komaki, Nihon Chiseigaku gakusho (A Memorandum of Japanese Geopolitics) (Osaka: Akidaya, 1944), p. 49.

¹²Nobuyuki Iimoto, "A General Idea of So-called Geopolitics." Review of Geography (Chirigaku Hyoron), Vol. 4-a (January, 1928), pp. 76-99.

¹³Goro Ishibashi, "Seiji-chirigaku to Chiseigaku" (Political Geography and Geopolitics), Chigaku Zasshi (Journal of Geography), Vol. XLII, No. 500 (October, 1930).

¹⁴Sekai Daihyakka Jitan (World Great Encyclopedia) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1957), XIX, 443.

German geopolitics were the object of criticism as well as of interest on the part of Japanese scholars.¹⁵

Following the Manchurian crisis, the academic and intellectual circles in Japan were showing increasing interest in the study of geopolitics and even popular magazines began to carry articles on the subject.¹⁶ According to Professor Watanabe, Japan emerged after 1931 as a vanguard nation in leading the struggle against the "extremely irrational status quo of the world," similar to the case of "patriotic" Germans who struggled to recover from the ruins of war.¹⁷ Hence, the new policy of Japan was in demand of some theoretical basis. Since this was the time when the Nazi party was gaining and consolidating power, the geopolitics which was considered to have become a logical basis of the Nazi principle naturally became a center of interest on the part of Japanese officials and political leaders.¹⁸

¹⁵Hikari Watanabe, "Chiseigaku no Naiyo ni tsuite" (On the Contents of Geopolitics), Chirigaku Kenkyu (Geographical Research), Vol. I, No. 10 (October, 1942), p. 1176; R. Kjellen's Der Staat als Lebensform (1917) 4 Aufl., Berlin 1924, was translated in Japanese by Professor Abe Shigoro in 1936.

¹⁶Professor Royama includes himself in the circle. See Masamichi Royama, Toa to Sekai- Shin jitsujō heno ronsaku (East Asia and World- Theoretical Guide to New Order) (Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1941), pp. 364-365.

¹⁷Iimoto, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

¹⁸Watanabe, loc. cit.

In the opinion of Professor Komaki, the popularity of German geopolitics among Japan's intelligentsia reached its peak after the China Incident, and they began to appreciate the practical value of German geopolitics more. Scholars were particularly attracted to the study of Haushofer, the dean of German geopolitics, who in focusing on Monsoon Asia and the Pacific Ocean used Japan as a model. Professor Haushofer's Geopolitik des Pazifischen had become a widely read book among Japanese intellectuals.¹⁹

However, in the evolution of contemporary geopolitics, Haushofer was preceded by Kjellen who, in turn, was preceded by Ratzel. Prior to his assignment to Japan, Haushofer had familiarized himself with theories advanced by Ratzel and Kjellen. Here lies the justification for introducing the views of the latter excluding pre-modern geopolitical writers.²⁰

¹⁹Komaki, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

²⁰If "geopolitics" is simply defined as a study of "earth-man" relationship, Greek philosophers such as Aristotle or Pythagoras can be included among pre-modern geopolitical writers as in the cases of Professors Kristof and Ishibashi. Kristof lists Aristotle and Bodin whereas Ishibashi lists Aristotle, Pythagoras, and Chinese practitioners of geomancy (feng-shui); see Ladis K. D. Kristof, "The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IV, No. 1 (March, 1960), pp. 17-18; and Goro Ishibashi "Seiji-chirigaku to Chiseigaku" (Political Geography and Geopolitics), Chigaku Zasshi (Journal of Geography), Vol. XLII, No. 500 (October, 1930), p. 611. It is true that Aristotle, as these two scholars argue, discussed the relationship of the natural environment to human character and also to the economic and military necessities of his ideal state, but most of the geopoliticians have rejected

Frederick Ratzel (1844-1904).²¹ Ratzel, a geographer at the universities of Munich and Leipzig published in 1897 Politische Geographie, the first systematic and thorough survey of political geography. In this work Ratzel "restated much of the theory of geography in the light of the evolutionary" view and metaphorically compared the state to an organism.²² Without indicating a limit to the process, he considered territorial expansion as a reward created by the cultural development of a nation.²³ Thus, Ratzel contributed much toward utilization of pure geographical knowledge for the political purposes of imperial governments.²⁴

as so much rubbish Aristotle's concept of the "political animal" striving as a social and moral being. See Herman Beukema, "Geopolitics," The Encyclopedia Americana, XII (1962), 472e.

In a series of lectures delivered at the University of Konigsberg, Immanuel Kant delineated parts of geography by terming one such part "political geography." G. E. Percy, R. H. Fiffeld and Associates, World Political Geography (New York: Thomas Y. Crowelle Co., 1945), p. 22.

But such pre-modern writers are excluded from this study since the Japanese expressed only a casual interest in them.

²¹He was a teacher of Ellen C. Semple, and American geographer and was a friend of Max Haushofer, the father of Karl Haushofer; Percy, op. cit., p. 24.

²²Derwent Whittlesay and Hans W. Weigert, "Geopolitics," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. X (1962 edition), p. 182F.

²³Ihizuka, op. cit., p. 180; Beukema, loc. cit.

²⁴But the first stage of the corruption of geography was started by Karl Ritter, according to Edmund A. Walsh, Total War: A Footnote to History (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1948), p. 39; cf. Karl Ritter, Geographical Studies, trans. William Leonard Gage (Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1862), p. 57 ff.

Ratzel is credited with conceiving the term "Lebensraum" at the beginning of the twentieth century. To one Japanese geographer, the geopolitics of the 1920's and 1930's was merely a branch of Ratzel's political geography.²⁵ Ratzel pictured Germany as a state nearly suffocating within boundaries delimited by foreign powers,²⁶ but a Japanese geopolitician would not accept Ratzel's view on the geographical location of Germany.²⁷

It appears that since the turn of the century a number of Japanese geographers became informed of evolvement of political geography. They had noticed that in 1882 Ratzel entitled his first volume "Anthropo-Geographie" and that Jean Brunhes (1869-1930) used the term "Geographie Humaine."²⁸ In 1930 Ratzel's Das Meer als Quelle der Völkergrösse was translated into Japanese. Ichikawa states in the translators' preface that "Ratzel clarifies the geographical foundation of maritime power in his book. To us, a seafaring nation of Asia, it helps us to realize how immense an impact the ocean bears upon the rise and fall of a nation-state."²⁹

²⁵See Ishibashi, op. cit., pp. 611-612.

²⁶Beukema, loc. cit.

²⁷Chiri: Kokudo kokusei hen (Geography: On National Soil and National Strength) (Tokyo: The Secondary School Text Publishing Co., 1944), pp. 4-5; Ihizuka, loc. cit.

²⁸Ihizuka, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

²⁹Friedrich Ratzel, Zweite verbesserte Auflage, besorgt von Hans Helmolt, Das Meer als Quelle der Völker-

Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922). "Geopolitik" was first coined by this Swedish political scientist, a professor at the universities of Goteborg and Uppsala. Deploing the political scientists' legalistic view of the state as primarily a creation of law, Kjellen set out to "endow the legal skeleton with socio-geographic flesh and blood."³⁰ He proposed five coordinate aspects of a theoretical system of government on the following order of importance for the purpose of study:³¹

<u>Geopolitik</u>	- geography and the state
<u>Demopolitik</u>	- population and the state
<u>Oekopolitik</u>	- economic resources of the state
<u>Sociopolitik</u>	- social structure of the state
<u>Kratopolitik</u>	- government of the state

It is significant to note that he put Geopolitik first, although it had previously been assigned in last place, and Kratopolitik last instead of in first place.³²

In 1928 Dr. Ogawa, a noted Japanese political scientist, admirably introduced Kjellen's theory as follows:

grösse: Eine politische-geographische Studie, München und Berlin, 1911, trans. by Seichi Ichikawa as Ratzel Kaiyoron: Shokokumin Hatten no Gensen to shiteno Umi (Tokyo: Kokin Shoin, 1930), trans' preface, pp. 2-3.

³⁰ Edmund A. Walsh, "Geopolitics and International Morals," in Compass of the World: A Symposium on Political Geography, ed. Hans W. Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1944), p. 16.

³¹ Whittlesay, loc. cit. and Percy, op. cit., p. 25.

³² Walsh, loc. cit.

The left-wing of political science is Geopolitik, not geography, and its object is reich,³³ not land... the right-wing is not study of the national law or constitutional history but Verfassungs-Verwaltungs-politik.³⁴ In the center is... a nation which is to be dealt by Ethnopolitik, not ethnology. This (Ethnopolitik) and Geopolitik... discussing a nation's economy is Wirtschaftspolitik, not national economics. Between (Ethnopolitik) and the other wing (Ver-³⁵fassungs-Verwaltungspolitik) stands Sozialpolitik...

In the scope of political science which Kjellen attempted to delimit, continues Ogawa, Geopolitik and Ethnopolitik are new. Since these two areas show most clearly the biological characteristic of a state, they should be called "Natureseite" peculiar to the state. While the other three, "Oeko, Socio and Krato," can be called "Kultureseite" which expresses the will of the state. In the opinion of Ogawa, Kjellen insisted that one area of political science must be focused on his so-called "Natureseite."³⁶

Kjellen enlarged Ratzel's organic theory of a state

³³"Reich" is referred to as "das von politischen organisation durchdrungene Land": Koji Ihizuka, "Geopolitik no Kihonteki Seikaku- 3 (Basic Character of Geopolitics, part III)," Keizaigaku Ronshu (Collected Essays of Economics), Vol. XIII, No. 5 (May 1, 1943), p. 487.

³⁴This is referred to by Haushofer and associates as "Herrschaftspolitik (Kraftpolitik)," Rudolf Kjellen, Der Staat als Lebensform (Berlin, 1924), p. 130 quoted in Karl Haushofer, Erich Obst, Herman Lautensach and Otto Maull, Bausteine zur (Berlin, 1928), Chapt. I: trans. Tamagi Hajime (Tokyo: Kagakushugi Kogyosha, 1941), p. 6.

³⁵Takuji Ogawa, "Seijigakusha no Kantaru Kokka (State from the Viewpoint of Political Scientist), Part II," Chikyu (The Globe), Vol. IX, No. 6 (June 1, 1928), p. 401.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 401-402.

and his idea of Lebensraum, both of which are logically associated with each other. Like Ratzel, Kjellen believed that a state is a living form and is therefore subject to the "laws of growth."³⁷

To another Japanese admirer of Kjellen, organic disposition of a state is explained in Die Grossmächte der Gegenwart and Der Staat als Lebensform. "A State, almost like a living individual...speaks, negotiates, or cooperates, or fights, or hates or sympathizes." This view was regarded by the Japanese in 1930 as "an advanced opinion heretofore expressed in political science."³⁸ In the words of Professors Weigert and Whittlesay, the "biological qualities" in the Kjellen's organismic theory are definitely not metaphoric, implying that Kjellen assumed that a state has powers "superior to the human groups or individuals who constitute it."³⁹

However, Kjellen's use of an organic theory vocabulary was regarded by Professor Kristof as metaphoric and "quasi-organic" because, in his view, Kjellen regarded individuals

³⁷Saneshige Komaki, Nihon Chiseigaku Gakusho (A Memorandum of Japanese Geopolitics) (Osaka: Ahidaya, 1944), pp. 44-46.

³⁸Ishibashi, op. cit., pp. 612-613.

³⁹Whittlesay, loc. cit.

and nations as being more important than the state.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, this was not the way Japanese scholars interpreted Kjellen. Dr. Ogawa, in fact, deduced from the works of Kjellen that "a state is the most magnificent living form among (all) the 'Form des Lebens' on earth...and is an object of study that may be called 'Biopolitical'."⁴¹ In the opinion of Professor Ihizuka, Kjellen's organic theory of state was a "splendid combination of totalitarian theory of state and thought system of geographic determinism."⁴²

Kjellen's theory of a living state coincided with much of the traditional political thinking in Japan,⁴³ such as totalitarian and "family" theory of state in which an individual is a part subordinated always to the whole of

⁴⁰Kristof, op. cit., pp. 22-23. From Rudolf Kjellen, Der Staat als Lebensform, trans. M. Langfeldt (Leipzig: S. S. Hirzel Verlag, 1917). Kristof quotes such statement as "the life of the state is, ultimately, in the hands of the individuals" (pp. 218-220), and the power of the state to seek the national welfare...ought to be circumscribed "where the individual has a goal proper to his personality (personlichkeitszweck)," pp. 228-232.

⁴¹Ogawa, op. cit., pp. 399-400.

⁴²Koji Ihizuka, "Geopolitik no Kihonteki Seikaku (1)" (Basic Character of Geopolitics, Part I), Keizaigaku Ronshu (Collected Essays of Economic), Vol. XII, No. 8 (August 1, 1942), p. 536.

⁴³In Germany this view was coincided with those expressed by such pre-Darwin philosophers as Johann Fichte, George Hegel and Friedrich von Schlegel: Whittlesay, loc. cit.

the state. Kjellen's clothing "geopolitics" with the vocabulary of fashionable evolutionary natural science seemed to have been an added attraction to the Japanese geopoliticians who were seeking "scientific" arguments for their policy of expansion.

The pro-German Swedish professor's contribution toward the development of geopolitical concepts went beyond the idea of Lebensraum or organic theory. He introduced the "Volk" idea,⁴⁴ made power instead of law the most important attribute of the state,⁴⁵ and enunciated a formula of Autarkie⁴⁶ for the German empire to the imperialistic ambition of which Kjellen gave his blessings through his works. This idea of Autarkie, according Professor Beukema, was a "preview of the closed state economy eventually set up"⁴⁷ by the Nazis in Europe and by the Japanese in Asia in the name of the "New Order."

Karl Haushofer's View of Japan. Haushofer was deeply impressed by Japan during his stay there (1908-1910) officially as an artillery instructor to the Japanese army⁴⁸ but

⁴⁴ Komaki, loc. cit.

⁴⁵ Edvard Thermanius, "Geopolitics and Political Geography," Baltic and Scandinavian Countries, IV (May, 1938), p. 166.

⁴⁶ Beukema, op. cit., pp. 472e-472f.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ The New Funk & Wagnalls Encyclopedia (New York: Univorm Publishers, Inc., 1951), XVIII, 6379.

actually as a military observer for the German General Staff.⁴⁹ Since he made the Pacific area the center of his research, German geopolitik turned to the Far East while Japanese geopolitics naturally turned to Germany and were therefore influenced by German concepts.

Haushofer's doctoral thesis in 1911 dealt with the geographic basis of Japan's military power. In 1913 he published Dai Nihon: Betrachtungen uber Gross-Japans Wehrkraft, Weltstellung und Zukunft (Great Nippon: Greater Japan's Military Power, World Role, and Future).⁵⁰ After his retirement from the army in 1919, he devoted himself to compounding and developing geopolitics. In addition to the Geopolitics of Pacific Ocean he wrote eight books on Japan between 1913 and 1941,⁵¹ in addition to works covering the

⁴⁹Koji Ihizuka, Chirigaku Nihon- Shakaigaku no Ichihumon (Criticism on Geography- Geography as a branch of Social sciences) (Tokyo: Teikoku shoin, 1948), p. 137; G. E. Percy, R. H. Fifiield and Associates, World Political Geography (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1948), p. 27.

⁵⁰Published in 1913 in Berlin by E. S. Mittler & Sohn.

⁵¹In the order of date of publication they are: Karl Haushofer, Dai Nihon: Betrachtungen uber Gross- Japans wehrkraft, weltstellung und zukunft (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1913); _____, Das Japanische reich in seiner geographischen entwicklung (Wien: L. W. Seidel & Sohn, 1921); _____, Japan und die Japaner: eine landes-und volkaskunde (Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1923); _____, Japan reichserneuerung: strukturwandlungen von der jei-ji-ara bis heute (Berlin: W. de Gruyter & Co., 1930); _____, Japan und die Japaner: eine landes-und volkaskunde (Leipzig und Berling: B. G. Teubner, 1933); _____, Japans werdegang als weltmacht und empire (Berlin: W. de Gruyter & Co., 1933); _____, Alt-Japan, werdegang von der urzeit bis zur grossmachtschwelle (1868-Meiji) (Berling, Leipzig: W. De Gruyter & Co., 1935); _____, Japan baut sein reich (Berlin: Zeitgeschichteverlag, 1941).

"Indo-Pacific space" or the "Eastern questions" in every issue of the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik.⁵²

Over a decade after he saw in Japan the forceful annexation of Korea and later the gradual penetration into Manchuria, this master geopolitician heaped the highest praise on Japan as a model of "geopolitical instinct" which German should examine. The Japanese "geographical instinct" were illustrated as follows: (1) the Japanese consciousness of "any danger that threatened its (their) national existence," and their unrivalled "space sense," or "geopolitical realization of imperial growth; (2) the propaganda skill of the Japanese government in successfully rousing the Japanese "geopolitical instinct" by picturing the country as lacking enough space to feed an exploding population and being on the verge of suffocation because it was surrounded by the world's mightiest powers, and (3) when the people rallied for new territories, the Japanese government secretly pursued its conquest of space according to the rules of "jiujitsu," in which a "step back gains distance from which to watch the opponent until a wrong move supplies the opportunity to

⁵²Derwent Whittlesay and Hans W. Weigert, "Geopolitics," Encyclopedia Britannica, X (1962 ed.), 1821; and Felix Martin Wassermann, "Haushofer and German Geopolitics: A Tragic Experiment in Power Politics and Education," Education, Vol. 72, No. 6 (February, 1952), p. 365.

knock him out."⁵³ It was by the use of the geopolitical rule of jijutsu that Japan was able to almost double her territory without much opposition, while the Reich lacking geopolitical instinct had picked up a "few more or less valueless colonial morsels with practically everyone objecting."⁵⁴ Haushofer expressed his confidence in Japan's continued success in expansion as long as Japan keeps her jijutsu fashion and avoided the dangers of "unbridled expansion."⁵⁵

Haushofer knew, however, that in terms of accurate economic terms there was little truth in Japanese claims for Lebensraum on the ground of overpopulation; because his own computations were in agreement with the view of Commerce Minister Oura that "Old Japan could feed approximately another 25 millions (over their then 66 millions), while Korea still has room for an additional 14 million."⁵⁶ This would make Japan's Lebensraum, as of 1914, capable of spacing for as much as 105 millions. Thus, it was apparent that Japan's expansion drive was dictated more by imperialistic ambitions than by space necessity, but to Haushofer

⁵³Karl Haushofer, Das Japanische reich in seiner geographischen (Wien: L. W. Seidel & Sohn, 1921), pp. 1-5, 67-74 in Andreas Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1942), pp. 9-10, 29-30, 36-37.

⁵⁴Dorpalen, op. cit., p. 8.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 36.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 34; Haushofer, op. cit., p. 64.

such a drive grew out of concern for the distant future, that is, "a space farsightedness rare in political life."⁵⁷

Die Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans: Studien uber die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Geographie und Geschichte (Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean: Studies on the Relationship between geography and history) was first published in 1924, and was Haushofer's first thorough application of geopolitical theories to the problems of Japan and the Pacific Ocean.⁵⁸ Among his geopolitical publications it was not only the most important book but also the most widely quoted and read by the Japanese. Here, he urged Germany's closer contact with the Pacific, especially with Japan, as there would be no conflict of vital interests between Germany and Japan after Germany's loss of her foothold in the Pacific. Therefore, he said that Germany could subscribe to Japan's leadership in the "Asia for the Asiatics" movement on the ground of a "symbiosis of cultural politics."⁵⁹ Haushofer attempted to justify his theme of

⁵⁷Dorpaleu, op. cit., p. 35. Haushofer lists the prevalence of party "short-sightedness" which is "an attribute of a narrow European space conception. The limitation of empire aims to really attainable goals is sufficiently enforced by outside pressure. There is no need for domestic brakes." from Dorpalen, op. cit., p. 33.

⁵⁸Herman Beukema, "Geopolitics," The Encyclopedia Americana, XII (1962), 472g.

⁵⁹Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans: Studien uber die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Geographie und Geschichte (1924), p. 162 in Weigert, op. cit., p. 736; and also Weigert, Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 172.

German-Japanese cooperation on ethical grounds by picturing both nations as "oppressed" people who seek to destroy the "oppressive" status quo. One way for Germany to hold "the strategic lines of a future geopolitics of the Pacific" was, Haushofer repeated, to help liberate "the cultured colored races which will rise against our oppressors" like France which he termed "the uncultured colored people of a half-African power."⁶⁰

Much of his philosophy regarding the Pacific stemmed from the combination of Japanophilism and geopolitics. In the opinion of Haushofer, the feeling of brotherhood dominates the "Asiatic national philosophies" while "the national philosophies of Rome and the Mediterranean areas" are dominated by the feeling of class warfare.⁶¹ It is argued that the Oriental family system, based on more instinct than the Western counterpart, recognizes the "necessity of allegiance" and "leadership of political and military affairs." Buddhism, which originated in India, was regarded as being

⁶⁰ Haushofer, op. cit., p. 242 in Hans W. Weigert, "Haushofer and the Pacific" (Review Article on Geopolitik Des Pazifischen Ozeans by Karl Haushofer, 1924), Foreign Affairs, October, 1941, p. 737; also in Dorpalen, op. cit., p. 165. On other occasion, Haushofer terms the Anglo Saxon powers as "our own race" that have expelled Germans from their midst and thus forced them to "scout for such companions of disaster in the 900 million Southeast Asiatics.": Hans W. Weigert, Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 172.

⁶¹ Karl Haushofer, Nihon (Japan), trans. Norio Sasaki (Tokyo: Dai-ichi-shobo, 1943), p. 18.

more tolerant than Christianity and Judaism.⁶² After comparing the Western system with the Oriental system in favor of the latter, Haushofer eulogized Shintoism in geopolitical terms:

Among what should be observed in connection with geopolitics such as national imaginary power, artistic impulse, and cultural geography, Shintoism, the spiritual force arising in the Pacific, is geopolitically the most firm thing of life. Shintoism has absorbed and assimilated Buddhism, Chinese national philosophy, and Western culture... Yet without losing the characteristics of the Pacific.⁶³

So strong was Haushofer's affection for the things Japanese that he termed them "this noble race" or even "the Nordic Japanese."⁶⁴ With Japan a "kind of revolutionary nemesis"⁶⁵ in the Far East, he felt, the East could exercise a "punishing justice" to the "merciless economic and political enemies and oppressors" in Asia.⁶⁶ He also argued that Japan, until she was taught by America and the West how "to secure its living-space by defensive strokes," was for

⁶²Ibid., p. 16.

⁶³Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans (1938), trans. Taiheiyo Kyodai as Taiheiyo chiseigaku (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1942), p. 445.

⁶⁴Hans W. Weigert, Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 179.

⁶⁵Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik des Pazifischen ozeans: studien uber die wechselbeziehungen zwischen geographie und geschichte (1924) in Edmond A. Walsh, Total War: A Footnote to History (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1948), pp. 8-9.

⁶⁶Edmond A. Walsh, "The Mystery of Haushofer," Life, September 16, 1946, p. 114.

two and a half centuries a peaceful, non-militaristic country.⁶⁷ Haushofer appeared to have won many a German's ear to his argument that an alliance with Japan would disperse the efforts of Germany's opponents, but he seemed to have stood alone in his Japanophilistic arguments.⁶⁸

Haushofer's philosophy of pan-Asiatic regionalism was expressed in his proposal for the formation of a Japan-China-India League with Japan as its leader. This bloc was to include other small countries of the Far East, extending roughly from the valley of the Indus to that of the Amur. He pointed out that such a bloc formation is favored by geographical and cultural conditions, such as (1) "the physical uniformity" in that all these countries belong to the monsoon belt and also "in the tilling of the soil, with rice and tea the most important agricultural products, and (2) "definite resemblance" on the social and spiritual life of this part of the world in that "the concept of life, the relationship between the young and the old, and between individual and community, family structure, and guilds are similar." On this basis, the Pacific geopolitician concluded, Japan, China, and India could form a political bloc of compact

⁶⁷ Hans W. Weigert, "Haushofer and the Pacific," (Review Article on Geopolitik Des Pazifischen Ozeans by Karl Haushofer, 1924), Foreign Affairs, October, 1941, p. 739.

⁶⁸ Herman Beukema, "Geopolitics," The Encyclopedia Americana, XII (1962), 472h.

solidarity.⁶⁹ Against the will of China and India, Haushofer felt, Japan could never expect to obtain the undisputed leadership over East Asia.⁷⁰

Beginning with her invasion of Manchuria in 1931, however, Japan abandoned the care with which she had previously received international acquiescence in her expansionist activities and which Haushofer extolled as Japanese geopolitical instinct, and pursued a policy of "unbridled expansion" against which he had warned.⁷¹ Not only did the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo turn China into a bitter foe of Japan, but it also embittered India, the Philippines, and the Netherland Indies⁷² in which Japan would want to replace European guardianship with Japanese in the name of an Asian bloc. Knowing that the Japanese thrust into Manchuria jeopardized his hopes for Eastern solidity, the General nevertheless defended the invader

⁶⁹ Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik, XVI (1939), 572; XVII (1940), 49 in Dorpalen, op. cit., pp. 165-166.

⁷⁰ Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik, X (1933), 360-361; XIV (1937), 43-44; XV (1938), 743; Weltpolitik, p. 159; Geopolitik der Pan-Indeen, p. 52; Gustav Fochler-Hauke, "Grundlagen und Entwicklung des Vormachtkampfes in Ostasien," Ibid., XII (1935), p. 154 in Dorpalen, op. cit., p. 167.

⁷¹ Cf. Hilary Conroy, "Government Versus 'Patriot': The Background of Japan's Asiatic Expansion," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. XX, No. 1 (February, 1951), p. 31ff.

⁷² Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik, XIV (1937), 1026 in Andreas Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1942), pp. 166-167.

without dismay by pointing out that Japan was protecting her interests in a region where the Chinese were evidently unable to maintain order.⁷³

Haushofer was afraid, however, that China's disunity might tempt Japan into pushing deeper in China and thereby forever doom Sino-Japanese cooperation.⁷⁴ And when Japan attacked China anew in July 1937, the voluble General ignored the renewed hostilities in his August survey, and almost evaded the issue in his September report. But when he wrote his next report, he was "hard put to explain Japan's aggression."⁷⁵ He stated:

Since the Chinese had refused to come to terms with Tokyo, Japan had to take stronger measures to enforce her desire for peace in the Far East. All she wanted, after all, was to obtain China's cooperation against any outside interference. In working towards this objective, she merely responded to the wishes of Sun Yat-sen who had always hoped for a close collaboration of the old-culture powers of Asia. The use of force was regrettable, but seemed to be the only policy which China would understand.⁷⁶

However, in early 1938 Haushofer urged that Japan recognize a vast and deep space of China and expand into a

⁷³Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, VIII (1931), 868-869 in Dorpalen, loc. cit.

⁷⁴Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, XIII (1936), 466, XIV (1937), 1033 from Dorpalen, op. cit., p. 168.

⁷⁵Dorpalen, op. cit., pp. 168-169.

⁷⁶Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, XIV (1937), 847-853 in Dorpalen, loc. cit.

sphere of least resistance, namely, "going South into the warm seas."⁷⁷ His associate, Wolf Schenke, in his article entitled "Space as a Weapon" in the Zeitschrift,⁷⁸ suggested in 1938 that Japan would do well to make peace with China as "space would permit China to survive." Schenke pointed out that Japan should have realized that a "war against such a large-space country could be won only by the quickest possible annihilation of the opposing forces."⁷⁹ Instead, the Japanese made the mistake of employing small forces at the beginning and failed to keep after the Chinese forces until they were completely annihilated. Meanwhile, the Chinese quite naturally saw "their only chance in a strategy of attrition."⁸⁰

The Munich school under Haushofer had long labored to guide Japan toward friendship not only with China and India but also with Russia. It was Haushofer's geopolitical view that a "German-Russian-Japanese transcontinental alliance"⁸¹ was destined to doom the sea-powers and its empires. Basing his ideas on the view expressed by Sir

⁷⁷Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik, XV (1938), 42 in Dorpalen, loc. cit.

⁷⁸Wolf Schenke, "Der Raum als Waffe," Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik, XV (1938), 705ff.

⁷⁹Dorpalen, op. cit., pp. 301-302.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 302.

⁸¹Ibid. Halford Mackinder. "The Geographical Pivot of History," Geographical Journal, April, 1904.

Halford Mackinder as early as 1904,⁸² Haushofer concluded that Japan must reconcile her aims with those of Russia as well as Germany. He had warned that both Germany and Japan should never allow their ideological conflicts with Russia to endanger the geopolitical foundations of their adjustable spaces. "Japan and Germany were two stations of the inner line, but between these stations was Russia," to which, together with the Asiatic continent, "will belong the geopolitical future."⁸³

Since Japan's collaboration with a Russo-Chinese bloc would secure Japan's back from continental attack, Haushofer argued, Japan could easily start her crusade for an empire in the South Seas. Referring to the establishment of Japanese towns in the coast of Korea, Formosa, Ryukyu, Java, and Bonin between 1910 and 1920,⁸⁴ he liked to point out that the Japanese were born to sea-faring and destined to expand in the Pacific. According to Edmond Walsh, Haushofer subtly drew Japan's attention to Australia as a means to relieve her population pressure.

⁸²Mackinder, loc.cit.

⁸³Hans W. Weigert, "Haushofer and the Pacific" (Review article on *Geopolitik Des Pazifischen Ozeans* by Karl Haushofer 1924), Foreign Affairs, October, 1941, pp. 740-741.

⁸⁴Karl Haushofer, *Geopolitik Des Pazifischen Ozeans* (1936), trans. by Taiheiyo Kyokai as *Taiheiyo chiseigaku* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1942), pp. 146-147.

But it should not be forgotten that the tropical north and northeast of Australia today give shelter to only a few thousand white men although they could offer homesteads for thirty million people. Heat and humidity make these spaces unfit for large-scale colonization by the white races; the climate is more suitable for the Japanese.⁸⁵

It was even argued that Japan's territorial acquisitions of Korea, Sakhalin, and Manchuria had proved unacceptable to her subjects because of the too rough climate. Yet the northward expansion was carried out because it proved to be the easiest. The might of the Anglo-American navies kept Japan from advancing southward even though her real objectives lay there. Since the difficulties presented by the South Seas were lesser, and "only there the Japanese peasant could find climate and soil to his liking," Japan was therefore urged to move southward to the Philippines, the Malay Peninsula, the Netherland Indies, and above all, to sparsely populated Australia and New Zealand.⁸⁶

Haushofer's Influence in Japan. After having discussed Haushofer's eulogy on the role of Japan in the world, it is of significance for this investigation to analyze the Japanese response to his teachings. Dr. Saneshige Komaki,

⁸⁵Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (1930), p. 961, in Edmond A. Walsh, Total War: A Footnote to History (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1945), see also Weigert, op. cit., p. 741.

⁸⁶Andreas Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1942), pp. 160-161.

a Japanese geopolitician who ideologically dissociates himself from German geopolitik liked to point out that Haushofer

...while in Japan, studied at Kyoto, the old capital and the heart of Japanese tradition, rather than at Europeanized cities such as Yokozuka, Kobe, etc. He reportedly stayed at the Kyoto temple located by the Imperial tomb where he received direct contact with Japanese spirit. Hence, in the thinking of Haushofer one can clearly notice the influence of Japanism far deeper than in other Euro-Americans.⁸⁷

Yet Professor Komaki gave a favorable review on one of Haushofer's works which explained the inevitability of the revival of East Asiatic races in the light of common, natural environment, history, economy and culture.⁸⁸

According to Professor Ihizuka, Haushofer's first book seemed to have touched the heart of sensitive Japanese. Published in 1913 when William II was fulminating against the "Yellow peril,"⁸⁹ the Dai Nihon was, indeed, a courageous adoration of Japan. In Dai Nihon, the author organized his opinion as an individual soldier in order to appeal to his fatherland. Of all Haushofer's publications, it is most worthy to read even today though its subtitle "Greater

⁸⁷The review was on Sudostasiens Weideraufstieg zur Selbstbestimmung (1923). See Saneshige Komaki, Nihon Chiseigaku Gakusho (A Memorandum of Japanese Geopolitics) (Osaka: Akidaya, 1944), pp. 42 and 51.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 43.

⁸⁹Koji Ihizuka, Chirigaku Hihan - Shakaigaku no ichibumon to shiten chirigaku (Criticism on Geography - Geography as a branch of social sciences) (Tokyo: Teikoku shoin, 1948), pp. 173-174.

Japan's Military Power, World Role, and Future" has become almost nonsense since V-J day. In the opinion of Ihizuka, this book would serve as one of the original materials in reconsidering the reality of Japan's so-called "modernization" and it can also be highly valued as a social reportage of yesterday's Japan.⁹⁰

The fact that Japan's political and social outlook showed many similarities with those of Prussia-Germany was demonstrated in the former's Meiji Constitution which was partly modeled after that of the latter. Hence Haushofer's teachings have gained a hearing in Japan as much as in Germany. It appears, however, that his advocacy on a "German-Japan alliance" received a wider audience in Japan than in race-conscious Germany.

In the opinion of Professor Weigert, the concept of the GEACPS was "the outcome of eager studies of the German geopolitics on the part of Japanese whose opinions had weight."⁹¹ In later years at the International Military Tribunal one of the Tojo's statements tended to support such a view; Tojo asserted that the Japan-Manchukuo-China economy was modeled not after colonialism but after Lebens-

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 174-175.

⁹¹ Hans W. Weigert, Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 177-178.

raum and bloc economy.⁹²

Some of the Japanese press, publications, and announcements of Japanese foreign policy bear evidence that Haushofer's theories had had effect upon the Japanese.

According to Professor Strausz-Hupe, Japanese generals, professors, and politicians have flocked to the Geopolitical Institute at Munich. Thus it was no surprise to him that "the Japanese press plagiarizes Haushofer's terminology and some of the official Japanese press release on Japan's 'New Order' in East Asia read like verbatim transcripts of Haushofer's writings."⁹³ Even if the view of Strausz-Hupe were to be discarded, there are evidences showing that some Japanese statesmen advocated during 1938-1939 an alliance with Germany with the purpose of attacking the colonial powers- Britain and France- on two fronts. This plan appears to be based on Haushofer's "sympiosis of cultural politics."⁹⁴

It is generally held that Haushofer's advice was instrumental in bringing about the rapprochement between Japan and Germany in 1936 and the Tokyo-Rome-Berlin Axis

⁹²Kondoshoten Shuppanbu (compiled), Sabakareru Seki no Rekishi (A History of Judged Century) (Tokyo: Kondo-shoten, 1950), pp. 97-98 and 244.

⁹³Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Geopolitics," Fortune, November 1941, p. 119.

⁹⁴Ernst L. Presseisen, Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933-1941 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), p. 23.

in 1940.⁹⁵ However, geopoliticians in Japan were less appreciative than those in Nazi Germany of Haushofer's attempts at a reconciliation of Germany and Japan with Communist Russia. In fact "the influence of Haushofer declined sharply in Japan," when the German-Russian non-aggression pact of 1939 was concluded and was hailed by Haushofer as a highpoint in geopolitical progress.⁹⁶ And, when the similar agreement was finally concluded between Japan and Russia on 13 April 1941, it appeared as though Haushofer had at last succeeded in persuading the Japanese to fulfill his policies.

In his elaborate book on geopolitics entitled, Theory of a Japan-Germany-Russia Continental Bloc: Its Geopolitical Consideration (Nichi-Doku-So Burokku ron: sono Chiseigakuteki Kosatsu),⁹⁷ Risaburo Asano reiterates a Haushofer's celebrated thesis that the Japan-Germany-Russia Continental Bloc, consisting of the GEACPS, European Grossraumordnung, and Russian Grossraumordnung, would be invincible in their mutual struggle to change the status quo of the world.⁹⁸ Asano

⁹⁵Andreas Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1942), p. 162; Edmund A. Walsh, "The Mystery of Haushofer," Life (September 16, 1946), p. 114; Weigert, op. cit., p. 117.

⁹⁶Presseisen, op. cit., p. 22.

⁹⁷Published in 1941 by Tokaido of Tokyo.

⁹⁸Ibid., pp. i-iii and p. 295.

argued that by concluding the non-aggression pact with the Axis powers the Soviet Union was cooperating with the Axis who had already given promise of victory.

In the past war trials at Nuremberg Haushofer testified about his role in the Japanese-German "courtship." He had frequently been consulted on Japanese affairs by von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office. General Hiroshi Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Germany in the late 1930's and one of General Haushofer's close Japanese friends,⁹⁹ liked to eulogize the Nazi elite for the Japanese audience through publications as Haushofer eulogized their Japanese counterpart for the Germans. Haushofer's house in Munich had also been the rendezvous for conferences between Nazi officials and Japanese statesmen and military leaders.¹⁰⁰

Lastly, Haushofer's geopolitical ideas, which had already influenced German foreign policy especially where

⁹⁹This opinion was reinforced from Donald H. Norton's letter dated January 12, 1962; CAJMEF, IMT 623 "The idea of German diplomacy (Doitsu gaiko no rinen)," by Oshima Hiroshi from Bungei Shunju, January, 1940.. Japanese text and translation (IPS Doc. No. 3268), 9p. Reel WT82; CAJMEF, IMT453 "The Tripartite Pact and the U. S. (Sangoku Domei to Beikoku)," An article Oshima Hiroshi, published in Dai Ajia-shugi, Nov., 1940. Japanese text and translation (From IPS Doc., No. 2377), 9p. Reel WT59.

It seems important to note that Oshima also served as an editorial supervisor for Japanese publications on Nazi Germany including German geopolitik. See, for an example, Kenzo Kawakami, Nachisu no Chiri-kensetsu (Geographical Construction of Nazism), ARS, 1941, p. 3 and 106.

¹⁰⁰Walsh, "The Mystery of Haushofer," op. cit., p. 107; Total War: A Footnote to History (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1948), p. 8.

it pertained to Japan, was producing an effect on Japan. On March 29, 1941, two weeks prior to the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact. von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister of the Reich cautioned Matsuoka, the visiting Japanese Foreign Minister, not to go too far in the impending talks with the Russians in Moscow. Von Ribbentrop hinted that a German-Soviet war was "not out of the realm of possibility," and also assured Matsuoka that Germany would attack Russia immediately if Moscow should ever attack Japan. Hence, the Japanese Minister was encouraged to continue to push forward to the south, especially on Singapore.¹⁰¹ Japanese policy of "pushing southward" could be no more than implementation of Haushofer's repeated recommendations to Japan regarding southward expansion. But a "war against Russia" was not found in any of his teachings. Hence, it seems probable that Haushofer's admonition for the rapprochement with Russia was neglected at the von Ribbentrop-Matsuoka talk at Berlin, and that the German attack on Russia marked the end of Haushofer. Yet it is significant to note that the validity of Haushofer's premises was unaffected by the manner in which Germany attempted to dominate the "heart land."¹⁰²

¹⁰¹Walsh, Total War, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

¹⁰²Strausz-Hupe, op. cit., p. 114.

III "JAPANESE" GEOPOLITICS

Since the subjective requirements of Japan's national power politics and national self-sufficiency was never identical with the German's, Haushoferian geopolitik- despite its affinity for Japan- could not be totally applied to the changing situations of Japan. Consequently, the Japanese geopoliticians made a great effort to establish a methodological frame of Japanese geopolitics which could be suitably applied to the Japanese situation.¹⁰³

They rightly understood that Geopolitics was an "applied science" and that political expressions of a state arising from "life-union of blood and soil" were different according to each nation-state, and felt it natural to develop the peculiarities of Japanese geopolitics.

Japanese geopolitics was therefore called a "new science" which combined "pure science" with "applied science," in order to serve the state directly or indirectly. In the opinion of Professor Iwata,

The view that to introduce national characters in science is to twist scholarship has delayed the very growth of knowledge...Glorious development of (Japanese) geopolitics can be realized only when it strongly expresses national characters of Japan... Geopolitics should combine subjectivity with objectivity.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³Kozo Iwata, Chiseigaku (Geopolitics) (Asai Shin Koza 38. Tokyo: Asai Shinbunsha, 1942), pp. iii, 5 and 8.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., pp. 52-53.

Hakko Ichiu, the great ideal of Japan, was used by the nationalist geopoliticians as a theoretical basis of "Japanese" geopolitics. To Iwata, a Japanese view of "life and death" was based on "joining nature and becoming one with nature," although another geopolitician, Dr. Komaki warned that this should not mean "cowardly submission" to the nature.¹⁰⁵ The Japanese view of nature differed from the Western view in which the conquest of nature was regarded as the object of struggle. Accordingly, "Japanese" geopolitics was to incorporate the Japanese Weltanschauung.¹⁰⁶

Study of geopolitics in Japan did not begin until a few year after Zeitschrift für Geopolitik began its publication in 1924.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, ex post facto rationalization of Japan's earlier geopolitical development was frequently made in terms of Japan's territorial expansion since the Meiji Restoration.¹⁰⁸ In other words, Japan had been having its own geopolitical experiences long before she imported German geopolitik.

Geopolitics of Komaki. Dr. Saneshige Komaki appears to be the foremost advocate for creating a Japanese version

¹⁰⁵Saneshige Komaki, Nihon Chiseigaku Sengen (Declaration of Japanese Geopolitics) (Revised and enlarged edition: Tokyo: Hyakuyosha, 1942), p. 76.

¹⁰⁶Iwata, op. cit., p. 59.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁰⁸Saneshige Komaki, Nihon Chiseigaku Gakusho (A Memorandum of Japanese Geopolitics) (Osaka: Akidaya, 1944), pp. 49-50.

of geopolitics out of Japan's strong national predisposition. Komaki, a long-time professor of geography at Kyoto Imperial University, was one of those scholars who became interested in European geopolitical ideas in the mid-1920's. Komaki admired Haushofer for his "Japanized" thinking and his eulogies of Japan. In his opinion, however, Japanese geopolitics could not be copied from British or Germanic geopolitik.

Komaki compared British geopolitics to that of a mere stratagem and German geopolitik to that of power struggle relying on "force" in guiding her policy. Since it followed neither of these patterns, Japanese geopolitics must be returned to the Imperial way (Kodo)¹⁰⁹ and its starting point sought in the historical and geographical foundations of the Japanese empire.¹¹⁰ He argued that the existence of Japanese geopolitics was evident in the writing of Yoshida Shoin (1830-1859)¹¹¹ who is known as the father of modern Japanese imperialism, in the Kondo Hisaku¹¹² (Confidential plan of World Unification) of Sato Nobuhiro (1769-1850) and

¹⁰⁹Komaki uses both Kokutai (National Policy) and Kodo (Imperial Way) interchangeably. See Komaki, op. cit., p. 51; Ihizuka, op. cit., p. 54.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹For his biography, see Hendrichus Strallen, Yoshida Shoin (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 1952).

¹¹²Sato Nobushiro, Keizai taiten (The Compendium of Economics) XVIII, 567-69 in Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene (comp.), Sources of Japanese Tradition (Records of Civilization Sources and Studies No. LIV. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 603. For detail, see section "Hakko Ichiu," and "Historical Background of Japanese Expansionism" Chapter II of this work.

even in the Kojiki (Records of Ancient Matters) and Nihon-shoki¹¹³ (Chronicles of Japan). On the basis of these sources, proponents of "Japanese" geopolitics maintained that their geopolitics emerged far ahead of Haushofer, Kjellen, and Ratzel.¹¹⁴

The ideological roots of the so-called Japanese geopolitics are, therefore, the Imperial way (Kodo), Hakko Ichiu, and Kokutai (National Polity). All of these concepts, although nebulous, expound a Japan-centric cosmos. Kokutai-Kan (the view of national polity) combined both geographical and historical views while the theory of Sonno-Joi (Reverence for the Emperor and Expulsion for Foreigners) was a natural product of such "views of national polity."¹¹⁵ The "Japanese" geopolitics could be, therefore, viewed as a policy-science in which Japanese Weltanschauung and conception of national interests were reflected. For these reasons, Professor Komaki insists even today that his geopolitics differed from the German geopolitik.¹¹⁶

¹¹³See p. 19, n. 3 of this study.

¹¹⁴Komaki, op. cit., p. 52.

¹¹⁵Saneshige Komaki, Nihon Chiseigaku Sengen (Declaration of Japanese Geopolitics) (Revised and enlarged edition; Tokyo: Hyakuyosha, 1942), p. 142.

¹¹⁶In his letter dated October 31, 1961 Dr. Komaki, President of Shiga University, points out that, after attending the International Congress for Geographers held in 1938 at the Netherlands as Japan's delegate, he was traveling in Germany and could have easily arranged a visit with Haushofer at that time. He said "I deliberately intended not to see him because I was thinking of developing Japanese geopolitics in my own way."

CHAPTER IV

"GEOPOLITICAL" ARGUMENTS FOR JAPANESE EXPANSION IN EAST ASIA

Japan's expansion in East Asia has been subject to various interpretations among scholars. The interpretations that are rather familiar to Western scholars can be classified into two groups: (1) plot thesis v. Conroy's non-plot antithesis, (2) from Maxon's thesis of "rule from below" (i.e., the policy of the field army became the official policy of the Imperial government) to Maruyama's antithesis of "fascism from above" (i.e., the tosei group, by seizing control of the army, imposed fascism on the Japanese people.¹ Yet it can be argued with substantial evidences that a geopolitical interpretation of Japanese expansion provides a picture that is sounder than these well-known interpretations.

¹For the first group, see Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868-1910 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960) and Chon Dong, "Can Aggression Be Justified and Imperialism Rationalized by 'Realism'?" Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, No. 14, 1961: a review article on these two books is in The Journal of Asian Studies, August 1963, pp. 469-472. For the second group, see Yale Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California, 1957) and Masao Maruyama, Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo (Thought and Movement of Modern Politics) (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1956-1957), 2 vols.

The geographic condition of a country- be it insular or land-locked- is one of the relatively permanent material elements of her foreign policy. Frequently in the past the foreign policies of the Axis Powers and the Allied Powers were explained in terms of geographical determinism.² In fact, even today, the "geopolitical" factor of Japan is viewed by many Japanese scholars as the most fundamental determinant of her international growth.³

I. GEOPOLITICAL RAISON D'ETAT

Long before there was a study of Political Geography, it was known in Japan, as in England, that the advantage of her insular location gave her the freedom of choice either to remain aloof from many struggles in the outside world, especially on the Continent, or to expand beyond the seas and/or on the Asiatic mainland.⁴ The former was the attitude

²Chiri (Geography): Kokudo Kokusei hen (On National Soil and National Strength) (The Secondary School Texts Publishing Co., 1944), pp. 4-5 and p. 54.

³This opinion was reinforced during an interview the author had with Professor Chihiro Hosoya of Hitotsubashi University in Washington, D. C. on August 23, 1963.

⁴For comparison between Japan and Great Britain, see Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan," in Roy C. Macridis (ed.) Foreign Policy in World Politics (2nd ed.: Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 225 and also Raymond Aron, "Conflict and War from the Viewpoint of Historical Sociology," in International Sociological Association, The Nature of Conflict (Studies on the Sociological Aspects of International Tensions. Paris: UNESCO, 1957), pp. 193-197.

For comparison with the United States, see Arnold

of Tokugawa Japan and the latter that of Japan in the twentieth century.⁵

Despite the relative security accorded to the insular country, however, in the words of the editors of the Japanese Association of International Relations, Japan by virtue of her geographical proximity to the land mass of Asia also occupies one of the most important Mittel-lage (Middle-zone) sandwiched between land and sea powers. Being adjacent to three spheres of influence, namely, Slavs, Anglo-Saxons and Hans (Chinese), such a middle-zone country often becomes a "cockpit of nations." Accordingly, they argue that it is this uniqueness of Japanese geopolitics- combining the advantage of insularity and the disadvantage of the Mittel-lage that has determined the course of the last 100 years of Japanese history "from glory to the grave."⁶

A Japanese Asiatic association called Toho Kyokai 東洋協会 (Eastern Association) conducted a series of lectures in 1892 on Formosa, Sakhalin, Kurile Island and Korea. Although the geo-strategic location of all of the areas was emphasized, the special importance of Formosa was noted.

Wölfers and Laurence W. Martin (eds.) The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1956), pp. ix-xxvii.

⁵ Aron, loc. cit.

⁶ "Honshono Puran" (Plan of This Book) in Nihon Gaiko no Bunseki (Analysis of Japanese Diplomacy): Kokusai Seiji (International Politics), Summer, 1957.

Formosa's geographic location in Asia was compared to that of Istanbul (Constantinople) in Europe. The island was also regarded as the best location not only to restrict British activities in the Orient but also to protect the Japanese nation.⁷

Meiji leaders appear to have sensed intuitively the difficulty of Japan as an international "Middle-zone." A major question of Meiji foreign policy was how a "middle-zone" country could secure and permanently maintain the position of a "free-hand" in the world. Among the possible policies suggested were:

(1) To join with England in order to prevent Russia from emerging as a power in the Orient... (2) To make an alliance with Russia, so that with joint land forces she could invade Korea and Manchuria, and with a joint naval force capture Tientsin, Shanghai, Peking and conquer China eventually. Such an alliance would keep proud England from re-exerting its influence in Asia. (3) To ally itself with Germany...so that Germany would attack Russia from the European side while Japan destroyed Eastern Siberia, or (4) to join with China, and jointly expell America from the western coasts of the Pacific and obtain its territorial possessions...⁸

As a result of a half-a-century struggle to secure a "free-hand" in the "dog-eat-dog" world, Japan emerged following World War I as one of the five land powers and the three sea powers of the world. Yet the resulting position of the growing nation was subsequently proven to be not without difficulties.

⁷Manjiro Inagaki, Tohosaku Ketsuron soan (Draft on the Conclusion of Eastern Policy) (Tokyo: Tetsugaku Shoin, 1892), Appendix p. 1, p. 19, p. 56, p. 89, and p. 100.

⁸Ibid., pp. 234-235.

II. THE JAPANESE MONROE DOCTRINE

In the eyes of the Japanese, it seemed to be natural and inevitable inclination that Japan as a belatedly emerging nation sought an outlet for expansion in Korea and in China.

From ancient times Japanese diplomacy was directed toward the continent, and Korea was a viaduct between the continent and Japan. For this reason, the Korean peninsula was viewed as an area of life-and-death importance, just as the Flanders to Britain.⁹ Since Korea, Manchuria and most of China were included in what is called by Mackinder and Haushofer as "Marginal Crescent," which could not escape the pressures either from the maritime powers or from the continental powers, it was inevitable that Japan attempted to expand her influence to catch up with other areas of the world and picked these areas as her theater of action. After successfully challenging China and Russia's influence in Korea, Japan annexed the latter. With Korea as an integral part of the Japanese empire, Manchuria appears in Japanese geopolitics as a Mittel-lage of the Far East. It was viewed as the Balkans or Belgium of the Far East.¹⁰

⁹Hikomatsu Kamikawa, "Nihon Gaiko heno Puroregomena" (A Prolegomena to Japanese Diplomacy), Nihon Gaiko no Bunseki (Analysis of Japanese Diplomacy): Kokusai Seiji (International Politics), Summer, 1957, p. 7.

¹⁰Hikomatsu Kamikawa, Nihon Gaiko no Sai-shuppatsu (Restart of Japanese Diplomacy) (Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyu-sho, 1960), p. 232.

In the words of Maehara, "without having been given the right to represent the American continents" in 1823 the United States proclaimed the "Monroe Doctrine" on behalf of its neighboring states of the Western hemisphere.¹¹ The fact that European powers implicitly conceded to the United States meant, in reality, a recognition of American hegemony over the American continents. Hence the Japanese leaders were unable to see why a doctrine, similar to if not better than the Monroe Doctrine, could not be proclaimed in the East.

If a Monroe Doctrine is to be proclaimed for the Orient, it must be a result of consultation and agreement among the Oriental peoples concerned, and not an arbitrary dogma conceived by any single nation who reserves the right to interpret and apply it as it pleases.¹²

The idea of a Monroe Doctrine for Asia was at first suggested to Japanese Viscount Kaneko by American President Theodore Roosevelt.¹³ After Roosevelt's mediation for a peace conference had been accepted by Russia and Japan in the summer of 1905, Viscount Kaneko was invited to Sagamore Hill where he and the President spent the evening of July 7th and the following day discussing many problems of the

¹¹Mitsuo Maehara, Hoichiro Nokuchi and Hajime Kobayashi, Dai Toa Kyo-Ei-Ken No Min-Zoku (Nations of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere) (Tokyo: Rokumeikan, 1942), Vol. I, p. 121.

¹²The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere (Tokyo: The Osaka Mainichi and The Tokyo Nichi Nichi, 1941), p. 8.

¹³Both Kaneko and Roosevelt were Harvard graduates and were on intimate terms. See Hikomatsu Kamikawa, Japan-American Diplomatic Relations in the Meiji-Taisho Era (Tokyo: Pan-Pacific Press, 1958), pp. 212-216.

after-war policy of Asia.¹⁴

According to the testimonial article written by Kaneko on the conversation he had had with Roosevelt, the President reportedly said:

Japan is the only nation in Asia which understands the principles and methods of Western civilization. She has proved that she can assimilate Western civilization, yet not break up her own heritage. All the Asiatic nations are now faced with the urgent necessity of adjusting themselves to the present age. Japan should be their natural leader in that process, and their protector during the transition stage, much as the U. S. assumed the leadership of the American continent many years ago, and by means of the Monroe Doctrine, preserved the Latin American nations from European interference, while they were maturing their independence. The future policy of Japan towards Asiatic countries should be similar to that of the United States towards their neighbours on the American continent. A 'Japanese Monroe Doctrine' in Asia will remove the temptation to European encroachment, and Japan will be recognized as the leader of the Asiatic nations, and her power will form the shield behind which they can recognize their national systems.¹⁵

According to reports, the President suggested that the sphere of the Japanese Monroe Doctrine should include the whole continent of Asia- east of Suez Canal as far as west of Kamchatka, India, Annam, the Philippines, Hongkong and other European and American colonies were excluded. He advised, however, that Japan should observe the American policy of the "Open Door" in China. On July 11, 1905

¹⁴George H. Blakeslee. "The Japanese Monroe Doctrine," The Foreign Affairs, July, 1933, p. 672, p. 680. Kentaro Kaneko, "A 'Japanese Monroe Doctrine' and Manchuria," Contemporary Japan, September, 1932, pp. 175-176.

¹⁵Kaneko, op. cit., pp. 176-177.

Kaneko reported by cipher telegram to his government on this pro-Japanese opinion of Roosevelt.¹⁶

On September 10, 1905, on the eve of Kaneko's departure for Japan following the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, he was once again invited to Sagamore Hill to spend half a day. At this meeting President Roosevelt suggested that the Japanese government cease the issuance of passports to Japanese labors going to America and turn them towards Manchuria which had been ceded to Japan by Russia. As for the Japanese Monroe Doctrine, Kaneko asked if, on his return, he might report the President's advice to the Emperor and his Ministers so that his government might prepare and establish an Asiatic Monroe policy. Roosevelt asked him not to make his view public while he was President. Upon his return Viscount Kaneko reported to the Emperor.¹⁷ It seems for this reason that some Western scholars trace the origin of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine to the period shortly after the Russo-Japanese War.¹⁸

According to Professors Fifield and Percy, the Japanese Monroe Doctrine, which arose in 1905, had the following essential principles, all of which were later

¹⁶Ibid., p. 177.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 181-182.

¹⁸Russell H. Fifield and G. Etzel Percy, Geopolitics in Principle and Practice (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1944), pp. 99 and 94; Blakeslee, op. cit., p. 672.

incorporated into the Japanese version of geopolitics:

1. Pan Asianism.
2. The idea of self-defense.
3. The right to live.
4. The right of Nipponese leadership in the Far East.
5. The idea of "special interests" in China.¹⁹

It may be worthwhile to point out that the United States had recognized some of these principles, especially from 1905 to 1930, although such recognitions could have been postulated on the assumption they would not be used for aggressive purposes. In 1915 Secretary Bryan officially recognized that "territorial contiguity creates special relations" between Japan and South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.²⁰ By the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917 Wilson's administration recognized that "Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous."²¹ Since Bryan's statement had not been made public, "Lansing's concession of 'special interests' came as a shock to an American public imbued with a traditional, if somewhat vague, friendship for China."²²

As for the terms "special interests" and of "territorial propinquity" in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, the governments of the United States, Japan and China interpreted them differently. Secretary Lansing understood that the

¹⁹Ibid., p. 94, pp. 97-105.

²⁰Blakeslee, op. cit., p. 680.

²¹Ibid.: Kaneko, op. cit., p. 183.

²²Paul H. Clyde, The Far East: A History of the Impact of the West on Eastern Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958), pp. 430-431.

term referred to the commercial and industrial advantage for Japan, while Viscount Ishii appears to have interpreted the terms as having principally a political nature. In his. Memoirs Ishii states that "the agreement gives to Japan a heavier responsibility concerning China's problems and a greater right to express herself regarding them than have the states of Europe and America."²³ The Chinese interpreted the notes as "indicating a withdrawal of the American Government, in favor of Japan, from any desire to exercise any influence in Chinese affairs."²⁴

In an article contributed to Foreign Affairs, Ishii clearly demonstrates that Japan's China policy has consistently been actuated by the same principles incorporated in the Monroe Doctrine. "Generally speaking, our policy in China has been based upon the belief that the establishment of an imperium in imperio upon her soil by any powerful third nation or group of nations is not only derogatory to her integrity but is also incompatible with our own security."²⁵ Viscount Ishii liked to compare the special importance of Mexico and Central American countries to the United States and China to Japan.

²³Blakeslee, op. cit., pp. 673-674.

²⁴Clyde, op. cit., p. 431.

²⁵Viscount K. Ishii, "The Permanent Bases of Japanese Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, January 1933, p. 227.

A statement made in 1930 by American Ambassador Castle immediately brings to mind the Kaneko-Roosevelt conversations of 1905; he stated, "Japan must be and will be the guardian of peace in the Pacific."²⁶

III. MANCHUKUO AS JAPAN'S LEBENSRAUM

In the introductory article for a monography entitled Analysis of Japanese Diplomacy, the post-war geopolitician Professor Kamikawa Director of the Japanese Institute of International Affairs (Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu-sho 日本国際問題研究所) described Japanese territory as:

An island lying extended on the great Pacific Ocean, while closely tied to the Asiatic continent... Along with this, a third important determinant of Japanese geopolitics is the narrowness of our domain and the poverty of natural resources. ...the surface which is not more than 1/350th of world land space is supporting 1/30th of the world population. ...the underground resources of the land, 40% of which is arable, are extremely limited lacking such resources for modern industry as steel, coal, oil, cotton and rubber. Thus our country is by birth not provided with the foundation for a modern empire.²⁷

Argument for Japan's over-population and its consequent need to acquire more lebensraum for its own food was

²⁶George H. Blakeslee, "The Japanese Monroe Doctrine," The Foreign Affairs, July, 1933, p. 680.

²⁷Hikomatsu Kamikawa, "Nihon Gaiko heno Puroregomena" (A Prolegomena to Japanese Diplomacy), Nihon Gaiko no Bunseki (Analysis of Japanese Diplomacy): Kokusai Seiji (International Politics), Summer, 1957, p. 3.

made by Kamikawa in the best pattern of German geopolitik.²⁸

Japan was depicted as a "great crowd of people packed into a small and narrow room,"²⁹ and there were only three escape doors, namely (1) emigration, (2) advance into world markets, and (3) expansion of territory. The first door and the second door which were once open to Japan were closed to her. Emigration has been barred by the anti-Japanese immigration policies of the United States, Great Britain, Australia and Canada. These countries also had been closed against Japanese goods by high tariffs and the abrogation of commercial treaties.³⁰

In his speech delivered before the British audience a Japanese Professor Takayanagi compared the twentieth century problems of Japan with the nineteenth century problems of Great Britain:

²⁸Prof. Kamikawa reminds the readers that Karl Haushofer had produced more than dozen publications on geopolitical study of Japan. See his "Kendai Kokusai Seijishi ni okeru Nihon" (Japan's Place in the History of Modern World Politics) in Nihon Gaikoshi Kenkyu (Study of Japanese Diplomatic History): Kokusai Seiji (International Politics), 1937, Autumn, p. 2 and footnote 2 on p. 19.

²⁹Kingoro Hashimoto, "The Need for Emigration and Expansion," an address to young men IMTPE, IPS, Doc. 487B. Exhibit 1290.

³⁰Ibid.: Kenzo Takayanagi, "A Japanese View of the Struggle in the Far East," International Affairs (London) Jan. 1939, p. 50; Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene (comp.), Sources of Japanese Tradition (Records of Civilization Sources and Studies No. LIV. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 763-764.

What was the difference between the Japanese position today and the British position in the nineteenth century? The latter then had had a great rapidly growing population and had needed expanding markets. So she had conquered Africa, not only the savage parts, but the white Boer Republics. Today her economic problem was different: she had to fit her economy during the second half of the twentieth century to a country which would have a rapidly declining population. But the Japanese problem was now exactly the same as the British problem in the nineteenth century, and she had to adopt the same methods, and was only doing so because the British Empire and others had forced her into that position by closing other markets against her.³¹

Since the doors for emigration and foreign markets were being pushed shut, it was argued, naturally, that Japan should rush into territorial expansion which was the last and the only remaining solution. Also, most of the prominent army leaders of Japan had insisted upon Japan's hegemony in Manchuria, although not from the same reasons.

General Sadao Araki and Shunroku Hata, the Chiefs of the Operations Division of the General Staff from 1927-31, constantly urged a military action in Manchuria designed to secure a crucial strategic advantages vis-a-vis the Communist army in the Maritime provinces of the Soviet Union.³² The leaders of the War Ministry also recongnized paramount importance of Manchuria to Japan. The so-called "German school" of the Ministry regarded Manchuria "primarily as a

³¹Takayanagi, loc. cit.

³²James B. Crowley, "Japan's China Policy, 1931-1938: A Study of the Military in the Determination of Foreign Policy," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Michigan, 1959), p. 36.

potential source of raw material for the basic objectives of the army- the building of a mechanized and powerful military machine."³³

Compared to the military actions committed by "white races" in India, South Africa, and Australia, Japanese violence in Manchuria and China, which for Japan possessed the "immutable fact of geographical propinquity" was argued to be more than justifiable.³⁴

IV. THE TANAKA MEMORIAL AND ITS PLAUSIBILITY

An extraordinary memorial, which recommended a policy of conquest and the establishment of a Japanese empire in East Asia, was allegedly drawn up by Premier Tanaka following a conference in Mukden³⁵ that was attended by all the civil and military officials of Manchuria and Mongolia.³⁶ The eleven-day discussion (between June 27 and July 7, 1927) of Japanese policies toward these two countries was supposedly summarized in this document.

³³Ibid., pp. 37-38.

³⁴Takayanagi, op. cit., pp. 36-37; Hashimoto, loc. cit.

³⁵According to The China Critic (Shanghai, 1931), IV, pp. 923-924, the conference "was led in Tokyo by Prime Minister Baron Gi-ichi Tanaka." See Louis L. Snyder (ed.), The Imperialism Reader (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962), p. 93.

³⁶The Tanaka Memorial: Japan's Dream of World Empire (Edited, with an introduction by Carl Crow, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942), pp. 20-22.

The Tanaka Memorial, published by the Chinese in 1929, was quickly denounced by the Japanese as forgery. The Chinese themselves were not able to prove complete authenticity of the document, although they believed that it had a Japanese origin.³⁷ It's authenticity was disputable,³⁸ but

³⁷Russell H. Fifield and G. Etzel Percy, Geopolitics in Principle and Practice (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1944), p. 6.

³⁸In the opinion of Prof. Reischauer, the authenticity of the Tanaka Memorial is open to question. However, he did not doubt that such views were often advocated by some governmental officials during the 1920's. See Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 164.

Professor Tiedemann recognizes the existence of the Memorial, although he doubts if such a document was ever presented to the Emperor. "It may well represent a working paper submitted by some members of the conference...it sums up a number of opinions which were current in Japan in the late 1920's and which were to dominate in the 1930's." See Arthur Tiedemann, Modern Japan: A Brief History (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1955), p. 128.

Yet, according to Carl Crow, the existence of this memorial was hinted at in a magazine article by Kuhura, then Minister of Communication. See The Tanaka Memorial, p. 20. The fact that the Japanese action for the domination of North China did begin on July 7, 1937, the tenth anniversary of the day when the Manchurian conference which drew up the Tanaka Memorial came to a close, adds weight to the credibility of the document. See The Tanaka Memorial, p. 112, also see Tatsuji Takeuchi, "The Tsian Incident," War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1935), pp. 247-257.

In the opinion of Professor Quigley, the enunciation in 1940 of a program for establishing a sphere of coprosperity in Greater East Asia lent credibility to the incredible Tanaka Memorial. See Harold S. Quigley, Far Eastern War 1937-1941 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942), p. 181.

According to Jaya Deva, Trotsky furnished us with the first positive proof of the Tanaka Memorial. "One day in 1925 in the summer of early autumn" Dzerzhinsky, as the head of the G. P. U., announced that a photostatic copy of the Tanaka Memorial had arrived in Moscow. He had previously informed a few members of the Political Bureau of the Soviet

its contents were plausible to many experts on the Far East including some Japanese in view of the fact that similar views were often expressed by Japanese leaders in and out of the official circles.³⁹ According to Jaya Deva, each one of Japanese leaders, such as "Chiefs of the Army, Navy, big trusts, political parties and of patriotic societies, and individuals like Baron Araki, General Tojo, Admiral Sugiyama, Mr. Matsuoka and Prince Konoe... is a virtuoso good enough to play the title-role in the set Tanaka Memorial."⁴⁰

Forgery or not, however, the Memorial seems at least to be worthy of a brief description, especially because it has been mentioned as a "Japanese expression of geopolitical expansion."⁴¹

The memorial, which outlined a positive policy for

government that a Japanese agent of the G. P. U. had succeeded in photographing the document kept in the archives of the Japanese Ministry of Naval Affairs. The photostatic copy bought for about 3,000 American dollars, had been flown to Moscow. An English translation of it was made. Trotsky, still a member of the Politbureau, who had recently left the War Commissariat and was then the head of the Committee on Far Eastern Affairs, was, he writes, "perhaps the very first person to become acquainted with the document in English and Russian translation of the Japanese text." For various reasons, especially of the position of the Soviet Union in international politics then, it was thought preferable to publish it in the U. S. A., and this eventually done. See Jaya Deva, Japan's Kampf (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1942), p. 150.

³⁹Robert E. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), p. 236.

⁴⁰Deva, op. cit., p. 144.

⁴¹Fifield and Percy, loc. cit.

Manchuria, was presented to the emperor on July 25, 1927. It served as a prelude to the creation of Japan's puppets, Manchukuo and New China under the name of the "New Order" in East Asia.

The territory of Manchuria and Mongolia was more than three times as large as Japan proper, but it was inhabited by only one-third as many people. Furthermore, its wealth of forestry, minerals and agricultural products was also unrivaled elsewhere in East Asia. Tanaka went on to say that the South Manchuria Railway Company had been created in order to exploit these resources for the perpetuation of Japan's national glory. But as the restrictions of the Nine Power Treaty⁴² had reduced Japan's special rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia, Tanaka declared, "we shall not be able to tap the riches of these countries...unless these obstacles are removed..."

The result (of the treaty) is that while our people cannot migrate into Manchuria as they please, the Chinese are flowing in as a flood... They have jeopardized our acquired rights to such an extent that our manual surplus population of eight hundred

⁴² It stated that (a) the powers respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial...integrity of China; (b) the powers give China the chance to maintain an effective and stable government; (c) the powers guarantee "the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China... Evelyn Waltz, Far Eastern History (Boston : The Christopher Publishing House, 1953), p. 382.

thousand have no place to seek refuge.⁴³

Without giving sound reasons as to why Japan should claim special rights in Manchuria more than China could, Baron Tanaka thus proposed to denounce the Nine Power Treaty for the sake of "self-protection as well as the protection of East Asia."

The Minseito policy was depicted as that of national suicide, since it emphasized through the Nine-Power Treaty Japan's TRADE rather than RIGHTS in China. England and America could afford to talk about trade relations because they had countries to supply them with food stuffs and other materials. Nevertheless, Japan could not afford to "merely hope to develop trade," since Japanese "food supply and raw materials decrease in proportion to her population."⁴⁴

Tanaka's statements on territorial expansion would seem to imply that the ultimate goal must be achieved even though Japan might have to rely on harsh policies.

...Japan cannot remove the difficulties in Eastern Asia unless she adopts a policy of "Blood and Iron." But in carrying out this policy we have to face the United States which has been turned against us by China's policy of fighting poison with poison. In the future if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to fight in the Russo-Japanese War. But in order to conquer China we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we succeed

⁴³The Tanaka Memorial, pp. 23-27.

⁴⁴Louis L. Snyder (ed.), The Imperialism Reader (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962), p. 96.

in conquering China the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realize that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights.⁴⁵

Tanaka concluded by saying that this was the same plan left to the Japanese by Emperor Meiji, and that its success was essential for Japan's continued national existence.

Tanaka's alleged proposal to denounce the Nine Power Treaty was not actually carried into effect. But the fact that the Japanese military authorities merely ignored the treaty and carried on a war without even a declaration of war marked the funeral of the treaty.

This action of territorial aggrandizement in 1931 was also the turning point between the liberal 1920's and the reactionary militaristic 1930's. The Japanese army heretofore stationed in Manchuria to protect the South Manchurian Railway, embarked on the conquest of all Manchuria on the flimsy pretext that Chinese troops had tried to blow up the railway.⁴⁶ In the opinion of P. M. Linebarger, "It was quite appropriate that Japan invaded Manchuria on September 18, 1931, the anniversary of the death of Hideyoshi,"⁴⁷ even though soldiers at front, not the government, might have

⁴⁵The Tanaka Memorial, pp. 28-29.

⁴⁶Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 165.

⁴⁷P. M. Linebarger, Chu Djang, and A. D. Burks, Far Eastern Governments and Politics: China and Japan (2nd ed., Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956), p. 427.

chosen the day linking the event. Within a few months Japanese soldiers overran Manchuria and landed at Shanghai in Central China.

Early in 1932, Manchuria became a puppet state called Manchukuo, the foothold in China which had been advocated by Hideyoshi, Tanaka, and dozens of other Japanese patriots. Her answer to the criticism of the League of Nations and the United States was simply to withdraw from the League of Nations.

V. JUSTIFICATION OF THE
GREATER EAST ASIA COPROSPERITY SPHERE
IN TERMS OF WORLD CONDITIONS

International Anarchy and Rising Belligerency. It may not be an exaggeration to say that it is Japan who should be held responsible for the downfall of the League of Nations and for the reappearance of international belligerency. By over-riding the wishes of the League of Nations in Manchuria and by withdrawing from the League in answer to the latter's criticism she not only turned the peace organization into a paper organization, but also alarmed the world. Yet, to the Japanese it was international anarchy, attributed to the powerlessness of the League as well as to the gradual emergence of belligerency among nations, that formed the justification for the creation of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere. Japan, therefore, viewed the Coprosperity Sphere as the only defense for Asia's have-not-nations.

As an aftermath of the 1929 depression, every nation tended to raise protective tariffs. While limiting imports and thereby preserving their gold, autarkic and "have"-nations sought foreign markets for the surplus of their products. Since have-not-nations had to import, the outflow of gold exceeded the inflow and this decreased their supply of gold. Consequently they were soon unable to purchase even the necessities of life. This phenomenon could be detrimental to the life of have-not-nations in peace time. Furthermore it could threaten the existence of such nations if they were in a state of war with have-nations.⁴⁸

In addition to the economic threats, politically powerful nations always imposed their will upon the weaker nations in the League of Nations. While laying the blame on the West for the failure of the League of Nations, Japan made further attacks on the West by saying that Anglo-American "imperialism" with its idea of destroying "Nippon" started with a series of oppressive machination, beginning with "the Naval Limitation Treaty

and the Nine Power Pact in 1921-22, intended to impede the growth of Nippon's naval power and political influence, and culminating in the open aid to Chiang Kai-shek against Nippon, in the unilateral scrapping of commercial treaties by those Western powers, in the freezing of Nippon's credits and the consequent

⁴⁸ Mitsuo Maehara, Hoichiro Nokuchi and Hajime Kobashi, Dai Toa Kyoeiken no Minzoku (Nations of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere) (Tokyo: Rokumeikan, 1942), Vol. I, p. 31.

paralyzation of her foreign trade, and, finally, on November 26, 1941, in the virtual ultimatum.⁴⁹

Japanese leaders believed that the existence and progress of any nation-state depended mostly on its own strength, and the strength of Japan alone could confront the intimidating measures utilized by the Western powers. It was therefore unsafe and unwise to establish a national policy without prior consideration of the possibility of a state of war in the future.⁵⁰

In order to avoid the threat to national existence derived from the material insufficiency, the Japanese argued that a nation should seek collaboration with neighbors or other countries. Thus, the construction of GEACPS was indispensable to the economic well-being of member states. The Japanese admitted, however, that no matter how indispensable it might be the establishment of GEACPS could not be forced on its members. It should result from the voluntary agreements of the component members.⁵¹

Emergence of Other Regional Blocs. The Japanese contended that the emergence of the Pan-American system and other supra-national regional blocs necessitated and hastened the creation of the Coprosperity Sphere in Asia.

⁴⁹Construction of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere (Osaka: The Mainichi Publishing Company, 1942), p. 7.

⁵⁰Maehara, Nokuchi, and Kobashi, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 5-6.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 9.

Koiji Morinobu maintained that the European conflict had given rise to new movements in the world economy. Four large blocs were being formed:

(1) The Far Eastern Coprosperity Sphere with Nippon as its center; (2) the European bloc with Germany and Italy as leaders; (3) the Pan-American Economic Sphere led by the United States; and (4) Soviet Russia's own economic Sphere.⁵²

East Asia was viewed as a natural sphere of Japan's influence, yet the Nipponese had been kept from exercising their sway over it. They felt that the American advance westward was far less justifiable than the Japanese request for supremacy in East Asia. It seemed to the Japanese that the Americans had a sufficient area of influence in the Western Hemisphere and the Americans' ambitions in East Asia were therefore artificial and excessive, while those of Japan were natural and legitimate, because of geographic proximity, common race and the similarity of customs and institutions among the nations of East Asia.⁵³

⁵²Ibid., p. 44.

⁵³The Japan Yearbook 1943-44 (Tokyo: The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, 1943), p. 259.

CHAPTER V

THE ECONOMIC THEORIES OF THE GREATER EAST ASIA COPROSPERITY SPHERE

Geopolitics of "have-not" nations is defined in Chapter I of this manuscript as "a political tool to be used in search for national self-sufficiency and empire." Much of the economic aspects of the GEACPS reflects geopolitical concepts of "have-not" Japan.

In his instructions to Nomura prior to the Ambassador's departure for his post in Washington and afterward, Matsuoka reportedly have urged Nomura to work to make it understood in the United States that the establishment of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere "implied only the finding of ways and means for self-supply and self-support in the area."¹ Similar view is expressed in a Japanese history book published in 1942, which treats the GEACPS as the culmination of an "autarkic, planned, controlled economy."²

In his written reply to the writer regarding the

¹Shigenori Togo, The Cause of Japan, trans. and ed. by Fumihiko Togo and Ben B. Blakeney (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), p. 72.

²Masashi Okawa, Dai Toa Kensetsu Shi (A History of Greater East Asia Construction) (Tokyo: Misaki Shobo, 1942), pp. 2-c, 1-111.

origin of the GEACPS Colonel Susumi Nishihara, presently Chief of War History Office of Japan's Defense Agency and formerly Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry, concludes that "the GEACPS was a Japanese product of autarkic policies which had world-wide tendencies since the conclusion in 1932 of the Imperial Economic Conference held at Ottawa, Canada."³

The Japanese nation was apparently convinced that the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere was the vital necessity for Japan to secure her Lebensraum. Japanese propaganda made much capital out of the argument based on Japan's well-known lack of many "essential" raw materials⁴ and the economic pressures of the Western powers.

I. ECONOMIC RATIONALE OF THE ORGANIZATION

The rational foundation of the economic organization can be described as the "economic nationalism" of the have-not nations. It was argued that the antagonism between the "haves" and the "have-nots" was attributed to unsatisfactory territorial and economic arrangements. Thus a Japanese professor and former diplomat liked to point out that "Britain, France, the U. S., and the Soviet Union together monopolized 55 per cent of the available natural resources

³Quoted from his letter of January 9, 1963.

⁴Paul Einzig, The Japanese "New Order" In Asia (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1943), pp. 11-12.

of the world, the remaining 15 per cent being distributed among some seventy countries."⁵ According to a publication of the Japanese Foreign Ministry this unfair distribution of natural resources could not fit into the Japanese ideology in which everything belongs to Kami (God) and natural resources common property of humanity.⁶

"With 2,774 individuals jammed into every square mile of arable land and with the number of inhabitants increasing at the rate of 1,000,000 a year,"⁷ Japan must find an adequate solution.

Imagine the conditions which would result if half of the residents of America (equivalent of Japanese proper population) were transported to a land two-thirds as large as California (equivalent size of Japan proper) and with a part of it too cold for habitation and without the oil and other products with which California is blessed.⁸

Thus, emigration would be a possible cure if the Japanese had places to go. It was argued that most places

⁵ Shigetomo Sayegusa, "The Axis Project of World Order," Contemporary Japan, September 1942, Vol. XI, No. 9, pp. 1281-1282.

⁶ Confidential, December 1936, Reel 1504 of O-4, Interdepartmental Committee Foreign Publications (IDC Films), Item No. 67. Copies of this document are available, in miniature, as Reel 1691 of O-4, Item No. 194, Nippon Koryu no Gaiko Shido Genri Koryo (An Outline of Principles Guiding Japanese Foreign Policy), and also as CAJNFA, Sp 252, Outline of the Guiding Principles of Japanese diplomacy (Nihon koryu no gaiko shido genri koryo), Dec. 1936, 153 p., Reel Sp 146, p. 143.

Hereafter this source will be referred to as "Reel 1504 of O-4, No. 67."

⁷ American and Japan's Manifest Destiny, Businessmen of Kyoto (Kyoto: Japan, n.d.), p. 1.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

that could take in Japanese immigrants were the territorial possessions of the white races and that their doors had been "slammed shut and sealed."⁹ An alternative method to adjust Japan's self-interests with her ideals was to seek space which the West, with possession of merely nominal rights, had not been fully utilizing. From the whites who have thus far exploited the Asians, the Japanese argued, this much concession was overdue to Japan. Japan would also thereby avoid the troubles arriving from the racial and cultural differences.¹⁰

The only other remedy left, in the eyes of the Japanese, would be industrialization and trade, and on this Japan has staked her future existence. Nevertheless, most of the Western nations, failing to sympathize with Japan's position, were preventing her from acquiring an access to their resources and at the same time were excluding Japanese goods from their markets in the West. Where else can Japan turn her face but Manchuria and China¹¹ and what else can she do except organize "corporate living.?"

The Lebensraum claim of a weaker state which had the misfortune to be geographically located next to a more

⁹Ibid., pp. 1-2: "Reel 105 of O-4, No. 67," p. 146.

¹⁰"Reel 1504 of O-4, No. 67," p. 146.

¹¹See Harold M. Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times (6th ed. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1959), pp. 532-533.

powerful state appeared to have little merit as it seemed impractical for such a weaker state to "enjoy the right of overriding the policy of mutual reliance" of a powerful neighboring state. It was apparent that so long as Japan had to depend on the economic resources and strategical location of neighboring states, she could not tolerate intervention in the latter by an outside nation from a different region. On this basis, it appeared just and proper that Japan, standing firm on the principles of geographical propinquity, as exemplified in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, should demand that her neighboring countries join the GEACPS.¹²

II. BLOC ECONOMY TO GROSSRAUMWIRTSCHAFT

Free trade, a means of the old international order, was destroyed by the so-called "have" nations after the world economic panic of 1929. As a result bloc economy, a new order of international political economy, made its appearance. Gradually, however, the bloc economy developed into a new economic order Grossraumwirtschaft, the Japanese version of which was a "co-prosperious economic new deal in

¹²Kamekichi Takahashi, "Why Co-prosperity?" Contemporary Japan, Vol. XI, No. 10 (October 1942), pp. 1412-1413.

collaboration with the nations of Greater East Asia."¹³

Professor Nokuchi traces the origin of the economic plan of GEACPS to Britain's "Empire Preference," which he called "Bloc Economy," and to the German Grossraumwirtschaft.¹⁴ Both of these systems, related to economic and political geography, were the policies of a state economy which abandoned the traditional free-trade economy.

Nokuchi lists the three prerequisites for the formation of a bloc economy:

- (1) To ensure within the bloc foods, the raw materials for industry, power resources...all of which are requisite to the existence of nations of the bloc.
- (2) To ensure the markets for the products of the bloc as well as the place for enterprises to take the capital investments.
- (3) To provide within the bloc means of transportation and communications.¹⁵

Britain's "Empire Preference" system began in 1932 with the conclusion of the Ottawa agreement.¹⁶ Those countries out-

¹³See book review of Kamekichi Takahashi's Kyoei-ken Keizai Kensetsu-ron (A Treatise on Establishing a Co-prosperous Economic Zone. Tokyo: The Toh-shi Keizai-sha, 1942) in Contemporary Japan, Vol. XI, No. 8 (August 1942), pp. 1259-9.

¹⁴Mitsuo Maehara, Hoichiro Nokuchi and Hajime Kobayashi, Dai Toa Kyo-Ei-Ken No Min-Zoku (Tokyo: Rokumeikan, 1942), Vol. II, pp. 1-5. See Maurice Parmelee, Geoeconomic Regionalism and World Federation (New York: Exposition Press, 1949), pp. 8-9. Grossraumwirtschaft literally means "economy of great area."

¹⁵Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁶These agreements comprised a comprehensive system of tariff preferences between Great Britain and most of the dominions. It was agreed that most products from the dominions concerned would be admitted into Great Britain free of duty for a 3- or 5-year period. In return, the dominions

side the system were discriminated against. For instance, unlimited wool was produced in Australia whereas none was produced in Japan, who was eager to import the wool, but Australia was not allowed to export it to Japan. Conversely, Australia could not purchase cheap priced products of cotton which she desperately desired to import from Japan. Thus, Australia or other members of Britain's bloc economy could not develop their own economy, as they were joined to promote the best interests of the home state, Britain. Hence, the British bloc economy was, in the opinion of Nokuchi, exclusive, capitalistic and imperialistic.¹⁷

Japan had depended almost entirely on countries of the dollar or sterling bloc for her supply. But when Britain and United States shut their doors to her, the Japanese felt they had no alternative but to secure their position by consolidating the East Asian economic sphere. The bloc economy of "Nippon-Manchukuo" was thus concluded at the time of establishment of Manchukuo in 1932, when this economic system reached its peak in popularity. Some consideration was given to include New China in this bloc system but the idea was frustrated by Japan's realization of

arranged more advantageous preferential duties for a large number of British products. Harold Sloan and Arnold Zurcher, A Dictionary of Economic (3d ed.; New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1953), p. 236.

¹⁷Maehara, Nokuchi, and Kobayashi, op. cit., p. 10.

the "inherent" defects in the system and also by the need of Southward expansion.¹⁸

Supposedly the Grossraumwirtschaft had emerged as a device free from "defects" in the bloc economy. It was a product of the Nazis economy, meaning a cooperative economy whereby the surrounding states with close ties of race, space, history and culture, joined Germany in a broader economy which provided natural resources for the needs of the "raum." According to Nokuchi, the member states were independent of each other in the Grossraumwirtschaft, but they were economically directed by the organ of united economy, called wirtschaftsarbeitsgemeinschaft.¹⁹ In this systems, he says no such imperial or exploitative elements existed such as found in the British bloc economy. It could be assumed, however, that technically and economically advanced Germany guided others, but even in this case there still existed a relationship that was cooperative and mutually dependent.²⁰

Moreover, Grossraumwirtschaft was not exclusive as long as the trade with states outside the raum promoted the interests of the latter. Thus, it is pointed out that "the economy of autarky and trade at the same time" was the core

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 14-15.

¹⁹Literally meaning "economy of working cooperation."

²⁰Maehara, Nokuchi and Kobayashi, op. cit., pp. 11-12. See also Parmelee, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

of world policy of the European Grossraumwirtschaft. It was the Japanese belief that the world economy would develop only under such cooperative economic systems, for blockading and exclusive systems of bloc economy could only invite wars.²¹

In sum, the economic system of the GEACPS was a Japanese version of the German Grossraumwirtschaft. Paul Einzig is of the opinion that Germany replaced the doctrine of Lebensraum with that of Grossraumwirtschaft. Because, the former sounded more selfish and imperialistic, the latter seemed to express the advantages of large economic units which would be substantial enough to enable the conquerors to increase their standard of living and, to a less extent, also of the subject races. The Japanese term, "Co-Prosperity Sphere" was reportedly a "much better advertising slogan" than the German term because it "implies not only economy on a vast scale, but also the sharing among all participants of all benefits derived from that economy."²²

However, the Japanese authorities on geopolitics used interchangeably such terms as Lebensraum, Autarky, and Grossraumwirtschaft. Kunitatsu includes the following conditions for the structure of Lebensraum:

²¹Loc. cit.

²²Paul Einzig, The Japanese "New Order" In Asia (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1943), pp. 24-25 and 30.

(1) The co-prosperity sphere based on the theory of broad-space economy, (2) the sphere secure for defense in terms of physical geography and transportation, and (3) the autarkic sphere which may have to cover the temperate as well as tropical zones, in order to assure its essential raw material resources.²³

It is clear that the complete satisfaction of conditions set for Japanese Lebensraum necessarily deprived another country of its living space. Furthermore, the economic and geo-strategic expediency can not overshadow historical and political difficulties.²⁴ Hence, the economic policies of Japan regarding the GEACPS were understandably based on a gradualistic approach. After complete reorganization of her national economy, Japan would expand the original bloc economy area of Manchukuo-Japan into China.²⁵ The Japan-Manchukuo-China sphere would then be expanded to include Thailand, Burma, Indo-China, the Netherland East Indies, the Philippines and on and on, thereby gradually evolving into the Grossraumwirtschaft comprising the Asian continent as well as the Pacific Ocean.²⁶

²³Hisaya Kunimatsu, Chiseigaku to Toa-Kyoeiken no shomondai (Geopolitics and various problems of GEACPS. Tokyo: Kaiseikan, 1944), pp. 73-78.

²⁴Ibid., p. 78.

²⁵F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 337-344.

²⁶See M. A. Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 69-70 ff.

III. ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION

The Japanese made much of the advantages accruing from the GEACPS for participating states. Some countries were endowed with rich natural resources and raw materials, while others maintained an extensive scale of highly developed mechanical industry. Hence, there was wasteful duplication and regrettable maladjustment of production and distribution among these nation-states. This could be prevented in a controlled and rationalized economic area. As an example of wasteful duplication:

Sugar is produced superabundantly in Java and enough of it is turned out in Nippon to cover the total consumption within the Japanese Empire. The Philippine Islands produced vast quantities of sugar which they are obliged to dump on the American market to the latter's incessant perplexity. If, then, the Philippines curtailed the sugar industry and produced cotton, Japan with her huge cotton industry would be able to consume it to the benefit of both.²⁷

According to the Research Section of the Japanese Ministry of War, the whole economy of the Co-prosperity Sphere would be harnessed in such a way that it would reduce overproduction of those resources for which the demand inside the area would remain below the existing production. Rubber, tin and sugar were specially mentioned in this connection. On the other hand, the production of other goods

²⁷ The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere (Tokyo: The Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, 1941), p. 9.

needed by the sphere would be increased. No GEACPS nation should live for itself alone but for the Sphere as a whole. Each nation should produce that to which it was best adapted, and receive what it lacked from the others. The principle of international division of labor was, therefore, to be applied extensively.²⁸

Japanese sources included the followings as the general economic plan of intra-GEACPS: (1) free movement of capital from one region to another, no section being developed in preference to, or to the detriment of the others; (2) the establishment of a central financing institution to assure a smooth flow of working capital as well as stabilize inter-state monetary relations; (3) uniform distribution of population proportionate to the productive capacity of each region; and (4) efforts at increasing productivity among raw material-producing countries through the introduction of scientific means.²⁹

An official Japanese source listed following things to be done in respect to the economy of the GEACPS as a whole:

GEA should have a self-sufficient economy,

²⁸Einzig, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

²⁹The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, p. 5. See Construction of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, p. 9.

doing away with gold economy as a whole³⁰ and replacing it with community economy... With respect to currency, the note-issuing banks of each locality should be taken over and other paper currencies should be additionally issued. The exchange rate between the local currencies and the yen should be based on the exchange quotations prevailing at each time...

Economic plans based on geographical, economic and other relevant factors should be drawn up for each country, and their industries appropriately distributed. In making this distribution, attention should be paid with a view to making the countries inescapable of separating from Japan politically...

In order to supplement the labor power in the districts with scarce population, Chinese, Indians and some of the local inhabitants should be migrated.³¹

Among the economic schemes affecting the entire "Co-prosperity" sphere, were also the followings:

The mineral resources of the "Co-Prosperity" Sphere will be exploited to the full in so far as the present output does not fully cover the requirements of the "Co-Prosperity" Sphere plus the quantities needed for the accumulation of strategical reserves...

Consumption in the "Co-Prosperity" Sphere will be influenced with the object of being able to cover requirements out of the resources of the particular countries concerned, and out of the resources of the other members of the "Co-Prosperity" Sphere in preference to outside countries.

³⁰According to Paul Einzig the Bank of Japan would have a central gold reserve to secure the yen, which would be the foundation of all other currencies. No attempt would be made, however, to maintain a ration between the gold stock and the volume of currency and credit. Einzig, op. cit., p. 48.

³¹IMTFE, Exhibit No. 675, pp. 6-7.

The Transport System of the "Co-Prosperity" Sphere will be reorganized to reduce its dependence on sea communications. To that end the Japanese authorities are planning to build extensive railways and roads...

Currencies of all Japanese-controlled countries will be based on the yen. Each country will have a note-issuing authority of its own, and the reserves of this authority will consist of a yen balance with the Bank of Japan.

After initial devaluations of the currencies of conquered countries, stability at the new parities will be maintained in the "Co-Prosperity" Sphere. Eventually the yen will be adopted as the monetary unit everywhere...

The monetary policy pursued will be one of expansion in accordance with the requirements of production.

The authorities will aim at maintaining a steady price level with the aid of extensive price control and direct Government intervention in the market.³²

The distribution of specific functions was to be arranged among the key member-states of the GEACPS, but the functions which Japan assumed herself are of special interest. As a central planning authority Japan would apply a high degree of planning to the GEACPS territories. Such planning, however, would affect only the main lines of the economy of the sphere and leave other details to the authorities of the various countries.³³ For instance: (1)

³²Einzig, op. cit., pp. 47-49.

³³INTFE, Exhibit No. 675, p. 7.

Japan would be the center for all specialized industries, such as the production of "precision-machinery," arms, important chemical products, and the shipping and fisheries;³⁴ (2) as the international financial center of the "Co-prosperity" sphere, Japan would cater to the financial requirements of the sphere. Under the system of multilateral exchange with Tokyo as its center, each member of the GEACPS would have a clearing account in Tokyo, and would settle its liabilities in relation to other members of the sphere by drawing on its clearing balance;³⁵ and (3) the area should be provided with scientifically trained and technically skilled Japanese.³⁶

Manchukuo and different sections of China were assigned certain functions. A great part of Japan's heavy industries would be transferred to Manchukuo and the greater part of her light industries to Northern, and to a lesser extent, to Central and South China.

Manchukuo's mining, industry and agriculture would be vigorously promoted with the aid of a labor force from Northern China.

Northern China, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang would increase their production of raw materials.

³⁴M. A. Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), p. 69.

³⁵Einzig, op. cit., p. 49.

³⁶Aziz, op. cit., pp. 69-70; IMTFE, Exhibit No. 675, p. 7.

improve their transport system by constructing railways, and build up widespread industries.

Central and Southern China would contribute to Japan's food supply as a result of the agrarian reforms.³⁷

In general, highly technical and strategic industries were to concentrate in Japan and Korea. The remaining countries of the GEACPS were to retain or develop secondary industries connected with their agricultural or mineral production.³⁸

"The root of the formation of an economic system in Sphere," Professor Maehara stated was "to systematize monistically and organically the economy of the entire Sphere as one unit."³⁹ This meant that a nation-state within the Sphere was not to be economically independent from other component members of the Sphere, and that the GEACPS itself was to be economically organized on a consistent plan as if it were operated in a single country. Maehara viewed such relationships among the members of the Sphere as entirely different from the traditional relationship of the home state and its colonies; in the case of latter, the colonies supplied raw materials that were manufactured in the home state.⁴⁰

³⁷Aziz, loc. cit.

³⁸Ibid., p. 70; Einzig, op. cit., p. 48.

³⁹Maehara, Nokuchi and Kobayashi, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 71-76.

⁴⁰Ibid.

But when the colonies can produce capital goods by themselves, they tended to become economically independent and remain separated from the economic control of the home state.

In GEACPS the economy of each nation-state was, however, to be only a component part of the greater economy of the whole Sphere. Each part, exercising its own peculiarities, was to play for the development of the whole a certain role designated for her. Accordingly, a part was inseparable from the whole, and the disjunction of a member from GEACPS would risk its own existence.

In matters of foreign trade with countries outside the Sphere, the GEACPS was to be considered as a single unit under the leadership of Japan. There would be no commercial relations or treaties with countries outside the Sphere when they were detrimental to the common interests of the Sphere. The proponents of GEACPS further contended that all resources and industries within the Sphere had to be used for the benefit and welfare of all its members. These should not be exploited for the maintenance of prestige and power of a non-Asiatic power in East Asia. However, the doors of East Asia would be open to all non-Asiatic powers when the Japanese "just" demands were recognized. Although the Japanese government rejected in principle the maintenance

of trade with areas outside the Coprosperity Sphere,⁴¹ it did not preclude the possibility of trading with other spheres for what the GEACPS could not produce. There seemed to be no question regarding the exchange of goods with the European (German) Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, in respect to whether the GEACPS should deal with the American sphere or bloc, there was some differences of opinion among the Japanese policy-makers of the GEACPS prior to the Pearl Harbor.⁴²

All these plans were the work of the Second Konoye Cabinet, in which General Tojo, the War Minister, and his group were highly influential.⁴³

⁴¹Aziz, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

⁴²INTFE, Exhibit No. 675, pp. 6-6A. Cf. Einzig, op. cit., p. 46.

⁴³The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere. p. 10.

CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE GREATER EAST ASIA COPROSPERITY SPHERE

In spite of its relief measures against the world depression the "bloc economy" had another serious weakness, in the opinion of Japanese planners of the GEACPS, in that it gave little or no consideration to the "geopolitical" relations of its component elements.¹ The ideas of the GEACPS, as envisaged by Matsuoka, presumably emphasized such regional relationships and on that basis embraced the Toa Seimei Ken 東亞生命圈 (East Asia Lebensraum), Toa Jikyu Jisoku Ken 東亞自治自足圈 (East Asia Autarkic Sphere), and the postulate of East Asian Sphere independent from Euro-American spheres.²

The implication of these ideas on the political organization of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere have been far-reaching. In fact, the organismic and legal theories of the GEACPS, both of which are discussed in this

¹Tetsuji Kada, "The Theory of an East Asiatic Unity," Contemporary Japan: A Review of Far Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 5 (July, 1939), pp. 574-581.

²Toa Chosa Kai (ed.), Toa Mondai Kenkyu (Tokyo: Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun Sha & Osaka Mainichi Shimbun Sha, 1941), Vol. I, pp. 17-20.

chapter, represent the essential concepts of Japanese geopolitics.

I. "NEW MORAL ORDER" IN ASIA

Realistic Idealism. The Investigation Department of the Japanese Foreign Ministry had kept as confidential a document, entitled Nihon Koyu no Gaiko Shido Genri Koryo 日本国府、外交指導原理綱領 (An Outline of Principles Guiding Japan's Fundamental Diplomatic Policy).³ A Chinese intelligence officer suggested that "Japanese propaganda and other terminology stems in large part from this document."⁴ The main theme of this 1936 document was the Japanese concept of realistic idealism.

Although it would be a gross mistake to interpret any period of Japanese diplomacy entirely from an economic angle, the document points out, a most fundamental purpose of Japan's diplomacy has always been the protection and development of her self-interests. This was due to Japan's uncritical adop-

³Confidential, December 1936, Reel 1504 of O-4, Inter-departmental Committee Foreign Publications (IDC films), Item No. 67. Copies of this document are available, in miniature, as Reel 1691 of O-4, Item No. 194, Nippon Koyu no Gaiko Shido Genri Koryo (An Outline of Principles Guiding Japanese Foreign Policy), and also as CAJMPA, SP 252, Outline of the guiding principles of Japanese diplomacy (Nihon koyu no gaiko shido genri koryo), Dec. 1936, 153 p., Reel SP 146.

Hereafter this source will be referred to as "Reel 1504 of O-4, No. 67".

⁴For his brief remark, see the front page of the "Reel of O-4, No. 67".

tion of Euro-American imperialism as if it were her own principle of diplomacy. For this reason Japan had been unpopular among the Chinese and other Asiatic nations, despite the fact that she alone was in the position to secure their safety and welfare as their only powerful ally.⁵

Accordingly, it was high time for Japan to abandon the Western form of imperialism and return to Japan's traditional moralism, that is, to declare Kodo (Imperial Way) to the four seas and correct the defects of the then contemporary world with it and thereby materialize Hakko Ichiu—"the familistic world society."⁶

If the advancement of the material well-being of the Japanese people was to be the sole purpose of her diplomacy, Japan could best pursue a policy of "pacifism" (neutrality) and "negativism" (isolation).⁷ No new territory could be obtained without the risk of going to war against another imperialist power or without arousing national consciousness on the part of the natives. Therefore, if the cost for her military preparations were diverted to domestic use, Japan, with her then territorial possessions, could enhance the living standard of her people, provided she carried out

⁵"Reel 1504 of O-4, No. 67," pp. 9-10.

⁶Ibid., p. 11 and p. 90.

⁷Ibid., p. 4.

would not countenance the separation of ethics from government. Only the Philosopher-King, who equated politics and ethics, was capable of ruling over the people "as Heaven desires them to be governed." Hence, government "may be moral, immoral, but never amoral."¹²

The Confucian, Shinto and Buddhist components of Japanese ideology all recognize, though in different ways, the doctrine of inequalities among men. Therefore, to the Japanese getting men of superior virtue in government was more important than the form, political theory and law of the government.¹³ Likewise, it was only the moral and right nation which followed Kodo that was worthy to exercise universal sovereignty.

Thus the purpose of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere under Japan's leadership would be the attainment of a "moralistic" Lebensraum in East Asia in which each nation-state would be able to embody the Kodo spirit of Hakko Ichiu.¹⁴ Furthermore, this Asiatic regional organization was also to be regulated by the moral traditions of Asia as

¹²Ibid., p. 28.

¹³"The Doctrine of the Mean" (Legge's translation), Chapter XX, Sec. 2, 3, 4. In James Legge, The Four Books (Shanghai, 1930), as cited in Reischauer, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

¹⁴Chiri (Geography): Kokudo kokusei hen (On National soil and National strength) (The Secondary School Texts Publishing Co., 1944), p. 95. See also Toa Chosa Kai (ed.), op. cit., p. 17.

and incapacity of the League, Germany was able to rearm herself, regain lost ground and forge ahead on the world stage to such a marked degree while Italy had scarcely been afforded "as good an opportunity to endeavor to reestablish the ancient Roman Empire as she had in the past few years."¹⁸

Professor Kobayashi demonstrated that previously the order hitherto in East Asia was devoid of "morality," owing to the intervention by the Anglo-Saxon powers. Their order was accordingly aimed at the exploitation of East Asia; an order whereby the strong power preyed upon the weak power. Hence, the weaker did not trust or respect the stronger, and the stronger had little respect for the weaker. Neither "Co-existence" nor "coprosperity" has existed in such an order.¹⁹

The new moral order in Asia, therefore, purported to be:

An order whereby the stronger, with its responsible guidance and protection, guarantees the existence and the growth of the weaker. It is an order whereby the weaker has trust and respect in the leadership of the stronger, and heartily yields to the stronger's direction. Consequently, the GEACPS is an order which is bound by love, respect and trust.²⁰

Such an order was, of course, in accord with Hakko Ichiu, the

¹⁸Otto D. Tolischus, Through Japanese Eyes (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1945), pp. 4-5.

¹⁹Mitsuo Maehara, Hoichiro Nokuchi and Hajime Kobayashi, Tai Toa Kyo-Ei-Ken No Min-Soku (Nations of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere) (Tokyo: Rokumeikan, 1942), Vol. III, p. 53.

²⁰Ibid., p. 53.

great spirit of the founding of Japan. The mutual existence and prosperity would come to full maturity, Kobayashi continued, only when this spirit saturated every field of the GEACPS such as legal, political, economic and cultural.²¹

It may be added, however, that Japan did not preclude territorial conquest in the course of establishing the new "moral" order. It was argued that the early acquisition by the colonial powers of territory in Asia did entitle them to neither "preferential rights" nor an "ethical and moral" right to its possession. The vital question was whether such territory was being utilized "ethically and morally."²²

II. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF GREATER EAST ASIA

The Doctrine of National Inequality. The traditional theory of equality of nations was challenged by Japanese jurists. Professor Maehara argued that every state differed in actuality before international law as well as in its real power. The Naval Limitation Treaty of 1922 provided Japan with the ratio of three for the ratio of five respectively of the United States and Britain.²³ The Japanese viewed this as an acceptance of a discriminating

²¹Ibid., p. 55.

²²Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere (Tokyo: The Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, 1941), p. 50.

²³Emelyn Waltz, Far Eastern History (Boston: The Christopher Publishing House, 1953), p. 380.

status in international law. In the Council of the League of Nations, the great powers had permanent seats whereas such privileges were not given to the small powers, although the latter were equally represented in the Assembly.

These are examples of practical, if not theoretical, inequality among the states. Maehara noted that, the inequality of states in reality meant:

That the states, placed in unequal position, have recognized such an inequality by their will. Thus, the principle of the equality among states is tantamount to the denial of natural inequality and to the disregard of the will of the state.²⁴

Because the League Covenant acknowledged a legal primacy of the Great Powers, some states were entitled to much greater rights among states.²⁵

The doctrine of equality of states was introduced into the theory of international law by the naturalist writers. According to Professor Brierly, the Naturalists argued:

That as men in the 'state of nature,' that is to say, before their entry into the political state, were equal to one another, and as states are still in a 'state of nature,' therefore states must be equal to one another. ...this doctrine requires us to believe that states are equal in law despite these obvious inequalities in other respects.²⁶

The doctrine denies, however, that the weakness of a state is

²⁴Maehara, Nokuchi, and Kobayashi, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 83.

²⁵J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (5th ed.: Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 123.

²⁶Ibid., p. 124.

any excuse in law for disregarding its legal rights. It does mean that states are all equally entitled to have whatever rights they have upheld under the law.

Yet the ideal of the GEACPS, argued Maehara, could hardly be materialized by the agreements among states of "equal" rights, since "it emerges from the natural principle which places the nation-states of superior power and resources in a higher position than those of lesser importance.²⁷ In other words, the order of hierarchy was to be arranged by each component member of the GEACPS holding its own proper position.

Japan would naturally be entrusted to determine the degree of inequality in the "real power" for different members of the GEACPS, and there was to be no attempt to apply the "democratic" principle of "one state, one vote" in the managements of international affairs. Traditionally, a sovereign state could legally claim equal status with others and the right of self-rule. But this would not be the case in the GEACPS, where each member state would be assigned to "proper" functions and status in terms of its own strength. The scope of self-rule of any member was to be limited, so as to abide by the common object of the GEACPS.²⁸ Since limits were set upon each member according to its ability, any activities transcending such limits were

²⁷Maehara, Nokuchi, and Kobayashi, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 87.

²⁸Ibid., p. 88.

surrender of its extraterritorial rights in Manchukuo and the pledges made by her in her treaties with Manchukuo, China and Thailand were cited as evidence of regional reciprocity and "equitableness."³¹

The Principle of Justice. The principle of intra-Sphere relationship was, in practice, to follow "the principle of justice," which would enable as well as help each member to secure its proper and legitimate place in the GEACPS. Since the "old-fashioned academic principle of equality of nations" had failed to take cognizance of this stern fact, Matsushita asserted, "the principle of justice...constitutes a vital point in the compilation of an international law for greater East Asia."³²

The so-called East Asiatic concept of justice was compared with its Western counterpart. The latter was one of observing treaty rights and obligations albeit "static," while the former was one of "dynamic justice," which sought more equitable adjustment of the two.³³ The "dynamic justice" did not mean disregard of international law but a revision of the law in the light of moralism so that nations could maintain respect for the law.³⁴

³¹Ibid., pp. 1717-1718 and 1714.

³²Ibid., pp. 1718-1719.

³³Kawai, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

³⁴"Reel 1504 of O-4, No. 67," p. 107.

The "Spheric" Law. Although European international law did not include in its scope the establishment of a co-prosperity sphere in an Asiatic region, Japan took it for granted that the treaties contracted between her and Manchukuo, China and Thailand had legalized the de jure structure of the proposed GEACPS. Since such treaties represented "voluntary" contracts between states, they could be repudiated by either party at an opportune moment. To rectify this law, Japanese proponents of the GEACPS urged the formulating of a "spheric" law in guiding the relations among the countries of the GEACPS.³⁵

In 1939, Karl Schmidt, a German Professor of Law, asserted that the principles of Lebensraum and Grossraumwirtschaft should be recognized as doctrines in international law. He criticized the failure of existing international law to keep pace with issues and developments in problems of space and attributed this failure to the tradition of treaty-positivism and the legitimacy of the status quo. Schmidt further maintained that the Monroe Doctrine was the first noteworthy application of geopolitics. "Our endeavor to introduce the idea of principles relating to greater areas into international law will find here its best foundation and

³⁵Matsushita, op. cit., pp. 1712, 1714; Masatoshi Matsushita, "Greater East Asia International Law (II)," Contemporary Japan, Vol. XII, No. 1 (January 1943), p. 30.

starting point," he emphasized.³⁶

The "Spheric" law, based upon Japanese concept of "dynamic" justice was hardly different from the position of Schmidt, except that the Japanese theorists stressed such Confucian as well as organic ideas as "community harmony" and "mutualism of partner-states."

Although international jurists had not disputed the national right to propagate self-defence and self-preservation, they were in a quandry regarding the exact nature and extent of these rights. For this reason, Japan argued that it was absolutely necessary that small and weaker nations cooperate with powerful neighboring states to insure their self-existence. Accordingly, it could be argued that in the GEACPS the weaker nations were to exercise the right of self-existence as defined in international law; however, in view of the upsurge of bloc spirit this right of self-existence should not be viewed as a "local aspiration on the part of an individual state," but as a "contributive cog in the wheel of regional reciprocity."³⁷

For the settlement of all intra-Spheric disputes, a central peace machinery was suggested. It was to be entrusted with the power of mediation and arbitration even for a disputes

³⁶Charles Kruszezski, "Germany's Lebensraum." The American Political Science Review, Vol. XXXIV (October, 1940), pp. 973-975.

³⁷Masatoshi Matsushita, "Greater East Asia International Law (I)," Contemporary Japan, Vol. XI, No. 12 (Dec. 1942), pp. 1715-1716.

occurring between a members of this Sphere and that of another Sphere. Such matters as extradition of undesirable political refugees and judicial and police cooperation among the countries of the GEACPS were to be treated "from the standpoint of spheric harmony without encroaching in the least upon the rights of local administrations."³⁸

"Inter-Spheric" Law. The relations of this Sphere with other Spheres of the world were to be regulated by the so-called "inter-spheric" law. In order to avoid confusion, spheric and inter-spheric laws were to be a unified law, instead of representing two different codes of law.³⁹ Thus, intra-spheric law of the GEACPS would not be detrimental to the political and economic interests of other spheres. It would not place any restriction on freedom of the seas and on inter-sphere trade. In fact it was to respect the three-mile limit of territorial waters.⁴⁰

III. ORGANISMIC INTRA-SPHERIC RELATIONSHIPS

The organismic theory of political organization, which coincides with the traditional political thinking in Japan, expresses a basic concept of Japanese chiseigaku 地政学 (geopolitics).


³⁸Masatoshi Matsushita, "Greater East Asia International Law (II)," Contemporary Japan, Vol. XII, No. 1 (January 1943), p. 32.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 30-31.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 35.

Accordingly, just as living organisms tend to expand strong and dynamic states such as Japan with a limited territory are bound to enlarge their area of influence as a means of self-preservation. Therefore, it was assumed by the Japanese geopoliticians that the weak neighboring states should join to a Pan-regional organization, that is, the GEACPS.⁴¹

Leadership of Japan. Among the proponents of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, there was no disagreement on who was destined to become the leader of East Asia. The Japanese assumption of leadership was apparently based on the Confucian as well as organismic principle of hierarchical relationships among the "Family of Asiatic Nations."⁴² Japan replaced China in assuming the "father's" role in Asia which was long held by China. The concept of the leading nation was also explained in terms of "Japan's" political ideals, such as Hakko Ichiu, Kokutai, and also Musubi (knot).

The term Musubi  expresses Japan's "cosmic" and "biological forces" which unites "divergent elements, generates life, and foster growth." The capacity for cultur-

⁴¹These views are almost identical with those of Rudolph Kjellen and Karl Haushofer.

⁴²For the Confucian principle see Chung-Yueh Hsu, China's Entrance into the Family of Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), and for the organismic principle see Rudolph Kjellen, Der Staat als Lebensform (Leipzig: S. S. Hirgel Verlag, 1917), p. 75.

al assimilation was used to explain Japan's capacity for expansion, which in turn revealed her capacity to "make the world one household"- Ichiuification of Hakko.⁴³ Kokutai (national polity) was supposed to indicate that Japan was the "life-center of universe."⁴⁴ The fact that almost all the families in Japan were related at least by distant blood ties to the Imperial Family was cited as an indication of peerless "solidarity of the Japanese people and the permanency of the State."⁴⁵

There were other reasons why Japan felt that she deserved the leader's role in Asia. Of all the Asian nations, only Japan remained independent by escaping the "tigers mouth" of Western imperialism,⁴⁶ and consequently the logical defender and redeemer of Asia.⁴⁷ It was claimed that the Japanese were also superior physically, mentally, and spiritually, as they were considered to be "an amalgamation of the various races of the world which enabled them to thrive in all temperatures...having the highest reproductive rate in

⁴³Tatsuo Kawai, The Goal of Japanese Expansion (Hatten Nippon no Mokubyo) (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1938), p. 39.

⁴⁴CAJMF, SP 255, "Basic ideas of political science in Japan (Nihon seiji-gaku no kiso rinen)," March, 1939, Reel SP 147, pp. 20-21.

⁴⁵Chikao Fujisawa, Japanese and Oriental Political Philosophy (Tokyo: The Research Department of the Daito Bunka Kyokai, 1935), p. 72.

⁴⁶Kishio Satomi, Hakko Ichiu (Eight Corners of the World under One Roof) (Tokyo: Kinseisha, 1940), pp. 18-22.

⁴⁷Construction of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere (Osaka: The Mainichi Publishing Company, 1943), p. 36.

the world and superior functioning bodies" despite shortness of their stature.⁴⁸

The Japanese sense of unity made them think of their world as an organismic whole. Hence their concept of internationalism differed from the Western counterpart which meant an association of individual, sovereign states. The Japanese vision of the GEACPS would subordinate the individual parts to the good of the whole and curtail the sovereignty of perhaps all the member states.⁴⁹

As the most advanced and able nation in Asia, Japan assumed the role of the family chief and hence the responsibilities of a big "father" for the "children" of the GEACPS family. Such an arrangement was to be the royal road to increase "the utmost efficiency of all concerned."⁵⁰ Hence Japan demanded that Asia first acknowledge the enhanced position of Japan, because the Western powers which were ignorant of the uniqueness of Japan would not concede a privileged position to Japan, unless the Asiatic nations themselves granted it.⁵¹ Thus, the leadership of Japan was

⁴⁸Hidejiro Nagata, Nippon no Zenshin (Japan's Antecedents) (Tokyo: Shinchosa, 1939), pp. 189-190.

⁴⁹Robert K. Reischauer, Japan: Government-Politics (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1939), p. 34.

⁵⁰Mitsuo Maehara, Hoichiro Nokuchi, and Hajime Kobayashi, Tai Toa Kyo-Ei-Ken No Min-Seku (Nations of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere) (Tokyo: Rokumeikan, 1942), Vol. III, p. 57.

⁵¹Masamichi Royama, Foreign Policy of Japan: 1914-39 (Tokyo: Japanese-Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p. 34.

recognized when a pro-Japanese Philippine lawyer said what Hakko Ichiu meant to him:

That each member of the GEACPS has its proper place under the sun. Every nation will handle and maintain its own government and may make its own decision as regards internal affairs, and Dai Nippon as the center will see to it that everything is kept within the bounds of good conduct and all that may endanger the position of East Asia as a whole is checked.⁵²

Such a concept of a hierarchical structure of the GEACPS can be deduced from an aristocratic sato shugi 藩閥主義 (principle of inequality of discrimination), an organismic shutai kyogutai shugi 主体局体主義 (a belief that everything has its main and subordinate parts), and also from a Pan-regional principle called Kokusai dai chiiki-teki shido kokka shugi 国际大区域の指導国家主義 (a principle of grossraum leadership among nations) which envisaged several world blocs as led by one, superior, leading nation within each sphere.⁵³

All of these principles are integral parts of Japanese geopolitics.

Plans for Political Construction. In general, the members of the GEACPS would not be required to modify forms

⁵²Construction of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, op. cit., p. 28.

⁵³Kumataro Yamamoto, Gaikan Toa Chiri (An Outline of East Asian Geography) (Tokyo: Kajitani Shoin, 1942), pp. 16-17; Kojiro Sugimori, "Kokushin Ki no .Seiji Rinen" in Makoto Hori, ed., Gendai Seiji no Kakushin Ron: Gendai Seiji Koza Dai Ni Maki (A Renovation Theory of Modern Politics: Lectures on Modern Politics, Vol. II) (Tokyo: Showa Shobo, 1942), p. 8.

of their respective government or political systems, but they would be called upon to adjust their policies or forms of government to the military and economic "requirements" of the whole, and also to the historical, political and cultural peculiarities of each area.⁵⁴ Under no circumstances, however, would the members be permitted to adopt policies aimed at their exclusive benefit at the expense of fellow members.⁵⁵ Some maintained that "independence" should be understood as equivalent to "co-existence" and "coprosperity" within the Sphere. Nationalism no longer signified exclusive loyalty to one's country; it was to be a broad inclusive allegiance to the whole Sphere, upon whose permanent existence the integrity of the member nations depended.⁵⁶ Hence the Japanese conception of "independence" within the GEACPS could not be construed as the Western counterpart based on the idea of liberalism and national self-determination.

According to the plans drafted by various branches of its government, Japan undoubtedly realized the need to respect the right of native populations to independence in order to

⁵⁴CAJMF, IMT 467, "Draft of a plan for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (Dai Toa Kyoei-ken kensetsu gen'an - soko). Prepared by the Soryokusen Kenkyu-jo (Total War Research Institute). Japanese text and translation. Jan. 27, 1942. (IPS Doc. no. 2402). Reel WT60, p. 9. This refers also to IMTFE, Exhibit No. 1336 (Doc. no. 2402B), although their English translations are not identical.

⁵⁵Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere (Tokyo, Japan: The Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, 1941), p. 8.

⁵⁶Construction of the GEACPS, op. cit., p. 9.

secure the active cooperation of the member states. Nevertheless, in those areas where the inhabiting races had no capacity for independence or areas which were strategically vital, Japan was willing to incorporate them into her territories.⁵⁷ It can be assumed, therefore, that Japan would exercise the self-assumed right to annex any backward territory whenever it was expedient to do so and that, in case the idea of self-rule clashed with the total requirement of the Sphere, the latter would prevail.

In order to analyze the plans for political construction of the GEACPS it is necessary to examine the memoranda drafted by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and War and also by the "Total War Research Institute," which was established by the Konoe Cabinet in September 30, 1940, to conduct study, research and training of officials in connection with total national war.⁵⁸ The Foreign Ministry proposed as the basic policies the tightening of economic and military cooperation throughout the Sphere. While encouraging respect for the desire of people for political independence, it advocated incorporation of "any region into the Imperial territory" when it was necessary for Japan's national de-

⁵⁷ LNT 467, *op. cit.*, passim; IMTFE, Exhibit No. 1333 (Doc. no. 1112A), Foreign Ministry draft, "Summarized Plan for Management of the South Sea Area," December 14, 1941, passim.

⁵⁸ IMTFE, Exhibit No. 868 (Doc. no. 1795B). "Official Gazette," October 1, 1940, p. 1.

fense.⁵⁹

A plan of the War Ministry purported that all occupied areas would be made "independent" even though Japanese control of military and foreign affairs was taken for granted. Since a combination of several states was foreseen when necessary, "independence" did not necessarily mean "one race for one nations."⁶⁰

The Total War Research Institute presented a draft of over 210 pages on the "Basic Plan for Establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." In addition to political and economic plans the document contained sections on "spiritual" and intellectual construction in which the GEACPS was envisaged as a step to achieve Hakko Ichiu. A strong influence of ideological motives was also indicated in the adamant belief of the Institute that war with Russia would be inevitable after the "present" war (World War II).⁶¹

The Institute aimed at three stages in expansion of

⁵⁹IMTFE, Exhibit No. 1333 (Doc. no. 1112A), Foreign Ministry draft, "Summarized Plan for Management of the South Sea Area," December 14, 1941, p. 1.

⁶⁰IMTFE, Exhibit No. 1334 (Doc. no. 1957B). Research Section of the War Ministry, "The Fundamental Principles of the Remedial Measures for Southern Regions to be occupied as a result of the Great East Asia War," December 1941, p. 2.

⁶¹IMTFE, Exhibit No. 1336 (Doc. no. 2402B), Total War Research Institute. "Basic Plan for Establishment of Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere (draft)," January 27, 1942, pp. 2, 4 and passim.

the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.⁶² The Inner (Political) Sphere, which paralleled a Basic and First Sphere, would be called "the nucleus of the East Asiatic Union" and therefore would be under firm control of Japan. But most countries in the Smaller Co-prosperity Sphere (Second Sphere) and the Greater Co-prosperity Sphere (Third Sphere or Sphere of Influence) would eventually be granted as much political independence as possible.⁶³ As for the less developed areas, political tutelage was projected preceding absolute independence. However, no form of self-government was anticipated for those people who had no cultural formation or significance, such as Dajakas, Papuans, South Sea Islanders, and Siberians.⁶⁴

All three memoranda reiterated the extermination of European and American domination from the areas of GEACPS. All three proposed a form of political, economic, military and cultural cooperation throughout the Sphere. However, hardly any of their policies advocated for East Asia seemed original or new, as they, despite difference in degree of extremism, reflected a theoretical framework not too different from those of earlier pan-Asianists, pro-German

⁶²See Appendix A. For detail, see next Chapter of this manuscript.

⁶³IMTFE, Exhibit No. 1336, op. cit., p. 3.

⁶⁴M. A. Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), p. 91.

geopoliticians, and ultranationalists.

In the following analysis of Japan's official thinking for an individual country within the Sphere, Formosa and Korea have not been included since they were regarded as integral part of the Japanese empire.

1. Manchukuo: To any plan-makers of the GEACPS, "the Japan-Manchukuo-China" was the basis for the Sphere, while Manchukuo was considered to be a laboratory of Japanese policies. In it five races were living together and the Japanese experiment among 30 million Manchurians would either alienate or attract 400 million Chinese and an other 500 million Asians to or away from Japan.⁶⁵ According to the plan of the Total War Research Institute in reference to the political forms of the Sphere "after twenty years,"⁶⁶ Manchukuo was expected to become "unified with" Japan. Emigration to Manchukuo was to be encouraged further, and it was also to be made a fullfledged base for military operations against the Soviets.⁶⁷

2. China and Hong Kong: China was to join the East Asiatic unification (the Manchukuo-Japan) as an "independent"

⁶⁵CAJMF, SP 252, Outline of the guiding principles of Japanese diplomacy (Nihon koyu no gaiko shido genri koryo), Dec. 1936, Reel SP 146, pp. 31-32. Hereafter this source will be referred to as "Reel 1504 of O-4, No. 67."

⁶⁶CAJMF, INT467, Reel WT60, op. cit., pp. 10-13.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 10.

unit, rather than an integral unit like Manchukuo.⁶⁸ The verbal differentiation in "political freedom" of the two countries could be explained in terms of anti-Japanese resistance in China, "the greatest obstacle" for the Japanese ambition in Asia.⁶⁹ The importance of China to the GEACPS is beyond description, as Japan lay in "the very shadow of China." In an address delivered in 1937 before the Carolina Political Union, a Japanese diplomat declared that Japan had been "forced to take unusual steps" in China, because Communist influence was being increased there and overhanging Japan.⁷⁰

The disposition of Hongkong was to be decided contingent upon the settlement of the "China Incident."⁷¹

It seems appropriate to insert here the views expressed by Dr. Masamichi Royama, since they represent typical thinking on the part of Japanese intellectuals in the past. Formerly a Konoe's brain-truster,⁷² Royama is a well-known political scientist and has authored more than a

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹"Reel 1504 of O-4, No. 67," p. 51, p. 43, and pp. 114-115.

⁷⁰Yakichiro Suma, Where Japan Stands: Addresses Delivered in America on the Sino-Japanese Conflict (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1940), pp. 44-45.

⁷¹INT 467, op. cit., p. 10.

⁷²The Japan Biographical Research Dept., The Japan Biographical Encyclopedia & Who's Who (Tokyo: The Rengo Press, Ltd., 1960), pp. 1258-1259.

dozen books.⁷³ He admitted that the Sino-Japanese conflict was fundamentally caused by "a clash between Japan's territorial and economic imperialism and China's demand for national unity and independence." A simple solution might appear to be that either Japan forcefully assume the position of a conqueror or China "beat back" Japan, but neither solution could be carried out in practice. The new order in East Asia was, therefore, an attempt to discover "some common basis for readjustment between the demands" of Japan and China. He also noted that the principles of the new order would conflict "at a number of points" with those of the Open Door and equal opportunity. "The trading rights" of other countries in China would be recognized by the new order, but their "trading practices or processes" would have to be modified or restricted at some points. He argued that modification of the trading practices of others did not necessarily involve impairment of their trading rights.⁷⁴

⁷³Most of these are mild but persistent expressions of Japanese concept of the leading nation in Asia. Compare his Toa to Sekai- Shin Jitsujo heno Ronsoku (East Asia and the World- Theoretical Guide to New Order) (Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1941) with his chapter on "Asia Keizai Hatten no Kokusai Seijiteki Igi," (International Political Significance of the Development of Asian Economy) in Japan ECAFE Kyokai (ed.) Ajiya Keizai Hatten no Kiso Riron (Basic Theories for the Development of Asian Economy) (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1959).

⁷⁴Masamichi Royama, Foreign Policy of Japan: 1914-39 (Tokyo: Japanese-Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), pp. 170-171, and 173.

3. Soviet Eastern Territory: The Institute would incorporate into Japanese territory the Maritime area which was designated to be a part of the vital "Inner Sphere." The remaining portion of the Soviet Eastern Territory was to be made into a special region belonging to Manchukuo of Japan.⁷⁵

4. Mongolia: Inner and Outer Mongolia would be united, and whatever degree of political independence would be granted the country depending upon its capacity and situation after twenty years.⁷⁶

5. The Philippines: In view of its comparatively high standards of living and administration, both the plan of the Foreign Ministry and the long-run plan of the Total War Research Institute wanted to turn the Philippines into an "independent country as soon as possible," so long as the latter would promise close military, economic and diplomatic collaboration with Japan.⁷⁷

6. French Indo-China: Despite a long history of the Annamese independence movement, Annamese political capacity was regarded as too weak for full-fledged self-government. Even though the status of "autonomy" would soon be granted to those peoples as a race, it was deemed necessary that

⁷⁵INTFE, Exhibit No. 1336, op. cit., p. 11.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷See INTFE, Exhibit No. 1333, op. cit., p. 1, and Exhibit No. 1336, p. 11.

they have many more years' protection of Japan before achieving statehood. Also, some places of military importance were to be made special areas for joint defense.⁷⁸

7. Thailand: To this traditionally friendly country Japan offered more assistance and expected, in return, closer cooperation in the military, political, economic and cultural fields. Japan would see Thailand recover her lost lands⁷⁹ and recognize her "as an independent country forming one unit of the East Asiatic Union."⁸⁰

8. Burma: A high degree of autonomy was to be accorded Burma. Its intense anti-British movements and cultural level entitled her to an independence, but her importance in terms of resources and a campaign toward India would necessitate "some protective interference."⁸¹

9. British Malaya: In summarized plan of the Foreign Ministry for this area⁸² Singapore and the other Straits Settlements would be organized as Japanese territories and administered by a Japanese Governor-General at Singapore.

⁷⁸INTFE, Exhibit No. 1336, op. cit., pp. 11-12, and INT 467, op. cit., p. 11.

⁷⁹This included the States of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu which were lost by Thailand to British Malaya. See Exhibit No. 1333, op. cit., p. 3.

⁸⁰INTFE, Exhibit No. 1336, op. cit., p. 12.

⁸¹CAJMPA, INT 467, loc. cit.

⁸²INTFE, Exhibit No. 1333, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

The present Federation of Malaya was to be dismembered and a new federation would be organized chiefly consisting of the former Federated and non-Federated States. The component states of the new federation would be recognized as kingdoms but each one of these kingdom-states as well as the Federation as a whole would be made Japanese protectorates by treaties. The Japanese Governor-General at Singapore would direct these protectorates and control their administration.

10. British North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei: British North Borneo would become a Japanese territory. Sarawak would be given the status after abolishment of its English monarchy, but Brunei was to remain as a Japanese protectorate although it would be recognized as a kingdom. All three areas would also be administered by the Governor-General at Singapore.^{S3}

11. Dutch Indies: Both the Foreign Ministry and the Total War Research Institute would make the Dutch Indies independent as "the Indonesian Federation." The Institute, however, attached a condition such as "when the suitable time comes," and would place it under economic and military "protection" in view of a primitive living standards except on Java.^{S4} The Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, expected a close military, economic and diplomatic "collaboration." Java (including Madura, Bali, and Lombok), Sumatra and Celebes

^{S3}Ibid.

^{S4}CAJMPA, INT 467, op. cit., p. 12.

(excluding Timor, Bali and Lombok but including the Sesser Sunda Islands and the Molucca Islands) would be changed into "States" from the status of "districts," which together in turn would be made into a federation. All three were considered capable of self-government. Dutch Borneo, Dutch New Guinea and Dutch Timor, which were considered incapable of self-governing, were to be made dominions of the Federal States even though their "control" would be "entrusted to Japan." For reasons of military and transportation requirements, Japan would incorporate as her territories the Riouw and Lingga Islands in the Singapore Straits, and the Anambas and Natuna Islands in the Borneo Straits. They would also be under the administration of the Japanese Governor-General at Singapore.⁸⁵

12. Areas in and out of the "Third Stage" Sphere:⁸⁶ According to the long-range plan of the Institute, Australia and India belonged to the so-called "Sphere of Influence" or "Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere."⁸⁷ This area was to be included in the GEACPS in its third stage of construction.⁸⁸ However, in a different section of the same plan⁸⁹ Hawaii

⁸⁵INTFE, Exhibit No. 1333, op. cit., p. 2.

⁸⁶See Appendix A.

⁸⁷INTFE, Exhibit No. 1336, op. cit., p. 3.

⁸⁸See the following Chapter for details.

⁸⁹INTFE, Exhibit No. 1336, op. cit., p. 13, and CAJNFA, INT 467, p. 12.

and Midway were grouped together with New Guinea and other South Pacific Islands, all of which would be incorporated into Japanese territory as they had great military importance but had no notable races worthy for self-government. New Zealand, although it remained outside the third stage sphere, was placed in the same category as Australia; both areas were considered as eventual territories of Japan in order to facilitate immigration of the Japanese race. As for India, Japan seems to have had no specific plan but to make it, if possible, an independent country having membership in the GEACPS.

It appears that the Japanese government had not spelled out administrative structures for individual members of the GEACPS except in general terms. "One-colored form of administration" was not envisaged in the light of the notable variety of historical and living conditions among these countries. For mutual settlement of various affairs and for mutual cooperation, however, committees, according to proposals, were to be formed by the peoples of the Sphere. The offices of these committees, preferably located in Japan, would presumably see to it that the following functions were carried out: (1) Security of military key points; (2) strengthening economic dependence upon Japan; (3) fostering the common ideals of the establishment of the Sphere; (4) emigration of able Japanese; and (5) the universal diffusion of the Japanese language.⁹⁰

⁹⁰INTFE, Exhibit No. 1336, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

In the opinion of the Total War Research Institute, construction of the GEACPS might require two wars, the current "Greater East Asia War" and another war with other spheres of the world. Hence, completion of second stage construction⁹¹ of the GEACPS while preparing for next war was considered "the primary starting points for the political construction"⁹² of the GEACPS.

A proposal on the construction of the GEACPS, which was not too different from the plans of the government, was provided by the president of an ultranationalist society.⁹³ According to Kingoro Hashimoto, the Sphere would be administratively divided into a category of "independent countries" which were to be supervised by Japanese advisers especially in the field of defense and diplomacy, and a category of "districts," consisting of areas which were strategically important or whose races had no capacity for independence.⁹⁴ The Districts which he would become Japanese territory were:

- a. Hainan Island and Hong Kong.
- b. Malaya, Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes.
- c. Ceylon Island and the opposite coast of India.
- d. Other islands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans (excluding Madagascar).

⁹¹See Appendix A.

⁹²CAJNFA, INT 467, op. cit., p. 9.

⁹³INTFE, Exhibit No. 675.

⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 5-6, and INTFE, Proceedings, p. 12,023.

And he listed the following countries as independent in the Sphere:

- a. Manchukuo.
- b. China (special areas to be designated in North China and Fukien).
- c. Burma (including the Bengal area of India).
- d. French Indo-China (French control to be withdrawn in the future).
- e. India.
- f. Philippines.
- g. Afghanistan (to be given Baluchistan).
- h. Siam (to be given portions of Malaya and Burma).
- i. Java.

In addition, a "Supreme Council for the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence" was to be established in Tokyo; a Planning Board to handle business affairs was to be established under this Supreme Council.⁹⁵

IV. COMPARISON WITH OTHER TYPES OF INTER-STATE SYSTEMS

Professor Perich of Belgrad University stated, according to Matsushita:

The neue ordnung of the world should be composed of selected units of nations whose economic relations should be guided by the principle of greater sphere economy, and that they should form a federation among themselves acknowledging a common international law. His idea is that, for the smooth operation of greater sphere economy in the world, all the component units of nations should form an international federation or a union of states.⁹⁶

Naturally, the question arises, did Japan's objective of the

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Quoted in Masatoshi Matsushita, "Greater East Asia International Law, (I)," Contemporary Japan, Vol. XI, No. 12 (December 1942), p. 1714.

GEACPS envision either a federation or "a union of states" based on such a principle of regional economy?

It was often admitted that the GEACPS was one of the three regional blocs, the other two being the "European Co-Prosperity Sphere of Germany and Italy" and the "North and South American Co-Prosperity Sphere."⁹⁷ Yet, the Japanese took pains to explain the differences of their system from and superiority to other regional systems. They claimed their Sphere was to be a combination of "partner-states" aiming at mutual prosperity and welfare of the region as well as of the world. They visualized in the Japanese system a regional international organization that in its inter-Spheric relationship would emphasize such ideas as "co-existence" and "mutual reliance," for it was guided by the principle of Hakko Ichiu.⁹⁸

Cf. Federal Governments. The GEACPS was referred to by Hashimoto as "The Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence" in which the constituent countries formed an "organic whole, with Japan as the brain, growing and developing as one living substance..." It was, therefore, more than a horizontal federation of Asian countries; it was also an organismic and hierarchic federation. The organismic

⁹⁷See INTFE, Proceedings, p. 15,653.

⁹⁸Ibid.; see also Masamichi Royama, Foreign Policy of Japan: 1914-1939 (Tokyo: Japanese-Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p. 171.

principle of the GEACPS was likened to the "principle of Hakko Ichiu...similar to that of the human body."⁹⁹

1. Deutsch Reich (1871-1918): Far from being legally equal, the component states of the German Empire were but an agglomeration of unequals dominated by one state, Prussia.¹⁰⁰ The structure of the GEACPS resembled this Empire in that it was also planned as an agglomeration of unequal states dominated by Japan. Both the Reich and the GEACPS combined authoritarianism with federalism, but the GEACPS could still become an absolute autocracy which was not possible in the Reich because the Kaiser was checked by the Bundesrat (the Federal Council), and also by Reichstag (the Federal Diet), the only democratic-representative institution in the Empire.¹⁰¹ In none of the plans for the GEACPS, however, was there any provision to check the position of the Japanese Emperor, symbol of the GEACPS's unity.

2. The United States of America: The United States acts as a single unit in external relations and a member "state" of the Union could not and cannot be recognized as an independent state. In the GEACPS, most members would be recognized as "independent" if not "autonomous." Nevertheless, the power Japan would enjoy over the other independent

⁹⁹INTFE, Exhibit No. 675, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁰⁰Gwendolen M. Carter, and John H. Herz, Major Foreign Powers (3rd ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1957), p. 400.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

members of the GEACPS appeared to be as great as the power designated to the national government of the United States vis-a-vis its component states. On the other hand, it would not be impossible that a member of the GEACPS including so-called independent countries have less powers than a state of the American Union. In the American system each state is treated as equal before law, whereas in the proposed Japanese system each country was to assume formally an unequal role.

Cf. the "Protective" Relationship. A protector usually guides important affairs of the protectorate such as finance, diplomacy, and defence as a means of protecting the latter. The exact nature of the protective relationship is decided by a treaty or other forms of agreement. The relationship between the protector and the protectorate is based on the unequal relationship, and therefore it resembles the relative positions among the member states of the GEACPS. The difference between the two was that in theory the former was "not based on 'mutual collaboration' as the latter was."¹⁰²

It seems that the range of control Japan would have exercised over the Sphere's members was bound to be much wider than the control exercised by the protector over the protectorate. Under such circumstances, every Japanese policy in Asia could be counted as a measure to promote

¹⁰²Mitsuo Maehara, Hoichiro Nokuchi, and Hjime Kobayashi, Tai Toa Kyo-Ei-Ken No Min-Soku (Nations of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere) (Tokyo: Rokumeikan, 1942), Vol. I, p. 52.

mutual collaboration among the Asian countries.

Cf. the League of Nations. As stated, the relationship of mutual reliance within the GEACPS was to be far more than the ordinary treaty relationship between one sovereign power and another. It was not intended to become a world organization like the League of Nations; it covered a region, however ambiguous its geographical boundaries may have been.¹⁰³

This Japanese version of a regional international organization was called a "cooperative" organization with "constructive and positive" functions in maintaining the then current order. In reference to the League, Japan argued that, if any international organization existed merely to maintain the status quo, changes of the present conditions would diminish or destroy its functions. For example, therefore, if any near-by country had enough national power to remain outside the Japanese system, Japan would have to take any necessary steps to make it join the Japanese "cooperative federation." The true independence of such a country, in the eyes of the Japanese, would cause "conflicts," rather than cooperation, with that power.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³Royama, op. cit., p. 170. Also see the next Chapter for boundary questions.

¹⁰⁴CAJMPA, SP 252, Outline of the guiding principles of Japanese diplomacy (Nihon Koyu no gaiko shido genri koryo), Dec. 1936, Reel SP 146, pp. 116-117.

Cf. The Monroe Doctrine. As already discussed in the section on "Geopolitical Raison d'Etat" of this manuscript, Japan rationalized the GEACPS in the tradition of the American Monroe Doctrine.¹⁰⁵ In fact, since the turn of this century her leaders liked to refer to her policy of expansion to what they called "the Japanese Monroe Doctrine."

Undue stress by Professor Kamikawa on the similarities of the two doctrines may be noted here with interest, since he has been known as one of Japan's authorities in the field of international relations.¹⁰⁶

It was argued that, except for the differences in the processes of their development and in their field of operation, the essential characters of the two regional systems were similar. In his opinion, the three principles which were originally embraced by the American Monroe Doctrine, that is, non-colonization, non-intervention and isolation (or non-territorial acquisition) were "the minimum claims of Japan under her "Monroe Doctrine." He cited the fact that Japan had "not only withdrawn herself from the League of Nations but participated in no political affairs" of Europe or of the American continents. Both the American and the Japanese doctrines had political as well as economic attributes, although the American system was oriented to an economic principle more than to a political one. Both doctrines were "affective manifestation of regionalism as

¹⁰⁵See pp. 83-88 of this manuscript.

¹⁰⁶The Japan Biographical Research Department, The

against universalism." The United States, the originator of regionalism, should give sympathy to Japan for following her example.¹⁰⁷

Cf. Western Inter-State System. According to Kobayashi, the binding force in the Western inter-state system, such as the British Commonwealth of Nations, was the mutual awareness that member nations' self-interests would be best served in such togetherness. As a consequence, a clash of competing interests could easily lead to its dissolution.¹⁰⁸ Also, the fight for political domination, which frequently found in democratic countries, would only result in breaking up the unity of the Sphere or entail oppression of its minorities. In the GEACPS, however, such evils were to be "nipped in the bud," because the Sphere as a whole would promote "co-existence" as if it were one living organ and would give prominence to the organismic

Japan Biographical Encyclopedia & Who's Who (2nd ed.; The Rengo Press, Ltd., 1960), p. 483.

He was awarded the Japan Academy Prize for his work titled Current History of Diplomacy in 3 vols. (1952).

¹⁰⁷Hikomatsu Kamikawa, "The American and Japanese Monroe Doctrines," Contemporary Japan: A Review of Far Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 6, August 1939, pp. 740-750.

¹⁰⁸Mitsuo Maehara, Hoichiro Nokuchi, and Hajime Kobayashi, Tai Toa Kyo-Ei-Ken no Min-Soku (Nations of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere) (Tokyo: Rokumeikan, 1942), Vol. III, pp. 56-58.

idea of the harmonious Oriental family system.¹⁰⁹ How the Western democracies preserved their close ties without necessitating the Oriental family system, was not mentioned.

The Western concept of international association was also criticized for its "undue subordination" of human elements to legal ideas. International justice, as interpreted by the Anglo-Saxons, was too "static" and legalistic, and it emphasized the observance of treaty rights and obligations. In the words of Professor Royama, international justice should attach "the greatest importance" to "dynamic" justice by ensuring "equitable distribution of economic forces." Hence, the Japanese regional system was intended to be more than a mere legal arrangement by placing humanity above legality and also by adjusting these two different, but not contradictory justices.¹¹⁰

A publication put out jointly by a Tokyo daily and an Osaka daily compared the scope and functions of the GEACPS with the Pan American Union and the League of Nations. As for its scope, the GEACPS was to resemble the Union since both placed special stress upon the security and prosperity of a certain geographic region of the world. But the GEACPS

¹⁰⁹Construction of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere (Osaka: The Mainichi Publishing Company, 1943), p. 41.

¹¹⁰Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, op. cit., p. 8, and Masamichi Royama, Foreign Policy of Japan: 1914-1939 (Tokyo: Japanese-Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p. 172.

was to have the range of activities as broad and multifarious as the League. According to this source, the "failure" of the League of Nations was attributed to its world-wide jurisdiction rather than the diversity of its functions.¹¹¹ Apparently it was assumed that the planetary organization should be launched only after successful experimentations of the Spheric organization in each region.

¹¹¹ Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, op. cit., p. 58.

CHAPTER VII

GEO-STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF THE GREATER EAST ASIA COPROSPERITY SPHERE

One of the important purposes of Japan's "territorial planning" in East Asia was to facilitate Japan's all-round military strategy¹ which, in turn, was aimed at the construction of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere by means of "war." Indeed, war was even regarded by the War Ministry as "the father of creation and the mother of culture."² Japanese territorial expansion, which usually accompanied her past wars, had been carried out gradually. Likewise, step by step expansion of the GEACPS was apparently envisaged by the strategists.

I. OCEANISM vs. CONTINENTALISM

In the opinion of Percy and Waite, Japan's shoreline configuration which offers easy landing access to the

¹IMTPE, Exhibit No. 865 (Doc. no. 1570), Planning Board, "Outlines of Fundamental National Policies," April 1941 (In section on "Outline for the establishment of territorial planning"), p. 10.

²IMTPE, Doc. no. 3089, Kokubo no Hongi to sono Kyoka no Teisho (Basic theory of National Defense and Suggestions for its Strengthening), opening page, quoted in James B. Crowley, "Japanese Army Factionalism in the Early 1930's," The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXI, No. 3 (May, 1962), p. 318.

islands and the lengthy coastline around her main and fringing islands has confronted the Japanese with strategic defense problems and presumably had "prompted the acquisition of outlying territory to serve as a protective screen." On the other hand, the insular nature of Japan helped her definite national boundaries to remain virtually inviolate, especially because Japan's challengers were geographically either continental or remote from the areas in which she became interested. During the last half of the nineteenth century, when the "neighboring" islands in the western Pacific were taken by Japan as her outposts, they offered no particular resistance to Japanese occupation. Likewise, the Volcano Islands, Marcus Island, Kuriles and Bonins were easily occupied.³

By virtue of Japan's geographical proximity to a great land mass from which the Mongols once made efforts to invade Japan via Korea, Japanese strategy with regard to Korea and China has been either to control them or to prevent their control by other powers. The same strategy was reflected not only in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, which was fought over Korea and Manchuria, but also in Japan's maintenance during World War II of a large army in Manchukuo south

³G. E. Percy, R. H. Fifield and Associates, World Political Geography (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1948), p. 374 and p. 384. See Appendix I.

of the Siberian boundary. Thus, Japan's peculiar geographic location presented her military strategists a conflict between a continental policy directed toward the north-west, (Northward, i.e., Hokushin-ron 北進論) and an oceanic one directed toward the Pacific (Southward, i.e., Nanshin-ron 南進論).⁴ On the one hand, the continent possessed important natural resources owned by a weak China, impotent Siam and lands such as French Indo-China and British Malaya which were controlled by the mother countries having troubles at home. On the other hand, there were insular storehouses of great natural wealth in the Netherland East Indies, owned by a weak, remote state and in the Philippines close to Japan but remote from her protector.⁵

Those who advocated Hokushin-ron (theory of Northward expansion) expounded the importance of Korea to Japan in geopolitical terms.⁶ They viewed Korea as the "stepping stone" for Japanese expansion in Asia. Manchuria was sloganized as

⁴See Andreas Dorpölen, The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1942), p. 128.

⁵Hikomatsu Kamikawa, Nihon Gaiko no Sai-Shuppatsu (Restart of Japanese Diplomacy) (Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyu-sho, 1960), p. 232; Percy, Fifield and Associates, op. cit., p. 384.

⁶Cf. Showa Kenkyukai Jimukyoku, Teikoku no Chosen Techisaku (Policy regarding the Empire's reign of Korea), 1939. (Confidential monograph.)

the "Great West" of the Far East or as Japan's "economic life line." Militarily, Japan's position in Manchuria was viewed as "essential to the protection of Korea." Such development as Russia's "influence" or "penetration" in North China and Mongolia had always concerned Japan since the Japanese interest in these areas and Soviet Eastern Territory expressed itself in relation to defense in Manchuria.⁷ Continental expansion was also regarded as a strategic "fence in the rear"⁸ which would, in turn, facilitate oceanic expansion.

The proponents of Nanshin-ron (theory of Southward expansion), on the other hand, often argued that further continental expansion lacked "permanence," as it would clash with the Russians who belonged to a Sphere of "different fata."

Haushofer, an advocate of the "German-Russian-Japanese transcontinental alliance," had urged that Japan limit its northward expansion and avoid by all means friction with Russia. "Sudden movement to the continent by way of northern Sakhalin" was viewed by him as "entering the graveyard by choice."⁹ He suggested that the

⁷H. M. Vinacke, Far Eastern Politics in the Post-War World (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1956), pp. 13-17.

⁸Joji Ezawa, Chiseigaku Kenkyu (Study of Geopolitics) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoron-sha, 1942), p. 140.

⁹Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans, (1938), trans. by Taiheiyo Kyodai as Taiheiyo Chiseigaku (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1942), pp. 197 and 260.

future development of the Japanese nation depended more on the direction of southward expansion; the master geopolitician warned that further "intrusion into the inner part of the Continent, thereby to remain separated from the Pacific Ocean, ... would involve a simple question of superiority of influence and economic power, but not a question of strengthening Japanese national policy."¹⁰ The identical theme was reiterated by a Japanese geopolitician Ezawa.¹¹

In an effort to point out the "sea-going instinct" of the Japanese, some Japanese liked to refer to Kojiki and Nihon Shoki for mythological descriptions about the "sea-defying spirit" of their remote ancestors,¹² while others liked to refer to the contribution of the marine traffic of the past to the present-day civilization of Japan, a "sea-footed" nation.¹³ Haushofer concurred with the view that it was natural for Japan to become once again interested in the South Seas which were taken over during her seclusion.¹⁴

¹⁰Ibid., p. 262.

¹¹Ezawa, loc. cit.

¹²Nobuhiro Matsumoto, "The Cultural Significance of the war," The Gaiko Jiho, Feb. 15, 1942, extracted in Contemporary Japan, April 1942, Vol. XI, No. 4, p. 616.

¹³Nyozekan Hasegawa, "Our Civilization and the Sea," Contemporary Japan, Feb. 1942, Vol. XI, No. 2, p. 240.

¹⁴Karl Haushofer, Tai Toa Chiseijigaku (Greater East Asia Geopolitics), trans. and compiled by Sakae Ishishima and Taro Kimura (Tokyo: Toshi Keizaisha, 1941), p. 28.

Such an argument of historical ties was used to augment Japan's awareness of the strategic materials possessed by Southeast Asia and Oceania, the opportunity provided by the developments in Europe, and the importance of the region from the military standpoint.¹⁵

II. HOUSHOFER'S VIEW OF THE LAND-SEA COMPLEX

When the Japanese government announced the construction of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere as the goal of her foreign policy in August, 1940, it included in its scope the Manchukuo-China-Japan axis and the South Seas although the latter was not precisely delineated. It appears that the policy-makers decided they could attain continental and insular objectives simultaneously. But, as was proven later, Japan's objective on the continent was consolidation of the areas already occupied while the oceanic objective was southward expansion. This dual character of Japanese policy fitted in well with the principle of "soil and blood." Japanese students of geopolitics often argued that since the structure of the Japanese race originally composed of the Pacific islanders as well as

¹⁵Ibid.; see Chiri (Geography): Kokudo Kokusei hen (On National Soil and National Strength) (Tokyo: The Secondary School Texts Publishing Co., 1944), pp. 24-25.

Asiatic mainlanders,¹⁶ the GEACPS should be viewed as a "promise to rational union of 'blood and soil' in the Indo-Pacific sphere."¹⁷

Haushofer used Japan as a model¹⁸ in stressing the importance of the Wehr-Geopolitik (Defence-Geopolitics) of combining continentalism with oceanism. He deplored the prevalence of the continental viewpoint even in the German naval construction program.¹⁹ Japan, on the other hand, profited by the war-geopolitical mistakes of others. Deeply impressed by Britain's serious predicament during the first World War, Japan wanted to avoid the danger of a similar encirclement. Hence Japan penetrated into the "protective buffer zone of Manchuria to gain more elbow room." In the eyes of Haushofer, therefore, the insular nation of Japan had developed a deep sense of watchfulness with regard to even distant threats.²⁰

Analogies were frequently made between Haushofer's view of the Pacific Ocean and the Japanese principles of the

¹⁶Kozo Iwata, Chiseigaku (Geopolitics), Asai-shin Koza 38 (Tokyo: Asai Shimbunsha, 1942), pp. 185 and 188.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 193.

¹⁸Professor Conroy concurs with this view in his letter dated January 3, 1962.

¹⁹Karl Haushofer, Wehr-Geopolitik (Berlin, 1932), pp. 62ff. in Andreas Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1942), p. 309.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 304-5, 307, and 313-314.

GEACPS. Referring to the Japanese new order, Haushofer stated that the ideal development of Japan lay in harmonizing and synthesizing her two traditional elements, the "dynamic" ocean element imbued with Japan's potentiality for growth and the "static" continental element which carried on Japanese history.²¹ The task of a new order in Europe or in East Asia, in the opinion of Haushofer, was to seek and preserve at all cost the tradition inherited from "time" (history) and "space" (geography).²² But a question arises: How far back does one have to trace the roots of such tradition before one can envisage the territorial boundary of GEACPS?

According to a Japanese expository book on Haushofer's Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean, it was not only the "justice" (Taigi-meibun 大東亜正義) of the Great East War but also in accord with "the most solemn truth" of Pacific geopolitics that Japan would include the "entire Malay Peninsula, French Indo-China, the Philippines, East Indies, lands and seas covering Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia, ...together with China and India in the GEACPS."²³ It is of

²¹Karl Haushofer, Tai Toa Chiseijigaku (Greater East Asia Geopolitics), trans. & compiled by Sakae Ishishima and Toro Kimura (Tokyo: Toshi Keizaisha, 1941), p. 14.

²²Ibid.

²³Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans (1935), trans. by Taiheiyo Kyokai as Taiheiyo Chiseigaku (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1942), p. 110.

Even northern Karafuto (Sakhalin) was included: p.

special importance to note that Seichiro Sato, author of this book, was a commissioner of the Cabinet Planning Board which had formulated various plans, including territorial planning, for the GEACPS. To Sato the GEACPS was the same area Haushofer called the "Indo-Pacific" Sphere which extended from the high peak of Central Asia eastward to Japan and westward to India. Geopolitically, it was viewed as an area of a "cooperate fate," since the Pacific and Indo areas form a sphere in terms of culture and race stemming from the Malayo-Polynesians.²⁴

The parallel between the geographical distribution of the yellow race and the amount of rainfall was cited as another evidence in the Indo-Pacific space of the geographic and logical relationship. In terms of geopolitics the Indo-Atlantic relationship was, therefore, fundamentally incorrect as were the division of China and control of India by the Euro-Atlantic powers.²⁵ It can be argued, therefore,

196. Haushofer regarded the Philippines, too, as a country that should be charged with a duty of carrying out the Pan-Asiatic ideal: p. 511: Seichiro Sato, Hausuhofa no Taiheiyō Chiseigaku Kaisetsu (Commentary on Haushofer's Geopolitics of Pacific Ocean) (Tokyo: Taiheiyō kyokai, 1944), pp. 65-86.

²⁴Iwata, op. cit., pp. 189-191.

²⁵Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans, (3rd ed., 1938), op. cit., p. 127, quoted in Joji Ezawa, Chiseigaku Kenkyū (Study of Geopolitics) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1942), pp. 137-138.

that in terms of Haushofer's "Geopolitik," as the Japanese saw it, the GEACPS possessed almost all the necessary conditions for "cooperate fate." In a combined view of land and naval battle, the GEACPS could be utilized locationwise to attain the mastery of the Pacific and Indian Oceans as well as the mastery of the land linking eastern Siberia, China and Burma. Furthermore, the fact that the GEACPS was, by and large a monsoon region, a rice producing region, and a region where the yellow race reside, was cited as an evidence of regional solidarity.²⁶

Nevertheless, the resemblance or parallelism between Haushofer's views and the Japanese theorists of the GEACPS may not be overemphasized; unlike Haushofer, rarely did the Japanese strategists feel it absolutely necessary to include India in the GEACPS. In fact, in a different part of Sato's book on Haushofer, India was not even mentioned in reference to the membership of the GEACPS.²⁷

III. ORGANISMIC DEFENSE SPHERE

However solid the economic and political foundation of the GEACPS might have been, its construction could never be materialized unless it had an effective defense organiza-

²⁶IMTFE, Exhibit No. 680 (Doc. no. 2330), Kokusaku Kenkyukai (National Policy Research Association), "Plan of Measures as Regards the Construction of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere," May 1943, pp. 50-51.

²⁷Sato, op. cit., p. 79.

tion that could expell any threat of outside encroachment. According to a book prepared by an office of the War Ministry, Japan would become a Wehrstaat (Defence-state), not a Militarstaat (Military-state) of the 19th century type. The defense-state would prepare the entire nation for "total" war by undergoing reforms in the state organ, Wehrvolk (Defence-nation), Wehrwirtschaft (Defence-economy), Wirtschaftskrieg (Economic-war), and Seelenkrieg (Psychological-war).²⁸

Territorial expansion was to be conducted "progressively and on a unified basis" from the standpoint of materializing such ambitious plans.²⁹ Planners deemed it necessary to include the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean in the defense sphere, because control of such seas would automatically provide control of the countries of the Sphere. The mainstay of such a defense structure was considered to be an air force, and the Japanese government laid emphasis on "seeking the controlled distribution of industry and population in their organic relation to the all-round communication and motive power plans."³⁰

²⁸Japanese War Ministry, Shukeika Betsuban (Paymaster Dept.-special team), Toa Kyoelken no Seijiteki Keizaiteki Kihon Mondai Kenkyu (Research on the Basic Political and Economic Problems of the GEACPS), Vol. I, No. 90-1 of Investigation of Economic Research Material, 1942, pp. 1-2.

²⁹INTFE, Exhibit No. 865, loc. cit., and INTFE, Proceedings, p. 15,655.

³⁰Exhibit No. 865, loc. cit.

The areas specifically considered by the Total War Research Institution as important "corridors of defense" for East Asia were:

- (1) The Kamchatka Peninsula area.
- (2) The eastern Siberia area and the Mongolian region.
- (3) The area west of the Chinese mainland.
- (4) Malay Peninsula, especially the southern part and the Indo-China Peninsula area.
- (5) The archipelago of Sunda and New Guinea area.
- (6) The eastern area of the Inner South Seas.³¹

For the minimum requirements of the defense sphere, ex-colonial Hashimoto suggested the inclusion of islands within "the line extending in the east from Hawaii and New Zealand, and in the west from the Persian Gulf eastward." He would include in the north the Aleutian Islands and eastern Siberia. Great naval ports would be established in the northern part of Japan, Singapore, the southern point of India, Sidney and Davao. With these as operational bases, many air bases would be established in the neighboring islands to form a series of operational spheres for the air forces.³²

From the viewpoint of war and construction, the Total War Research Institute contemplated three periodic stages, namely: (1) Period of the present war for urgent construction; (2) period of post-war management for adjustment; and (3) period to prepare for the next war after the lapse of about twenty years during which an extensive construction

³¹IMT 467, p. 6, cf. INTFE, Prosecution Doc. No. 1622 quoted in its Proceedings pp. 7419-20.

³²INTFE, Proceedings, p. 15,656.

program was to be carried out.³³

The so-called "three-stage" expansion envisaged by the Total War Research Institute consisted of three progressive defense spheres,³⁴ namely, (1) the "Basic" Sphere, (2) "Defense" Sphere and (3) Sphere of "Influence."³⁵

The Basic Sphere corresponded to the political "Inner Sphere" and covered such "nucleus" countries as Japan, Manchuria, North China, the lower Yangtze Area and the Russian Maritime area. This was the zone which required "absolute" safety. The Defense Sphere was the "zone which must be perfectly defended against" any attacks from Europe or America. Approximating the political "Small(er) Co-Prosperity Sphere," the Defense Sphere covered the small autarkic sphere of East Asia including the Basic (Inner) Sphere, Eastern Siberia, China, Indo-China and the South Seas. The Sphere of Influence was the zone whose "supreme position should be maintained" against any invasion from Europe and America. Corresponding to the political Greater

³³CAJMTA, IMT 467, "Draft of a plan for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (Dai Toa Kyo-ei-ken kensetsu gen'an - soko)." Prepared by the Soryoku-sen Kenkyu-jo (Total War Research Institute). Japanese text and translation. Jan. 27, 1942. (IPS Doc. no. 2402), Reel MT60, p. 14. This refers also to IMIFE, Exhibit No. 1336 (Doc. no. 2402B), although their English translations are not identical.

³⁴Cf. Appendix A.

³⁵IMT 467, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Influence Sphere would cover the larger autarkic sphere of East Asia including the Defense (Smaller) Sphere plus Australia, India and some groups of islands in the Pacific.³⁶

It appears that the defense plan of the Japanese government in the "Greater East Asian War" generally aimed at the construction of the GEACPS including the first and the second stage zones of the Defense Sphere. The central point of the first zone, was Osaka,³⁷ Japan and the heart of the second zone was Formosa.³⁸

Thus, the basic nuclear sphere, which surrounded Japan, was protected by the smaller defense sphere, which in turn was protected by the greater defense sphere. In other words, the second and third stage defense spheres were to be utilized as "the double corridors of defense"³⁹ for the first.

Obligations in-and-out of the Sphere. Professor Karl Schmidt, the German author of Grossraumordnung (Large-space-order), pointed out that in order to avoid a conflict between the regional spheres, each owed a duty of "mutual non-inter-

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Appendix B.

³⁸Tokuji Tamura (ed.), Dai Toa Kyoeiken Kensetsu no Kisoriron (Basic Theories for Construction of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere) (Kyoto: Ritsumeikan Shuppanbu, 1943), pp. 355-359.

³⁹INT 467, op. cit., p. 6.

ference."⁴⁰ It appeared to the Japanese that such a duty was to be observed only during the construction of the GEACPS at each stage.

In the event the GEACPS was invaded or attacked by another Sphere during its construction, all its members were expected to join as a unified body in defense of the Sphere. The burden of defense would be charged to each member according to its capacity, although each country was expected to exert its utmost. In the event a member intentionally failed to offer the necessary defense in spite of its ability to do so, it would be held responsible for the dereliction of the mutual obligation for defense.⁴¹

To members of the planning body for the GEACPS who were wholly seized with the mythical world of thought, the organization of the GEACPS was nothing but a stepping stone to Japan's ultimate domination of the whole world. When the construction of the GEACPS was completed within a quarter of century and a "larger military force" was organized, with 10,000,000 frontline troops and reserves, 60,000 to 200,000 "first-line" air force, and 5,300,000 tons of "naval vessels," "the second round could be begun aiming at the total and final defeat of England, the United States and

⁴⁰Quoted in Mitsuo Maehara, Hoichiro Noguchi, and Hajima Kobayashi, Tai Toa Kyoeiken No Minzoku (Nations of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere) (Tokyo: Rokumeikan, 1942), Vol. I, p. 59.

⁴¹Ibid., Vol. III, p. 81.

Soviet Russia." The second round could be followed by the third round, which would be the war of the hemisphere. The only enemy of the third round would be Germany.⁴²

Under such circumstances, "non-interference" between the different Spheres is an impossible task. It is true, though, that many Japanese strategists of the GEACPS hardly cherished the idea of having another war in order to unify the world under the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere. Their assumption was based on the existence of other spheres in the world and that the GEACPS would be confined to a sphere which, though ill-defined, could organismically be solidified into a geopolitical unit, embracing defense, economic, political and cultural spheres.⁴³

⁴²Exhibition No. 1336, p. 9 cited in M. A. Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), p. 96.

⁴³IMTFF, Exhibit No. 680, loc. cit.

CHAPTER VIII

CULTURAL PROGRAMS OF THE GREATER EAST ASIA COPROSPERITY SPHERE

Even if the economic, political and military structures of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere were complete, the organization would be like a "house built on sand" unless the attitude of the peoples involved were favorable. Even a military dictatorship obviously could not afford to underestimate the opinion of those to be governed. Their cultural programs bear this out.

I. "THOUGHT" POLICY

According to one of the documents published by the Total War Research Institute, the general aim of the cultural program was "to develop and intensify the essence of traditional Oriental culture,"¹ while that of the thought movement was to establish a "common conviction of constructing a new order based on the Oriental morality."²

¹CAJMEFA, INT 467, Draft of a Plan for the Establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (Dai Toa Kyoei-ken Kensetsu Gen'an-soko). Prepared by the Soryokusen Kenkyu-jo (Total War Research Institute). Jan. 27, 1942 (IPS Doc. no. 2402), Reel WT60, p. 14. This refers also to IMTFE, Exhibit No. 1336 (Doc. no. 2402B).

²Ibid., pp. 7 and 13.

In order to achieve both of these aims, it was considered necessary to eradicate from Asia the Weltanschauung of the West, which included Communism on the one hand and the Occidentalism on the other.³ "Jewish egotism" and the "Anglo-Saxonian individualism"⁴ were included in the latter.

To General Sadao Araki, an ideologist of the Japanese military dictatorship, Japan- the champion of East Asianism- was endangered from both within and without. The Communists were destroying the social order from within and the Capitalists were securing a corrupt hold on the government. The Soviet Union and the United States were, in the general's mind, Japan's potential external enemies.⁵ In a 1936 document, the Japanese Foreign Ministry listed four elements to be resisted for Asia's "cultural renaissance." There were: (1) Influence of the Russian Communism whose "absolute

³IMTPE, Exhibit No. 1335 (Doc. no. 1621C), Total War Research Institute. Establishment of East Asia: Maneuvers for the First Period of Total War, Feb. 18, 1942, p. 21 and CAJMF, SP 252, Outline of the Guiding Principles of Japanese Diplomacy (Nihon Koyu no Gaiko Shido Genri Koryo), Dec. 1936, Reel SP 146, p. 58.

⁴Toraichiro Maeda, Chiseironteki Shinko Nihonshi (New Study of Japanese History Viewed from Geopolitical Theory) (Tokyo: Nishodo, 1944), p. 50.

⁵Sadao Araki, Nippon Rikugun no Seishin (Spirit of the Imperial Japanese Army) (Tokyo, 1932), in Kenneth W. Colegrove, Militarism in Japan (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1936), pp. 47-48.

materialism" was attempting to destroy the "spiritual" Orient; (2) influence of Euro-America which was attempting to control and westernize the Orient by the magnanimity of its material civilization; (3) Japan's short-sighted and weak-kneed diplomacy; and (4) lack of self-consciousness on the part of Asiatics in general.⁶

To make the leaders and their peoples in different parts of the GEACPS fully realize the idea of East Asian unity, it was suggested that the thought policy should reinforce the underlying tie which bound them to the Oriental culture. "The Confucian concept of the family of states, emphasis on group rather than individual, and the stress on spiritual values rather than materials" were a case in point.⁷ The Confucian principles of Odo I Se (the Kingly Way) and the so-called Manchurian doctrine of Go Zoku Kyowa 五族協和 (the Harmony of the Five Races- comprising the Manchus, Japanese, Chinese, Koreans and Mongols) should be encouraged.

On the other hand, when they did not hinder the general cultural construction, the local traditions and cultures were to be respected as much as possible so that

⁶CAJMF, SP 252, op. cit., pp. 56-59.

⁷Sugihara Masanomi, Toa Kyodotai no Genri (Principles of an East Asiatic Cooperative Order) (Tokyo: Modern Nippon sha, 1939), cited in P. M. Linebarger, Chu Djang, and A. D. Burks, Far Eastern Governments and Politics: China and Japan (2nd ed.; Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), p. 437.

they could contribute toward the development of East Asian culture.⁸

A "powerful thought movement" was to be launched to convince the Asians that "the best and only way of the eternal prosperity of East Asia" was to unite in its "admiration of the Emperor's influence" and thereby to strengthen their support for Japan's war efforts.⁹ The Japanese, who were to be sent to different new areas, would persuade the natives that Imperial Japan, after having cast off its negative cultural characters while taking in good points of the West, was a manifestation of higher culture and morality and was, therefore, charged with the duty of building up the moralistic culture of the Orient.¹⁰ Thus, the people would soon realize that the world was striding forward "from liberalism to totalitarianism, from national economy to regional economy, from the old order to new order...toward the great ideal of Hakko Ichiu."¹¹

Specific measures were formulated with regard to the

⁸CAJMF, INT 467, op. cit., p. 66.

⁹Ibid., p. 13, and INTFE, Exhibit No. 1335, op. cit., p. 21.

¹⁰CAJMF, INT 467, op. cit., pp. 2 and 7. See also CAJMF, INT 286, Sadao Araki, Kokoku Nihon no Dai-shimei (The Great Mission of Imperial Japan), August 8, 1938, Reel WT 39.

¹¹INTFE, Exhibit No. 675, (Doc. no. 130), Kingoro Hashimoto, "Excerpts from the Article entitled The Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence (Dai Toa Koka Ken)" appearing in Taiyo Dai Nippon, January 5, 1942, p. 1.

natives in expectation of "enlightening" their political and economic ideas as well as social mores. The freedom of expression should be respected as much as possible; the existing rights of the natives to participate in the government should be extended. Whatever political or economic policies to be taken should in no case weaken their hope for the future. The native leaders should be appointed in important posts, thereby stimulating their hope and enthusiasm.¹²

The measures such as amendment or abolition of old taxes, abolition of the "bad" laws repugnant to the natives which had been introduced by the Westerners, and releasing farms belonging to the peoples of hostile powers were suggested as they would touch the hearts of the natives. Every effort was to be made to preserve the tranquility of their private life; old legends and even the worship of national heroes should be respected. The programs also included rehabilitation of areas damaged by the war and establishment of hospitals and travelling clinic organizations.¹³

II. EDUCATIONAL POLICY

An educational policy was to be carried out within the general framework of "cultural and thought construction." In another document of the Total War Research Institute entitled Draft of a Plan for the Establishment of the Greater

¹²INTFE, Exhibit No. 1335, op. cit., p. 22.

¹³Ibid.

East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, it was stated that all peoples would have to be taught to worship and follow "the Imperial Way" for the creation of a New Order, based:

Not on exploitation but on coprosperity, not competitive conflict but mutual existence, not a formal view of equality but a view of order based on righteous classification, not an idea of rights but an idea of service, not separated views of the world but one unified view of the world.¹⁴

The American, British, Dutch methods of education should gradually disappear, since the Japanese would aim both at propagation of the ideal of the GEACPS and at eradication of Occidental individualism and materialism as well as the "negative and conservative characteristics of the Indian and Chinese civilizations." Eventually the knowledge would be imparted by the native teachers in the Japanese language.¹⁵

In order to facilitate a mutual cultural exchange between the different sections of the GEACPS, Japanese leaders and scholars should be sent to important cultural centers, while the counterparts of these areas would be given the opportunity to visit Japan which would convince them of the futility of reliance on America or Europe. Native teachers and students were to be sent to Japan to get acquainted with universities and "Japanese" science; they were to be housed and taught in special institutions so that they might be utilized after their course of study to spread

¹⁴CAJNFA, IMT 467, op. cit., p. 13; IMTFE, Exhibit No. 1336, p. 15.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 20-21, and p. 15.

Japanese concepts in their respective countries.¹⁶

Although their religions were not to be opposed directly, "uncooperative" Christian missionaries from abroad would be replaced by the natives. Meanwhile, Tenno 天皇 teaching should be disseminated step by step. The Total War Research Institute proposed the Japanese "spiritual and cultural" leaders should be sent as missionaries to the various places of the GEACPS after strict selection and discipline.¹⁷

To the peoples of the South Seas who knew little of Japan, the "education" would become even more identical with "propaganda" of Japan.¹⁸ Some Japanese scholars suggested that the existing text-books on world history be revised as they were essentially the history of Occidental peoples confining its attention to "give prominence to the advancement of certain particular races."¹⁹

III. LINGUISTIC POLICY

It appears that the Japanese leaders realized that the task of stabilizing reciprocity within the GEACPS could not be accomplished without developing a mutual understanding

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 20-21.

¹⁷ INTFE, Exhibit No. 1335, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Toshio Kamba, "Pacific War in World History" Contemporary Japan, April, 1942, Vol. XI, No. 4, pp. 612 & 615.

affecting all matters of common interest. For this an effective medium of exchange should have to be organized, preferably by forming a common language.²⁰

The Total War Research Institute proposed several measures in the field of language: (1) To make Japanese a common language, if at all possible, by replacing European languages with it; (2) to open Japanese language schools; (3) to appoint natives who understand Japanese as officials; (4) to popularize Japanese newspapers and other publications; and (5) to teach elementary Japanese through radio-broadcasts.²¹

Tatsuo Kawai, one-time Information Director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, foresaw the difficulties of creating in short time one common spoken language for even the Japan-Manchukuo-China areas. He suggested, instead, to organize a "language alliance" for the adjustment of certain types of vocabulary, so that ordinary social intercourse and commercial transactions among the three nations could be simplified. He wished, however, to have a complete linguistic unification in time.²²

With regard to the "southern" countries, Yaghi, a

²⁰Takeshi Yaghi, "Our Language and Greater East Asia," Contemporary Japan, Vol. XI, No. 10 (Oct., 1942), p. 1468.

²¹IMTFE, Exhibit No. 1335, op. cit., p. 23.

²²Tatsuo Kawai, The Goal of Japanese Expansion (Hatten Nippon no Mokuhyo) (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1938), p. 108.

philologist in the service of the Foreign Ministry recommended selecting standard Japanese words and compile a dictionary and a grammar book. He recommended the investigation of various dialects and the preparation of dictionaries of them, so that Japanese equivalents of vernacular words could be presented. With the information on simplified Japanese available to native peoples, it would be easier to make them realize the utility of learning Japanese.²³

At a time when northward and southward expansion was taken for granted almost as a manifestation of the geopolitical theory of "land-sea complex," Japanese philologists argued that there already existed a linguistic affinity among all the vernacular and languages of the GEACPS including those of the South Seas.²⁴ To Nobuhiro Matsumoto, languages of the Southern races contained numerous words which were "phonetically identical" with their equivalents in the Japanese languages. He also inferred, by a comparative study of the various Asiatic languages, that all the languages in the GEACPS had a common origin and that "in the remote past both the northern and southern Asiatic races were in close touch with one another."²⁵

²³Yaghi, op. cit., pp. 1469 and 1472.

²⁴Ibid., p. 1474.

²⁵Nobuhiro Matsumoto, "The Cultural Significance of the War," The Gaiko Jiho, February 15, 1942, extracted in Contemporary Japan, Vol. XI, No. 4 (April 1942), pp. 616-619.
In an interview with this writer on June 25th, 1962

in the Library of Congress, Don G. Stuart of the Linguistic Survey of Asia commented on Matsumoto's views as follows: The phonetical identity between the Japanese language and the South Asian languages was discovered from comparison "made on isolated words which may be accidental." The view that all the languages of the GEACPS- north and south- have a common origin was based on "Father Wilhelm Schmidt's 'Austic theory' for the 'Malay-Polynesian languages'." Mr. Stuart stated also "although there can be no question that the Japanese have received loan words from Malay-Polynesian languages and from the Altaic languages, there is no satisfactory evidence to justify the conclusion that the Japanese is genetically related to either of these groups.

CHAPTER IX

JAPANESE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW ORDER

On November 3, 1938 Konoe's first cabinet made a declaration proposing to establish a new order in East Asia with its sphere confined to Japan, Manchukuo and China.¹ When Konoe's second cabinet announced its intention to create a New Order in "Greater" East Asia on July 26, 1940, it was meant for what was known as the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere including the South Seas.² But the decision to enforce such plans was made later by the Tojo cabinet and was being carried out by Japan's military power after December 7, 1941.

There seems to have been little doubt in the minds of the Japanese policy-makers that the full-fledged construction of the GEACPS could not be realized until Japan's "total" power had overcome the resistance of the "counter-influence" in and around the east Asia. To the militarists this meant

¹Shiro Nohara, "Tai Toa Kyo-ei Ken" (The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere), Ajiva Rekishi Jiten (As Encyclopedia of Asian History) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1960), Vol. VI, p. 52.

²Kondoshoten Shuppanbu (comp.), Sabakareru Seki no Rekishi (A History of Judged Century) (Tokyo: Kondo Shoten, 1950), p. 51.

a war and its successful completion; whatever steps taken during the war could therefore be viewed as inescapable and transitory means to an "ultimate" end.

Japanese officials readied the country in a total defense-state (wehrstaat) by ideally organizing the economic system and conditioning the people for war. Various provisions also assured the ruling clique of necessary financial means to function. The various research organizations and the governmental structure were also oriented toward the realization of Japan's "mission of Asia."

I. ROLES OF RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS IN JAPAN

Kyoto Chiseigaku-kai 京都地政学会 (The Kyoto Geopolitical Society). This organization was attached to Kyoto Imperial University under the direction of its geography professor, Dr. Saneshige Komaki. Although it was the tendency of many Japanese students of geopolitics to rely heavily on German geopolitics, Komaki directed his efforts to develop so-called Japanese Geopolitics based on Japan's national predisposition and interests.³ He had published nine books on Japanese geopolitics,⁴ two of which were written in

³See section on Japanese Geopolitics in Chapter III of this manuscript.

⁴They were as follows: Saneshige Komaki, Nihon Chiseigaku Sengen (Declaration of Japanese Geopolitics) (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1940; _____, Toa no Chiseigaku (Geopolitics of East Asia) (Tokyo: Meguro Shoten, 1942); _____, Dai Toa no Chiseigaku (Geopolitics of the Greater East Asia) (Tokyo:

collaboration with his associates.

It is interesting to note that four of the Komaki's books were published in 1942, when Japan was making the greatest expansion in her history. It was also in 1942 when this eminent geographer, a reputed scholar in spite of his nationalistic views, played a fantasia as he expressed through the government propaganda mills his outlook of the "world-for-Japan" in such an extreme form:

When Columbus set foot on the American continent there had been Indians living in the country. Thus it is obviously reasonable to term American an Eastern Asia... Even Europe recognizes Australia as part of Asia. Africa is also part of Asia. In Northern Europe there is Asiatic blood running thick in the veins of the inhabitants... Therefore we may also consider Europe as part of Asia... The Pacific Ocean is a sea for Asia. The Atlantic Ocean is also a part of Asia... There are no Seven Seas, but only one sea, and it is connected to Japan, where the sun is rising. All oceans are to be regarded as a Great Japanese Sea.⁵

His distortion of truth was, not incomparable in degree, however, to such German concepts as Geo-Medizine (Geo-

Nihon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai, 1942); _____, Nihon Chiseigaku (Japanese Geopolitics) (Tokyo: Dai Nippon Yuben-kai Kodansha, 1942); _____, Zoku Nihon Chiseigaku Sangen (Continuous Declaration of the Japanese Geopolitics) (Tokyo: Hyakuyosha, 1942); _____, Sekai Shinchitsujo Kensetsu to Chiseigaku (Construction of the World New Order and Geopolitics) (Tokyo: Wobunsha, 1944); _____, Nihon Chiseigaku Kakusho (Memoranda of Japanese Geopolitics) (Osaka: Akitaya, 1944); _____, with Nobuo Murōga, Dai Nampo Chiseiron: Mainichi Shinbunsha Dai Nampo Losa (Geopolitics of the Greater South Seas: The Mainichi Daily Lectures on the Greater South Seas) (Tokyo: Taiheiyō Shokan, 1945); _____, (ed.), Dai Toa Chiseigaku Shinron (New Geopolitical Theory of the Greater East Asia) (Tokyo: Hoshino Shoten, 1943).

⁵Quoted in Selden C. Menefee, "What Tokyo Tells the World," The Christian Science Monitor Magazine, December 19, 1942, p. 5.

Medicine),⁶ and Geopolitische Personalichkeit (Geopolitical Personality)⁷ or "the noble race," both of which referred to Haushofer's so-called "Nordic" Japan.⁸ Haushofer's works, at least until the mid-1930's, were reputed to be rather scholarly, perhaps more so than those of Komaki. Both the dean of the Japanese geopolitics and the dean of the German's had liked Kyoto, the old capital, more than any other city in Japan as a center of the Japanese tradition.⁹ Komaki would admit that there was no other commonness between them, but it would be difficult for him to deny that he had read most of Haushofer's works and had used at least some of the concepts developed by Haushofer in his publications. Whatever influence Komaki might have made on the Japanese policy-makers, however, may not be as much as the influence which Haushofer had made on Hitler's actual strategy.¹⁰ However,

⁶ Andrew Gyorgy, Geopolitics: The New German Science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), pp. 261-271; G. E. Percy, R. H. Fifield, and Associates, World Political Geography (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1945), p. 22.

⁷ Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans (1939) trans. by Taiheiyo Kyokai as Taiheiyo Chiseigaku (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1942), pp. 485-486 in Soichiro Sato, Haushuhofa no Taiheiyo Chiseigaku Kaisetsu (Commentary on Haushofer's Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans) (Tokyo: Taiheiyo kyokai, 1944), p. 70.

⁸ Hans W. Weigert, Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 179.

⁹ See section on Japanese Geopolitics in Chapter III of this manuscript.

¹⁰ See Derwent Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1942).

in view of the fact that the translated copies of Haushofer's publications were read by Japanese strategists as much as Kimaki's publications, probably Haushofer's ideas on Asia had contributed to the development of plans of the GEACPS as much as Komaki's.

Nihon Chiseigaku-kai 日本地政学会 (The Japanese Geopolitical Association). Instituted in Tokyo in November 1941, this association seemed to have expressed rather heavily the views of German geopolitics. Its research activities were focused on "the land-sea space surrounding Japan as her Lebensraum," and were dedicated to the cause of building Japan as a superior defense-state. The other activities of the Tokyo school included lectures on geopolitics and monthly publication of its organ, Chiseigaku 地政学 (Geopolitics).¹¹

The Association compiled into a book form a series of lectures given under its auspices. In one of his lectures, Yoshitake Ueda, President of the Association, argued that it would be a big mistake to recognize Germany as the founder of the New Order and Japan as its follower. The opposite would be true, since Japan's withdrawal in 1933 from the league of nations, which represented the old order, preceded those of

¹¹ Nihon Bunka Dantai Nenkan (Japan Yearbook of Cultural Organizations) (Tokyo: Nihon Bunka Chuo Renmei, 1943), p. 362.

Germany and Italy.¹² Another lecturer, Professor Kamikawa of the Tokyo Imperial University who was already well-known for his theories of "greater space," indicated his indebtedness to Haushofer when he stated that "the greater sphere in East Asia corresponds to the area designated by Professor Haushofer."¹³ It included India. Kamikawa's "system of the greater-space federation," however, paralleled Ishiwara's theory of the "East Asian League."¹⁴ Professor Nobuyuki Iimoto was managing director of the Tokyo Geopolitical Association; before the Manchurian Incident he authored an introductory article on Geopolitics and a book on Political Geography which was one of the earliest of its kind in Japan. Both of these works expressed author's sympathy for the German ideologies of militaristic nationalism and geopolitics.¹⁵

According to Professor Koji Ihizuka of the University of Tokyo, it was rumored that the Tokyo group was financially

¹²Yoshitake Ueda, "Taiheiyo no Sohau o Ronzu" (To Discuss on Fighting for Supremacy over the Pacific Ocean) in *Nihon Chiseigaku Kyokai* (comp.), *Chiseigaku Ronshu* (Collected Essays on Geopolitics) (Tokyo: Teikoku Shoin, 1942), pp. 209-210.

¹³Hikomatsu Kamikawa, "Taichiiki-shugi no Genri to Taisei" (System and Principle of Greater-Space-ism) in *Nihon Chiseigaku Kyokai* (comp.), *Ibid.*, p. 72.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 80 and 100.

¹⁵See Nobuyuki Iimoto, "A General Idea of So-called Geopolitics," *Review of Geography* (*Chirigaku Hyoron*), v. 4-a, January, 1928. And *Seiji Chirigaku* (Political Geography) (Tokyo: Kaizo Sha, 1929).

sponsored by and attached to the War Ministry, while the Kyoto group was likewise connected with the Navy Ministry.¹⁶ But, since Ueda, president of the Tokyo association, was a Vice-Admiral,¹⁷ such a rumor could be unfounded, or it could be a reverse of the truth.

Undoubtedly neither one of these geopolitical associations carried the weight of the Haushofer's Munich school in terms of its extent of influence as well as its amount of research. When the U. S. Occupation authorities, who overestimated the association's influence on the policy-makers, searched the residences of the staffs of the geopolitical societies they were astonished to find so small an amount of the material evidences.¹⁸

There were, however, other government-connected research organizations in Japan which were at least partly under the influence of the "geopolitical" theorists.

Kokusaku Kenkyu-kai ~~国策研究会~~ (National Policy Research Association). This association was instituted by baron Kinmochi Okura and Kāzuo Yatsugi in 1937 "to investigate the graver political problems of immediate attention to our country and to submit the resulting reports to the Japanese

¹⁶From a letter of Koji Shizuka to the writer dated April 23, 1963.

¹⁷Nihon Bunka Dantai Nenkan, loc. cit.

¹⁸The same letter.

government and to the public."¹⁹ Among the more than 2000 members of the Association there were high officials of the ministries of War, Navy, Home, Foreign, Overseas Affairs, Communications, and the Prime Minister's Office, in addition to political leaders, and representatives of the learned class as well as of banking facilities.²⁰ Indeed, it is hardly appropriate to call this Association a private organization.

Several of the leaders of the Association including Shinsuke Kishi joined the Cabinet or were appointed by the Government to be administrative leaders in the Southern occupied areas. Important reports and plans made by the Association were submitted to the Government, which in return provided the Association with necessary data including those of a "top-secret character."²¹

It is important for the purpose of this study to discuss the roles played by Kazuo Yatsugi, who was Chief of the Business Bureau of the Association from February 1937 to June 1945. At the same time he was on the non-official staff of the Research Section of the War Ministry during the period of December 1938 to the end of 1944.²² Elsewhere,

¹⁹IMTFE, Exhibit No. 678 (Doc. no. 2233), "Affidavit of Kazuo Yatsugi," August 30, 1946, p. 1.

²⁰See IMTFE, Exhibit No. 681 (Doc. no. 2302A), "List of Members of the Kokusaku Kenkyu Society," 1942.

²¹Exhibit No. 678, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

²²Ibid., pp. 1 and 5.

it is stated that he held a position since 1937 as a member of the Cabinet Planning Board.²³

Yatsugi drafted the so-called Sogo Kokusaku Junen Keikaku 綜合國家十年計画 (The Ten-Year Plan of Integrated National Policy),²⁴ which became the "script" for Kihon Kokusaku Yoko 基本國家要綱 (the Outline of Fundamental National Policy)²⁵ through which Konoe's cabinet declared its intention to establish the GEACPS. According to a letter²⁶ from Susumi Nishihara, presently Chief of the War History Office of Japan's Defense Agency and formerly chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry, in February 1940 Lt. General Akira Muto, Director of the Military Service Bureau of the War Ministry had ordered Col. Iwakuro to devise a ten-year plan. Iwakuro entrusted the National Policy Research Association do the job suggesting that the Plan of National Defense Policy

²³ Kazuo Yatsugi, Showa Jinbutsu Hiroku (A Confidential Document of the figures during the Showa period) (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 1954), see inside cover of the book.

²⁴ The fact that the "Outline of Fundamental National Policy" was based on the "Ten-Year Plan of Integrated National Policy" has not been questioned, although there appears to be a disagreement as to who and how many had been involved in the drafting of the Ten-Year Plan. Cf. Nihon Kokusai Seijigaku Kai-Taiheiyo-senso Genin Kenkyubu (comp.), Taiheiyo Senso heno Michi (Road to the Pacific War): Vol. VI-Nan'yo-Shinshutsu (Southward Expansion) (Tokyo: Asia Shimbunsha, 1963), p. 166.

²⁵ For the full text see INTPE, Exhibit No. 865 (Doc. no. 1570), "Outline of Fundamental Policies," August 1, 1940.

²⁶ Nishihara's letter of January 9, 1963.

(Kokubo Kokusaku An) drafted in 1938, be used as a reference. Yatsugi of the Association, thereupon, had consulted the representatives of each Ministry and had finally completed the draft of the Ten-Year Plan in June 1940.

According to this Ten-Year Plan, Japan's basic policy was to "establish a cooperative economic sphere embracing "Greater" East Asia with the strong tie of Japan-Manchukuo-China serving as its trunk and Japan as its kernel."²⁷ The scope of this cooperative economic sphere covered "Eastern Siberia, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Manchukuo, China, the Southeast Asian countries, India and Oceania."²⁸ When the Yatsugi-drafted Ten-Year Plan was embodied into the Outline of Fundamental National Policy, General Muto brought a copy of the latter to Konoe on July 18, 1940 and told him "with your understanding if this is adopted as fundamental policy of the Cabinet, the Army will not hesitate to offer its all-out cooperation to (your) new Cabinet."²⁹ On July 26, the Cabinet formally approved this Army-backed "Outline," which was publicly announced on August 1, 1940. On the same day the Foreign Minister Matsuoka gave a talk to explain the

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ See both Nihon Kokusai Seijigaku Kai-Taiheiyo-senso Genin Kenkyubu (comp.), op. cit., p. 168 and see Appendix for copy of the letter.

²⁹ Nihon Kokusai Seijigaku Dai-Taiheiyo-senso Genin Kenkyubu (comp.), op. cit., p. 167.

Outline of Fundamental National Policy; he used the term the "Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere" in place of "New Order in Greater East Asia"³⁰ which, in turn, corresponded to the term "Cooperative Economic Sphere in Greater East Asia" used in Yatsugi's Ten-Year Plan of Integrated National Policy.

Both the Ten-Year Plan and the Outline express the concepts developed or used by the German geopoliticians, such as: (1) A sphere organismically related to the core country;³¹ (2) the "creation and development" of a group of pan-regional "nations"; (3) organization of a "defense-state" on a fascist model; and (4) the necessity to form a "new bloc" embracing a Japan-centered East Asia.

In April 1943 the National Policy Research Association under the direction of Yatsugi issued a document entitled The Plan of Measures as Regards Constructing the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.³² For compiling about a 100-page document, it received 300,000 yen, one third of which was received from the governmental organizations including the War Ministry through Gen. Muto who, by then, had given a few speeches in the interest of the Association. This publica-

³⁰See p. 15 of this manuscript.

³¹For more information on this, see another publication of this Association, that is, INTFE, Exhibit No. 682 (Doc. no. 2229), "A Tentative Plan Concerning the Scope and the Structure of the GEACPS" Kokusaku-Kenkyu kai, 18 Feb. 1942.

³²INTFE, Exhibit No. 680 (Doc. no. 2330), Kokusai Kenkyukai, "Plan of Measures as Regards the Construction of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere," May, 1943.

tion is indeed filled with the geopolitical terminologies; the influences of Haushofer's Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean is visible in some parts of this document.³³ The GEACPS was not only to correspond with the region having monsoons, rice and the yellow race, but also to be utilized location-wise to attain the mastery of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.³⁴

Showa Kvenkyu-kai 昭和研究会 (Showa Research Association). This Association was instituted in November 1936 by Ryunosuke Goto, a classmate and a brain-truster of Konoe. In the words of Goto, they were on "such friendly terms that from time to time I expressed freely to him (Konoe) my views on political affairs and he on his part often consulted me on state affairs and discussed his unreserved opinions."³⁵

The some 300 member of this organization included many government officials a number of whom were connected with the Cabinet Planning Board,³⁶ which had formulated many plans for the GEACPS. The Association had on its committee such figures as Shigeru Yoshida and Dr. Masamichi

³³ Ibid., pp. 50-51.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ IMTFE, Proceedings, p. 30,607.

³⁶ Hanji Kinoshita (ed.), Taisei Jiten (Dictionary of New Order) (Osaka: Asai Shimbunsha, 1941), p. 98.

Royama.³⁷ Professor Royama, another brain-truster of Konoe was one of the leading controversialists in the theory of the East Asian regional system.

The publications issued by the Association such as Buroku Keizai ni Kansuru Kenkyu 通商経済問題研究 (A Study on Bloc Economy) and Toa Shin Chitsujo Kensetsu no Genri to Hosaku 東亞新秩序建設の原理と方策 (Theories and Plans for the Construction of a New Order in East Asia) present arguments parallel to those used by the Konoe's first cabinet. Expansion in China was defended in terms of the Toa Kyodotai-ron 東亞協同體論 (Theory of East Asian Cooperative Body) and the Konoe's declaration of 1938.³⁸ Royama's Toa to Sekai: Shin-jitsujo heno Ronsoku 東亞と世界-新秩序へ、論議 (East Asia and the World: Theoretical Guide to the New Order) could be considered as a "geopolitical"³⁹ essay; in this book he argued

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 97-98.

³⁸ Seijigaku Jiten (Dictionary of Political Science) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1954), p. 555 and Shiro Nohara, "Tai Toa Kyo-ei Ken (The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere)," Ajiya Rekishi Jiten (An Encyclopedia of Asian History) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1960), Vol. VI, pp. 51-52. See also Showa Kenkyu Kai (Showa Research Society), Buroku Keizai ni Kansuru Kenkyu (Study on Bloc Economy) (Tokyo: Seikatsu sha, 1939).

³⁹ Royama's book was published in 1941 by Kaizosha, Tokyo. See its last Chapter pp. 360-381 for his geopolitical discussion of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.

that the Japanese policy of the new order and later the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere had been gradually formulated with a view to settle the age-long instability of the Far East.

When military strategy after 1940 increasingly demanded a Grossraumwirtschaft and also political, military and "guarantee" occupation of remote areas, a group within this Association rationalized such expansion in terms of the all-inclusive GEACPS. Such geopolitical concepts as "dynamic" justice, Lebensraum and autarky were so frequently used that the influence of German geopolitics upon the Showa is almost as undeniable⁴⁰ as the influence exerted by the latter on Konoe.

Toa Renmei Kyokai 東亞聯盟協會 (The East Asia League Society). The Society was founded in September 1939 by Lt. Gen. Kanji Ishiwara, who in mid-1920 studied military affairs in Germany and was also one-time Professor of War History at the Army's Staff College. The purpose of this Society was to establish an Oriental "league of nations" on the basis of Odo 王道 (Kingly or Righteous Way) principles, by at first liberating East Asia from outside resistance. It would be like a Gemeinschaft (Community) rather than a Gesellschaft (Society). The area covering Japan, Manchukuo and China was designated as the sphere for

⁴⁰Seijigaku Jiten, loc. cit.

the East Asia league from which the political pressure of Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and France was to be expelled. The basic conditions for the league were (1) the responsibility for joint defense, (2) the unification of their economic systems but (3) the political independence of each.⁴¹ These were the Society's way of expressing the Konoe's three principles stated in 1938.

The Society's activities included: Monthly publication of the Toa Renmei 東亞聯盟 (East Asiatic League); establishment of League societies in different part of Manchukuo and China; and dispatch to these places of scholars or professors to help them gain an insight of the scene.⁴² Among the leading members of the Society were Takeo Kimura, a long-time associate of Ishiwara, who is carrying the League activities in post-war Japan⁴³ and Professor Naokichi Tanaka, the League's student adviser who defended the GEACPS in terms of the League's principles.⁴⁴

⁴¹Hanji Kinoshita (ed.), op. cit., pp. 151-152. See also Kanji Ishiwara, "Progress of Pan-Asiatic League Movement in Last Ten Years," Contemporary Opinions on Current Topics, July 3, 1941, p. 3.

⁴²Kinoshita (ed.), loc. cit.

⁴³I. I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Post-War Trends (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 47.

⁴⁴Kinoshita (ed.), op. cit., p. 147, and IMTFF, Exhibit No. 676 (Doc. no. 1955), "Great Union of Asia," appearing in Osaka Ji-Ji, January 31, 1942, pp. 1-2. See also his Dai Toa Seijiron (Theory of Greater East Asia Politics) (Tokyo: Taichido, 1943).

Ishiwara's plans for a league, which consisted of independent Manchukuo, China and Japan on seemingly equal terms, gained considerable support from Premier Kono and also from Wang Ching-wei, head of the puppet government in Nanking. According to the July 1941 issue of Toa Renmei, Ishiwara stated that:

Premier Prince Kono has sent a letter to President Wang at the end of last year, strongly encouraging the President to develop the activities of the (Pan) East Asiatic League, while the High Command of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces to China professed that the spirit of the (Pan) East Asiatic League campaign was the key to the settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict.⁴⁵

Thus, Ishiwara urged that the East Asia Bureau of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association should embrace his "ten-year old" movement with open arms, since it had the approval of both the government and the Army.

However, in subsequent years Ishiwara and his followers became disillusioned with the high-handed policies in China of the central leadership of the army including Tojo; for any attempt to coerce China by military means would, according to the League, isolate Japan from the countries that should be her closest partners. Ishiwara's plan were looked upon by Tojo as "excessive internationalism" and Idealism.⁴⁶

⁴⁵Quoted in "Progress of Pan-Asiatic League Movement in Last Ten Years," Contemporary Opinions on Current Topics, July 3, 1941, p. 3.

⁴⁶Morris, op. cit., pp. 46-47, and 442-443.

Although Ishiwara's influence on the government sharply declined after mid-1941, the ideas of his society had an important effect upon the militarists' thinking of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere. When the War Ministry requested Yatsugi of the National Policy Research Association to draft the Ten-Year Plan of Integrated National Policy, which became the script for Konoe's basic policy on the GEACPS, he was asked to use the Plan of National Defense Policy as a reference. The Plan of National Defense was drafted in 1935 by Lt. Col. T. Iwakuro of the War Ministry and Major K. Horiba of the General Staff Office as an unofficial tentative plan. It stated that the purpose of national defense was the protection of East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere consists of a living sphere, defense sphere and economic sphere. The living sphere (covers) Japan, Manchukuo, North China, Mongolia. The defense sphere (includes) Siberia south of Baikal, China, Southeast Asia south of Burma, Java, Sumatra, and North Pacific area and islands west of 170 degrees of east Longitude. The economic sphere includes the defense sphere plus India and Australia.⁴⁷

It is important to note that the design of the Plan of National Defense Policy was brought forward in 1935 by the followers of then Col. Ishiwara, who was then head of the strategy Section of the General Staff.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Quoted in the letter from Susumi Nishiura.

⁴⁸Ibid.

II. ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GREATER EAST ASIA MINISTRY

When expansion of the Japanese sphere reached its peak and the Diet of Japan was filled with members "recommended" by the new totalitarian party called the Imperial-Rule Assistance Political Council, the militarists around Tojo envisioned a permanent administrative machinery by which they could take over all the substantive programs regarding the newly won areas.

The Ministry of Greater East Asia (Dai Toa Sho ^{大東亜}
部) was established in November 1, 1942. It was to fulfill the need to plan and control, as a central organization, the affairs connected with the construction of the GEACPS in close cooperation with the Imperial Headquarters and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to push on the program of construction speedily and steadily.⁴⁹

Article 1 of the Ordinance for the organization of the Ministry stipulated the power and function of the Minister for Greater East Asia as follows:

The Minister...administers the business concerning the administration within the area of Greater East Asia excluding Nippon proper, Chosen, Taiwan and Karafuto, and other than purely diplomatic affairs, the protection of the Nipponese commercial rights and

⁴⁹ The Japan Yearbook 1943-44 (Tokyo: The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, 1944), p. 118.

interests in the foreign countries coming within the sphere and concerning Nipponese residents in those regions, and the business concerning emigrants, colonization and cultural affairs.⁵⁰

The "pure diplomacy," which was left to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would include merely formal functions such as the signing of treaties, the receiving of ambassadors, and matters of protocol.⁵¹

The functions of the new Ministry included the control of all former subordinate officials of the Japanese Foreign Service in the Greater East Asia Sphere. The Ordinance stipulated that "the minister for Greater East Asia directs and supervises all the Nipponese diplomats and consuls who are stationed in the Greater Asiatic Sphere..."⁵² Thus, the Minister had a general control of all administrative affairs in the Sphere; his Ministry was responsible not only for the orientation and coordination of the political, economic and cultural policies of the nominally independent countries

⁵⁰CAJMF, IMT 260, "Organization of the Ministry of Great East Asia Affairs" (Dai Toa-sho Kansei), November 1, 1942. Reel WT37, p. 2. Chosen (Korea), Taiwan (Formosa) and Karafuto (South Sakhalin) were administered by the Governments-General in the Home Ministry of the Japanese Government. See Seijigaku Jiten (Dictionary of Political Science) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1954), p. 856.

⁵¹Yale Candee Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military Rivalry 1930-1945 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957), p. 184.

⁵²IMT 260, loc. cit., and The Japan Yearbook 1943-44, op. cit., p. 118.

adhering to the Coprosperity Sphere, but also for the systematic exploitation of the occupied areas. All of the overseas companies and all of the occupation governments were under its control.⁵³

The Ministry consisted of a Secretariat, a General Affairs Bureau, a Manchurian Bureau, a China Bureau, a South Seas Bureau and a Trade Bureau.⁵⁴ In practice, the army retained substantial control of the most areas assigned to the Greater East Asia Ministry particularly Manchukuo, Burma, and the Philippines. Ambassadors to these countries were appointed through the Greater East Asia Ministry but they were normally the senior army officers in the occupied zones who were appointed at the insistence of the War Ministry.⁵⁵

Hence, the creation of the Greater East Asia Ministry signified not only domination of the Army over the Navy but also relegation of the Foreign Ministry to obscurity, which had been reluctant to follow the fantastic plans of the War Ministry.⁵⁶ It was also believed that the Greater East Asia Ministry would promote the Nipponization of the occupied

⁵³Report of Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan September 1945-September 1948, p. 132.

⁵⁴The Japan Yearbook 1943-44, loc. cit.

⁵⁵Political Reorientation of Japan, op. cit., p. 696.

⁵⁶Shigenori Togo, The Cause of Japan (Trans. and ed. by Fumikiho Togo and Ben H. Blakeney; New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), pp. 248-249.

regions more efficiently than the Foreign Ministry would.⁵⁷

Shigenori Togo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs whose power had already been systematically curtailed, resisted the plan to create a new Ministry until he was requested to resign by Tojo and other cabinet members.⁵⁸ Togo pointed out that his resignation was not caused by mere jurisdictional jealousy or disputes but by his disagreement with the underlying philosophy of those proponents of the Greater East Asia Ministry and the New Order ideas:

...the thoughts expressed by me conformed neither to the philosophy of military dominance nor to the concepts of bloc economy of the Lebensraum. It is clear that my position was discordant with the idea of a New Order in East Asia based on the idea of "living space," and accordingly with the designs for the Greater East Asia as then professed by Tojo and his adherents.⁵⁹

There were other specific objections Togo had against the Greater East Asia Ministry. The jurisdiction of two independent ministries- the new Ministry for East Asia and

⁵⁷ F. C. Jones; Japan's New Order in East Asia Its Rise and Fall 1937-45 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 336.

⁵⁸ According to T. A. Bisson, it would be unsafe to conclude that Tojo had had everything his way. He had managed to secure the essentials of what he sought, and with that he was content, but he had put through his plan against stiff opposition. Shigenori Togo had resigned on September 1. At that time the Officially announced date for inauguration of the Greater East Asia Ministry was October 1. Final inauguration occurred a full month later, largely due to "the painstaking but enthusiastic examination on the part of the Privy Council. T. A. Bisson, Japan's War Economy (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), p. 86.

⁵⁹ Togo, op. cit., pp. 247-248.

the Foreign Ministry for the rest of the world- would make it impossible to conduct a unified and consistent diplomacy. While Tojo argued that the countries of East Asian race would be treated differently from other countries as being Japan's kin, Togo viewed that such treatment would lead the East Asiatics to entertain suspicion of Japan's motives. Also, Togo was of the opinion that the very fact that "pure diplomacy" had to be left to the Foreign Ministry proved the new plan had serious legal defects.⁶⁰

As Togo, the Foreign Minister of Tojo's Cabinet, reiterated in March, 1942 in his opposition to the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry, the creation of the new Ministry was resented by most of the East Asians who were aware of its implications. Also the creation of two separate diplomatic organs made for confusion and division in Japanese policy, as the Ambassadors to the area within Greater East Asia Ministry jurisdiction were to report on all matters directly to the Greater East Asia Ministry with the exceptions of merely formal functions.⁶¹

The Greater East Asia Conference. The heyday of the Greater East Asia Ministry came on November 5, 1943 when it organized the Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo. The

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 250-251.

⁶¹Report of Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan September 1945-September 1948.

Conference was attended by six representatives of the allegedly independent allies of Japan- Chang Ching-hui of Manchukuo, Wang Ching-wei of China, Wan Waithayakon of Thailand, Ba Maw of Burma, and Jose Laurel of the Philippines. Subhas Chandra Bose, Head of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind was also present as an Observer.⁶² But, Asia's "real leaders" such as Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Tse-tung, Gandhi, Nehru, Osmena, and Quezon were absent.⁶³

The purpose of this conference appeared to be to mitigate animosity created by the Japanese policy of exploitation.⁶⁴ Toshikawa Kase is of opinion that the Assembly was timed to meet before the Cairo Conference, then believed to be imminent,⁶⁵ which sounded a death-knell to the schemes of the GEACPS by declaring that Japan would be stripped of all territories seized since 1894.⁶⁶

Japanese journalists called the meeting an "assemblage of representatives from the recently liberated areas of

⁶² Toshikazu Kase, Journey to the Missouri (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 72.

⁶³ P. M. Linebarger, Chu Djang, and A. D. Burks, (Far Eastern Governments and Politics::China and Japan (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), p. 437.

⁶⁴ Research and Analysis Branch, Interim Research & Intelligence, Dept. of State, Summary of Japanese Policies in Occupied Areas, #3291, November 9, 1945, p. 2.

⁶⁵ Kase, loc. cit.

⁶⁶ The territories to be stripped of were Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores and all the territories seized in the two world wars.

Southern Asia" and named its declaration a "Pacific Charter." This charter was in opposition to the Atlantic Charter; drawn in August, 1941 it proclaimed to free mankind from fear, from want, and from various restrictions on his personal rights. In the opinion of Professor Kamikawa the Atlantic Charter did not subscribe to sphere-politics as envisioned by Japan and Germany.

It has drawn the blueprint of a world politics preferable only to Britain and the United States. For that reason, it is a political antilogy which is contralateral on one side and unilateral on the other, and as such, it cannot but be challenged by Japan, Germany and their allies. The Greater East Asia Joint Declaration is antipodal to the Atlantic Charter, because it seeks to reconstruct the region of Greater East Asia as one of the component spheres of the projected new world order fabric, enjoying the freedom of action in the conduct of its own affairs unharassed and unhampered by third power maneuvers.⁶⁷

The "Pacific Charter" stated in its preamble that each nation should be permitted to secure its "proper sphere" in order to attain the permanent peace of the world, and that the purpose of the GEACPS was to free East Asia from the domination of the West, which had exploited the economic system of the colonial regions.⁶⁸ The five-points

⁶⁷Hikomatsu Kamikawa, "Asia Declaration and Atlantic Charter," Contemporary Japan. Vol. XII, No. 12 (December 1943), p. 1557.

⁶⁸Gaimusho Joyakukyoku (Foreign Ministry of Japan, Bureau of Treaty), Dainiji Sekai Senso Kankei Joyakushu (Collection of the Treaties related to the World War II), 1943, p. 450.

joint declaration reads as follows:

1. The countries of Greater East Asia through mutual cooperation will ensure the stability of their region and construct an order of common prosperity and well-being based upon justice.
2. The countries of Greater East Asia will ensure the fraternity of nations in their region, by respecting one another's sovereignty and independence and practicing mutual assistance and amity.
3. The countries...by representing one another's traditions and developing the creative faculties of each race, will enhance the culture and civilization of Greater East Asia.
4. The countries...will endeavor to accelerate their economic development through close cooperation upon a basis of reciprocity and to promote thereby the general prosperity of their region.
5. The countries...will cultivate friendly relations with all the countries of the world, and work for the abolition of racial discrimination, the promotion of cultural intercourse and the opening of resources throughout the world, and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind.⁶⁹

In establishing the political administration of the GEACPS the Greater East Asia Ministry gave the outward appearance of observing Article 2. For example, China, Burma, and the Philippines were "declared independent" by October 1943. To present the appearance of respecting the political autonomy of those regions where "independence" was not granted, the Greater East Asia Ministry made a point

⁶⁹The Japan Yearbook 1943-1944 (Tokyo: The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, 1944), p. 1049. For more information on the views of the delegates, see the texts of the addresses delivered at the assembly in INTFE, Proceedings, pp. 36432-36472.

of appointing a number of native administrators. Also, the Ministry established institutes both in Japan and in the Great East Asia areas for training "leaders of their people."⁷⁰

The Greater East Asia Ministry interpreted article 4 to mean that economy of the Sphere should be centralized under the control of the Japanese.⁷¹ Hachiro Arita, four times Foreign Minister, elaborated on this economic principle with his exegesis. Although British and American efforts forced Japan to shift to bloc economy, Arita argued, there was ample wisdom in the theory of bloc economy, whose formation was deemed a process through which the world has to go sooner or later, since the principles of free trade tend to make the nation controlling vast resources win the race. Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, while possessing practically all kinds of vital and strategic resources within their individual boundaries, were assuming "unreasonable" and "selfish" attitudes. In the world where its economic resources were so inequitably distributed, it was viewed most natural, rational and even lawful that countries in East Asia form a sphere for closer economic

⁷⁰Office of Strategic Service Research and Analysis, U. S. Department of State, The Great East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, Current Intelligent Study number 35, August 10, 1945, p. 3.

⁷¹Ibid.

and political collaboration.⁷²

Article 5 called for "the abolition of racial discrimination." The Ministry announced that this was to be "not mere mechanical equality," but a plan enabling "all people to live in contentment and peace."⁷³ The "dynamic" idea expressed in this statement of intention was put into practice on a small scale, however. This last principle was cited as living proof that the Greater East Asia Joint Declaration was not exclusive but magnanimous toward all nations. Arita called it the "Magna Carta" of the world.⁷⁴ According to Professor Kamikawa, it idealistically expressed the sincere desire of the Asiatics "to remain true to the ideal of 'live and let live'."⁷⁵

Even if the fundamental aims of the Japanese Ministry were simply to provide ideological support for the conquest of the Asiatic continent and to set up administrative machinery for the conquered areas, this was a great "psychological" gift to the nations of the South Pacific which had for years been vainly aspiring for independence.⁷⁶

⁷²Hachiro Arita, "New Order and East Asia Assembly," Contemporary Japan, Vol. XII, No. 12 (December 1943), pp. 1548-1550.

⁷³The Great East Asia Coprosperity Sphere,,op. cit., p. 4.

⁷⁴Arita, op. cit., p. 1550.

⁷⁵Kamikawa, op. cit., p. 1562.

⁷⁶Kase, op. cit., p. 72.

It may be worthwhile to introduce here an episode in connection with drafting the Joint Declaration. A War Ministry staff officer had told Kazuo Yatsugi of the National Policy Research Association in June 1943 that he would like to have some leading scholar like Dr. Ikutaro Nishida to make a rough draft of the Joint Declaration, since it was too important, publicity-wise, to be written hastily by a militarist. Nishida, Japan's leading philosopher, at first refused to comply with the request made through Yatsugi, but later he drew up Sekai Shinjitsujo no Genri 世界新秩序原理 (the Principles of World New Order), which was more or less what could be used as a reference or guide for the requested Declaration.⁷⁷

Of the principles of world New Order, reads the text, the East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere was based on "Chien 地 (earth-relation) as well as on tradition." The "Western" doctrine of national equality was inapplicable to the New Order. Each nation-state, while leading its own individual (proper but unequal) life in its sphere, would work toward the one world through the particular co-prosperity sphere it belongs. The real world peace would be realized only after these co-prosperity spheres, especially of Europe and Asia were completely materialized. Bloc economy and war

⁷⁷ Kazuo Yatsugi, Showa Kinbutsu Hiroku (A Confidential Document of the figures during Showa Period) (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 1954), pp. 271-281.

were accepted as necessary evils.⁷⁸

Yatsugi made 20 copies of Nishida's text and distributed it to the important ministries of the Government including the military authorities. But, when the Greater East Asia Joint Declaration was finally drafted he could hardly recognize in it the ideals expressed by Dr. Nishida.⁷⁹ To what extent the drafting committee of the Declaration had referred to Nishida's text is unknown. Nishida's rejection of national equality could have aroused suspicion on the part of the delegates. It may be added, however, that the text of this great philosopher was, in its content, incredibly parallel to the views of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere theorists.

III. THE AMBASSADOR'S CONFERENCE vs. THE POST-WAR COMMITTEE

Even though, on the occasion of the Greater East Asia Conference held in November 1943, the establishment of the GEACPS was formally proclaimed and the moderate Joint Declaration was publicized, the animosity already created by the Japanese and misunderstanding of their war aims had still persisted in various quarters. Since the Allies were

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 282, pp. 284-285. See pp. 292-296 for Nishida's complete text.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 293 and pp. 271-281.

planning to gather at San Francisco, there was even greater necessity to plan a second Greater East Asia Conference. But the arrangement had had to be altered to one for a conference of their ambassadors stationed in Tokyo, as the war situation made it impossible for the representatives to travel to Japan.⁶⁰

The Greater East Asia Ambassador's Conference was held on April 23, 1945 with the ambassadors of Manchukuo, China, Burma, Thailand and the Philippines. In their resolution the idea of "coexistence and co-prosperity" was defined as the term embodying the principles of "political equality," "economic reciprocity," "respect for individual cultures," and "non-discrimination." It is noteworthy that "political equality" was guaranteed to all countries, thereby flatly rejecting the heretofore Japanese doctrine of national inequality. It did incorporate, however, the familiar thesis that the "economic disproportion of the world" must be rectified. In this declaration "an order" was to have "as its framework a structure for a regional security suitable to the actual state of affairs, concurrently with an appropriate world-wide system."⁶¹

While the seven-points resolution of the Ambassadors reflects a radical change in the philosophy of the GEACPS,

⁶⁰Togo, op. cit., p. 273.

⁶¹See Ibid., pp. 273-275 for a full text of the resolution.

the creation on the other hand, in August 1944, of an "unofficial" Post-War Planning Committee showed an evidence of its unwillingness to sacrifice Japan's domination of Asia. Composed of noted Japanese imperialists who recommend a post-war structure for East Asia, the Committee planned to implement the Joint Declaration of 1943 merely to preserve Japanese hegemony in Asia and to propagate the Imperial Way. For this reason it added to the declaration a principle of "joint defense against aggression." Fortunately for the world, however, these plans never did extend beyond the official stage.⁸²

⁸²Summary of Japanese Policies in Occupied Areas,
op. cit., p. 2.

CHAPTER X

JAPANESE PERFORMANCE AND ITS IMPACT IN THE OCCUPIED ZONES

Even with administrative machinery such as the new Ministry for the GEACPS and the trans-ministerial Cabinet Planning Board that had been in operation, the task of enforcing the organizational plans for such a diversified and vast area had its limitations especially during the war. On the other hand, it seems necessary to bear in mind that the immediate requirements for the execution of the war provided an excuse for ruthless exploitation.

I. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FIELDS

Why did Japan encourage independence movements when real independence would drive Japan out? At the turn of the century Japan encouraged the independence of Korea from China's suzerainty only to make it her colony. Japanese establishment of "independent" Manchukuo and later "New China" apart from China, and the independence of the Southern countries from Western "yoke" seems to have been patterned after this strategy.

Manchukuo. In an attempt to control the economic policies of "independent" Manchukuo, the Japanese government proposed establishment of a Joint Economic Committee "to strengthen the economic Interdependence between the two countries in 1935."¹ The Joint Committee was to consist of eight members, four to represent each government so as to appear that each government had an equal representation in the Committee. The Foreign Minister Hirota pointed out, however, that one of the four representatives from Manchukuo would always be a Japanese who "will not make any decision that will be disadvantageous to Japan."²

Thus Japanese puppet government provided not only markets for Japanese good and capital but also essential war materials for Japan. As a result of the first five-year industrial program, the production of pig iron reached an amount which almost doubled the figure of the original plan. The production of steel ingots amounted to one and a half times the original figure and that of steel material amounted to more than two and a half times. The execution of the first five-year food program resulted in an increase in the production of rice and oats by more than three times previous production levels. Non-ferrous metals such as lead,

¹Williard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movement 1940-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 29.

²Quoted in ibid., p. 31.

zinc, gold, silver, copper and aluminum etc...all of these necessary war materials were supplied for carrying out the war.³ Thus, the establishment of Manchukuo brought about the remarkable growth of war industries.

Since the major functions of the Manchukuo economy were to help Japan execute the war and to enrich Japan's economy, the economic independence of Manchukuo was a fiction. Yet the degree of independence allowed was greater in the political realm than in the economic realm. As a result, according to F. C. Jones, the Japanese could repudiate charges of territorial expansion by declaring that they had not in fact annexed any territory, and they could deny responsibility for measures taken in Manchukuo which were adverse to third-power commercial and industrial interests there.⁴

New China. Even after the occupied areas of China were made "New China" with Wang Ching-wei as its President, it took several years before Wang's demands for "equality" were finally accepted. In later stage of war Japan not only realized that failure to meet the nationalist demands would delay their wholehearted cooperation but also felt the need to counter the effect of "the impending relinquishment" by

³The Japan Yearbook 1940-1941 (Tokyo: The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, 1941), pp. 298-300.

⁴F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall 1937-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 338.

the United States and Britain of their extraterritorial rights in China.

When Wang Ching-wei made another trip to Tokyo in December, 1942, Tojo promised to surrender Japanese extra-territorial rights and concessions in China, to turn over the International Settlement in Shanghai to the New China, as well as "enemy" properties in China which had been seized by Japanese forces.⁵ Furthermore, the status of equality was granted to New China in the Pact of Alliance signed on October 30, 1943, in Nanking by Ambassador Tani and Wang. Japan also renounced the rights she possessed under the Boxer Protocol.⁶

Nevertheless, Nippon-China relations had been so violent and wild that it was difficult to maintain peace through treaties alone. Thus, Wang's "peace" faction led the Ishiwara's "East Asia League" movement, which on the part of the Chinese was traced back to the "Great East Asia principle" of Sun Yat-sen. The irrationality of the confrontation of the two slogans, "China Reconstruction Through Resistance" and "China Reconstruction Through Peace" was to be readjusted through the East Asia League.⁷ It is doubtful whether this pro-Japanese movement had liquidated "egoistic"

⁵Ibid., p. 340.

⁶Ibid., p. 342.

⁷Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere (Tokyo: The Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, 1941), p. 50.

modern nationalism in China, although it provided a valuable factor in reducing the China's anti-Nippon racialism.⁸

In the newly acquired areas of Central and South China, the Japanese faced stronger resistance which was worse than what they had met in Manchuria and North China.⁹ Japanese policy, therefore, became more liberal in Central and Southern China than in North China, which was more liberal than that applied in Manchuria. Thus, in Central and Southern China the Japanese carried out their economic policy in a rather intelligent manner. For instance, they left the task of developing industries in those parts of China to the Chinese themselves; Japan was to assist them by supplying capital and technical assistance subject to certain controls. Special care was taken to avoid anti-Japanese sentiment, which might have been aroused among the native capitalists on economic grounds, and to leave ample room for free enterprise so that native capital might be employed as far as possible.¹⁰

Thailand. Of all the so-called members of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, Thailand offered the best cooperation to Japan. Japan's efforts to undermine the

⁸Ibid.

⁹Institute of Pacific Relations, Industrial Japan: Aspects of Recent Economic Changes as Viewed by Japanese Writers (New York: Comp. and trans. by Secretariat of the Institute, 1941), p. 44.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 47.

pressures on Thailand not only from British and French, but also from the China's Kuomintang was in the nature of a relief to the Siamese nationalists.

The Japan-Thailand Alliance, formally signed on December 21, 1941, provided for:

Mutual respect for sovereignty and independence, for full political, military, and economic assistance in the event of conflict with a third Power, and forbade any separate armistice or peace. It was accompanied by a secret protocol by the terms of which Japan undertook to assist Thailand to regain her lost territories, and Thailand undertook to give Japan all the assistance specified in Article 2 of the Treaty, in the existing war with Great Britain and the United States.¹¹

This treaty ensured a much wider scope of action to the Japanese forces in Thailand. On January 25, 1942, Thailand, as a copartner of the GEACPS, declared war upon Great Britain and the United States.

A Liaison Bureau was established to ensure military cooperation between the Japanese and the Siamese armies. Some of the Siamese participated in the invasion of the Shan States and conquered two of them- Kengtang and Mongpan. Siamese authorities retained control over their own nationals although the Japanese military police "cooperated" with them in cases involving aliens- Japanese civilians, Chinese and Indians. The Chinese and Indians were organized into pro-Japanese associations. Bangkok, indeed, for a

¹¹Jones, op. cit., p. 345.

while became the headquarters of the Japanese-sponsored "Free India" movement.¹²

Popular ill will towards the Japanese soon grew as the economic consequences of Thailand's adhesion to the Japanese made themselves increasingly apparent. In April 1942 Tokyo announced that an agreement had been reached for yen-baht parity. But the currency agreement represented a considerable devaluation of the baht. In the case of Thailand, as with other countries included in the yen-bloc area, the Japanese were quite unable to provide adequate supplies of manufactured goods. Hence, exports from Japan were few and prices were high, whereas Japan drew heavily upon Thailand, especially for supplies of rice. But even a favorable balance of trade with Japan brought no benefit to Thailand, since the credits which piled up to her account in Japanese banks remained "frozen" for the duration of the war. These grievances were increased by the behavior of the Japanese Army in Thailand which often paid for its needs by issuing Thai currency, thus damaging credit and promoting inflation.¹³

Outwardly, however, Japanese-Thai relations continued to be cordial during 1942-44. In April 1942 a Thai special mission, headed by General Phya Bahol, went to Tokyo professedly to affirm Thailand's adhesion to the ideals of Greater East Asia. Japan responded by sending a "Grand

¹²Ibid., p. 346.

¹³Jones, op. cit., pp. 347-348.

Mission of Goodwill" to Bangkok.¹⁴ Other signs of outward cordiality were the appointment of a Thai minister to Manchukuo, on June 29, 1942, the Thailand's recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime in China on July 7, and the conclusion of the Siamese-Indochina boundary demarcation agreement on July 11 in Saigon.¹⁵

When the existing governments were "cooperative" with Tokyo, as in the case of Thailand and French Indo-China, Japan supported the existing governments. In fact, French Indo-China was left undisturbed until March 1945.¹⁶

The Philippines. But, as in case of the Philippines and Burma where the greater resistance was expected, Japan's Military Administration controlled through its prominent puppets and elaborate and reorganized administration.¹⁷ Though the existing institutions of local self-governments were tolerated, they were dependent on Japanese military forces operating within the chain-of-command.¹⁸

In December 1942 the Japanese organized the Kalibapi, as association for service to the "New" Philippines. Like the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in Japan, the

¹⁴Ibid., p. 348.

¹⁵Loc. cit.

¹⁶H. M. Vinacke, Far Eastern Politics in the Post-War Period (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1956), p.33.

¹⁷Japan Yearbook 1943-44, op. cit., pp. 304-305. And Jones, op. cit., p. 361.

¹⁸Vinacke, op. cit., p. 31.

Kalibapi was intended to replace the old political parties by an all-embracing association devoted for the cause of Japan and the Coprosperity Sphere, pacification work in guerilla areas, and economic reconstruction on the lines desired by the Japanese.¹⁹

Despite many tempting exhortations by the Japanese and the Philippine puppets, local resistance movements continued and spread. In June 1943 the Military administration gave instructions to the Kalibapi to organize a Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence as a concessional means. This was followed by a special national convention of the Kalibapi: it produced a draft Constitution that was ratified by another convention. On September 20 the Kalibapi also elected a National Assembly which, in turn, elected Jose Laurel as President. He, together with Vargas and Aquino, was then summoned to Tokyo to discuss the Pact of Alliance with Japan; on October 14 the Pact was signed. The same day the independence of the Philippines was proclaimed and the Military Administration formally ended.²⁰

With the loss of Saipan, the fall of the Tojo Ministry and the approach of the American forces, the Japanese pretence began to be abandoned. In June 1944, the Foreign Minister of the Philippine Government, Claro M. Recto, addressed a letter to the Japanese ambassador in

¹⁹Jones., op. cit., p. 361.

²⁰Ibid., p. 365.

Manila, Murata Shozo, and to the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army, General Wati, in which he pointed out that the bad effects Japanese discrimination, arrogance and cruelty were having on the Filipinos was not offset by donations of clothing and medicine, and the use of a national flag. The hardship of everyday life outweighed all other considerations. The letter closed with a stirring appeal for "real" independence:

The Filipino must be given a real stake in the war. He must be given something concrete to fight for...something that will invest with living substance such high principles as Asia for the Asians or such large ideals as the establishment of the Coprosperity Sphere... They must be made to feel that this country belongs to them, that they are the masters in their own land, that the independence which they have proclaimed and which Japan has recognized is real and authentic.²¹

This communication was in fact one long condemnation of Japanese military practices and an indirect assertion that independence was a sham. Yet the Japanese recipients of the communication could not very well punish him for this outspoken reproof. Even had there been the will on the part of the Japanese to meet the conditions Recto desired, time was lacking as the Americans were already landing in the archipelago.

The Netherland East Indies. American abrogation of the commercial treaty between the United States and Japan in

²¹Williard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movement 1940-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 72-73.

January 1940 had reduced oil supplies for Japan. With the American market closed to Japan, only in the Netherlands Indies were there adequate sources. Japan therefore attempted to obtain from the Netherlands Government definite assurances that oil and certain quantities of East Indies products would be exported to Japan. When the Netherlands was in the hands of Nazi Germany, the Japanese government expressed its hope that the Netherlands Indies might be included within the GEACPS.²²

In December 1940 the Netherlands Government in exile flatly declared that the Indies could not be incorporated into the Coprosperity Sphere. To this the head of the Cabinet Planning Board in Tokyo replied that "Japan's objects were economic, not political, and that all Japan wanted was that the Indies should be part of a loose economic union, while remaining within the Netherlands empire."²³

With intent to incorporate the Netherlands Indies into the Coprosperity Sphere, the Japanese troops landed in the territory of the Dutch East Indies on January 10, 1942. But as to the political transformation, there turned out a welter of various opinions and organizational jealousies concerning the question of timing. The Foreign Ministry

²²Harold S. Quigley, Far Eastern War 1937-1941 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942), pp. 181-182.

²³Ibid., p. 182.

maintained that independence should be granted at once. The military, concerned with strategy, strongly opposed the idea on the ground that the intensified nationalist activity might interfere with their plans. The navy remained vigorously opposed to the idea of independence until late in the war, after the central Army authorities had earlier changed over to the side of those favoring it.²⁴

Netherlands Indies policy was thus characterized as "wait and see," as the division of opinion among the Japanese leaders continued. Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso who succeeded Tojo in July 1944, was also forced to remain vague in the promise of Indonesian independence. In a speech to the 65th session of the Diet on September 7, 1944, he said:

As to the East Indies, Japan permitted the inhabitants to participate in politics according to their wish...they have been cooperating remarkably with the military government there. In view of these facts...we intend to recognize their independence in the future...²⁵

This statement may be tantamount to an attempt to purchase Indonesian cooperation by the vagueness and hypocrisy of the promise.

The real motive of Japanese unsubstantial attitude toward the independence was later revealed by Tojo's testi-

²⁴Elsbree, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

²⁵Quoted in Ibid., pp. 50-51.

mony to the International Military Tribunal of the Far East. According to Tojo, the Liaison Conference decided in January 1943 to incorporate the Netherlands Indies into the territory of Japan. This decision was kept secret for fear that it would provide valuable materials to Allied propaganda.²⁶ Japan perhaps had to abandon the 1943 decision. But when independence was finally granted to the Indies, it was expected that they would cooperate with Japan by accepting responsibility for defense against the Allies.

Results. Japan destroyed the capacity of various countries of the GEACPS to produce a surplus for export outside the Sphere and diverted their production capacity to the production of goods required by her and by the Sphere. Also in some countries, Japan carried out the artificial overvaluation of the yen, thereby comparatively small amounts of Japanese exports could pay for Japanese imports of a much higher value.²⁷

The over-all material contribution of the continent to Japan were less than the northward expansionists had anticipated. Inadequate rail facilities and Allied attack on shipping during the last part of the war made it difficult to bring resources to Japan.²⁸

²⁶Quoted in ibid., p. 47.

²⁷Paul Einzig, The Japanese "New Order" In Asia (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1943), pp. 51-52.

²⁸Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Re-

With regards to Oceania it was impossible not only to integrate the areas into the industrial economy of Japan, but also to restore the production of the areas to meet the wartime need for raw materials. Allied submarines and then bombers caused tremendous ship losses thereby severing the sea communication between Japan and the South Seas. This meant farther difficulty of economic integration. In fact, the various countries within the GEACPS were requested to become more self-sufficient than before the war, so that each could meet its own needs. Hence the intra-spheric division of labor was inapplicable.²⁹

Indeed, the Japanese war of liberation gave poverty to Japan and "co-poverty" to the GEACPS.³⁰

II. PROPAGANDA FIELD

Even though the goal of cultural attachment to Japan was not reached, Japanese propaganda in the occupied countries had the effect, however limited, of contributing to the nationalist movement in post-war Asia.

Appeal to Color: "Asia for the Asiatics." While in Europe Dr. Goebbels was expounding the virtues of Hitler's

construction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), p. 110.

²⁹Einzig, op. cit., p. 50. And H. M. Vinacke, Far Eastern Politics in the Post-War Period (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1956), pp. 27-28.

³⁰Vinacke, op. cit., p. 28.

New Order, called Grossraumordnung, in Asia Japanese propagandists were selling her doctrine of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.

The Asians' attitude toward the colonial powers of the West have ranged from admiration to profound dislike and hatred. The admiration arose from Western leadership in bringing Western technique to them and assistance in raising their living standard. The recurrent economic crises of Western capitalism in the years following upon the World War I made it less admirable for the backward people of Asia. Moreover, the spectacle of the Western powers constantly quarreling with each other undermined the respect in which they were held as the keepers of the peace in Asia. Japan stepped gradually into the prestige vacuum left by the decline of respect for the West.³¹

Japan held before the eyes of her Asian neighbors the sins of Western colonization. She told them that the colored races occupied two-thirds of the world's surface. She impressed on them that Japan was the only power strong enough to beat the white powers as shown by the Russo-Japanese war.³² By the summer of 1942 many peoples of Asia were ready to accept Pearl Harbor, the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, and the fall of Singapore as

³¹ James P. Warburg, Unwritten Treaty (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1946), pp. 48-49.

³² Otto D. Tolischus, Through Japanese Eyes (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1945), p. 79.

proof of what Japanese propaganda had been telling them for some time: the white man was through in Asia.³³

British and French failure to get any real help against Japan from the native populations of their Asiatic dominions was due in the first instance to the unenlightened colonial policy of these nations; but native apathy, or even outright friendliness to Japan, was undoubtedly also the result of Japanese propaganda and subversive activity.³⁴

The Japanese told the Chinese if "it had not been for Japan's stern opposition, the dismemberment of China at the hands of the European powers would have been unavoidable."³⁵ The Japanese government reminded its neighbors of the fact that Sun Yat-sen advocated the doctrine of "the brotherly union of the Eastern peoples for the renaissance of the Orient." It also pointed out that the concept of the GEACPS was based on the similar ideal called Hakko Ichibu—all nations in one family.³⁶

But the ideal of all Asiatics in one family was not enough to convince them. The "wickedness" of the white-race enemy was recounted with tireless gusto and exaggeration in expectation of the Asian's feeling of urgent and definite need for such a racial solidarity as GEACPS.

³³Warburg, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Shingoro Takaishi, "A Pan-Asia Union," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCVII (May, 1941), p. 54.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 54-56.

Broadcasts to China seldom ceased referring to the Opium War of a century ago; the alleged shooting of Buddhist monks by the British at Pegu; British dependence on India and Malayan troops to do the actual fighting in Malaya while the British held their guns to their backs.³⁷ As for the "wickedness" of Americans, Japanese broadcasts highlighted race riots and race prejudice in this country. Lynching and restrictive immigration laws were held up before the Asiatics to prove America's dishonesty in claiming to fight for a free world. A Manchurian broadcast beamed to Asia claimed that "democracy as practiced by Anglo-Americans is tainted with the bloody guilt of racial persecution and exploitation."³⁸ In Burma, raiding planes scattered handbills claiming the massacre of the Burmese by British troops.³⁹ Thus every bit of evidence or rumor of such discriminatory actions was grist to the Japanese propaganda mill.

Appeal to Nationalism. Japanese propaganda was not confined to the emotional appeal of skin-color, but also directed to the political, economic, and even religious interests. The GEACPS propaganda promised to give political

³⁷ Selden C. Menefee, "What Tokyo Tells Asia," The Christian Science Monitor (February 20, 1943), p. 4.

³⁸ Newsweek, XIX, February 9, 1942, p. 38.

³⁹ Ibid.

independence to Chinese, Indians, Burmese, Filipinos, as well as the peoples of French Indo-China and ultimately to the Dutch East Indies. Efforts were made to prove to these Asiatics that the so-called Greater East war was not a war to acquire territory and riches for Japan, but a war to free Asia from exploitation of Western imperialists.

As an attempt to build good will toward Japan, the propagandists made appeals to various Asiatic countries. They told Burmese "Burma for Burmese" rather than "Asia for Asiatics." As for the Indians, nationalist leaders of India such as Gandhi, Subhas Bose, and even Nehru were praised, and Radio Tokyo shed sympathetic tears for their nationalist ambitions. Wherever possible, the native peoples' racial kinship with Japan was stressed.⁴⁰

Japanese experts in psychological warfare studied the detailed folkways of other Asiatic peoples whose countries they occupied and even instructed Japanese tourists and soldiers not to pat the native children on the head, since this was opposed to the local customs of these occupied areas. Japanese gave pre-eminence to symbols accepted by the peoples. In order to capture the sympathies of Quezon nationalists in the Philippines, they put the elder brother of then President Quezon on a broadcast.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Menefee, op. cit., p. 3.

⁴¹ Selden C. Menefee, "Japan's Propaganda War," Asia, (March, 1943), p. 167.

Economic Appeal. The propagandists held out economic incentives such as promises of markets for the surplus rice of Indo-China and Burma and the rubber of Malaya. Asians were told that the "economic sphere" of the GEACPS would avoid wasteful duplication and that having Java, for instance, specialize on sugar, Philippines on cotton, and Japan on industry, the maximum results would be turned out for the benefits of all Asians. They were also told that tariffs would be adjusted and that currency relations would be regulated in order to supply a sufficient amount of working capital and facilitate the distribution of raw materials.

Religious Appeal: Collaboration But Not Parallelism.

Religious appeal was made for the purpose of both building good will toward Japan and reinforcing religious affinity between the conquered and the Japanese. With similar object, however, propagandists made separate and different appeals to different sects of the religions practiced by the Asiatics.

Muslims were told that the Emperor of Japan was the "Protector of Islam," stressing affinity of the Muslim and Shinto religions. For Chinese Buddhists, Japanese established the Buddhist Research Institute in Peking "to renovate Buddhist education among them."⁴²

Appeal to Catholicism was a principal propaganda

⁴²Ibid., p. 168.

weapon used for the Filipino Catholics. The initiation of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Vatican was used as proof of official Catholic approval, and Catholic bishops and authorities were quoted as favoring the "New Order in East Asia." To please Filipino protestants, the famed Japanese evangelist Toyohimo Kagawa was dispatched to do "missionary" work.⁴³

To the Confucians in East Asia, the Nipponese asserted that Kung Hsien-ching, a descendant of Confucius in the seventy-second generation, was in Tokyo to "promote the study and revival of Confucianism," and incidentally to campaign for the removal of Western thought.⁴⁴

Call for Revolt. Another propaganda theme employed by the Japanese was to call for revolt against Western rule. They promised rich rewards to those who would heed the summons. It was called "a responsible role in the building up of the GEACPS." Rash B. Bose, Indian puppet who has been living in Tokyo for 27 years, broadcasted to India that he had organized 30,000 Indians in the Japanese-held territory into an "Indian Independence League."⁴⁵

Saigon radio blared forth, "Indians, this is your

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Selden C. Menefee, "Japan's Propaganda War," Asia, March, 1943, pp. 168-169.

⁴⁵Ibid.

time to rise...every man, woman, and child should participate in the national struggle...Boycott British goods, shut down all schools and offices. Refuse to cooperate with the government in any way."⁴⁶

Utilization of the Nationalist Leaders. The Japanese government utilized political refugees living in Japan. Rash Behari Bose, organized an "Indian National Army." Since the invasion of India was not actually planned, the INA was never used but mere existence was worthwhile for a propaganda purpose. In the opinion of Professor Elsbree, it was not until Subhas Chandra Bose returned to Asia from Germany, where he had sought active support for Indian independence, that the Japanese found an answer to the problem of effective leadership of the Indian "liberation" movement. He commanded a sizable and highly vocal following within India, a fact which the Japanese greatly used.⁴⁷

Generals Auinaldo and Ricarte of the Philippines, who had fled to Japan after the Philippine Revolution, were used during Japanese occupation of Philippines. But they were not able to resume an active role,⁴⁸ as they were not familiar with the contemporary scene in the Philippines.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 4.

⁴⁷Williard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movement 1940 to 1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 33-35.

⁴⁸Ibid.

This gave the Japanese a lesson that the type of popular leadership which they were looking for could be furnished only by figures more closely associated with the contemporary affairs in their native countries. Hence the Japanese militarists made greater efforts to secure the support of such leaders. But only a few of them made a common cause with Japan.

III. GEO-STRATEGIC FIELD

The question of delimiting the territory of the GEACPS had never been solved as there were more disagreements on this aspect than on any other aspect of the GEACPS. Even the same statesman talked of different boundaries on different occasions. A concrete territorial composition of the GEACPS would have to depend on each circumstances, since it would be "determined by Japan's total power under her synthetic judgement at a particular time of Japan's subjective conditions and objective conditions of East Asia as well as world conditions."⁴⁹

The most ideal condition for the territorial planning would have been to discover territorial space which corresponds to the political, economic, cultural, military and racial spheres of Greater East Asia. But it was beyond

⁴⁹INTFE, Exhibit No. 680 (Doc. no. 2330), Kokusaku Kenkyukai (National Policy Research Association), "Plan of Measures as Regards the Construction of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere," May, 1943, pp. 54-55.

possibility.

When defense was the primary criteria in delimitation of the Sphere, it required an area self-sufficient for strategic and food materials which, in turn, necessitated a wider "sphere under control." Such a grossraum might correspond to the autarkic sphere, that was economically desirable. But when the Sphere was too vast, it was more difficult to defend militarily and to meet the political resistance within it.⁵⁰ Therefore, it was frequently suggested by some planners that in order to meet the over-all ideals of the GEACPS as closely as possible, economic factors should not be allowed to overshadow other factors even if it meant trading with other Spheres and an inadequacy of military preparations.⁵¹

The GEACPS stretched from the uppermost northern tip of Manchuria to the southern tip of Malaya,⁵² both of which

⁵⁰ Japanese War Ministry, Shukeika betsuban (Paymaster Dept., special team), Toa Kyoeiken no Seijiteki Keizaiteki Kihon Mondai Kenkyu (Research on the Basic Political and Economic Problems of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere), Vol. 1, No. 90-1 of Investigation of Economic Research Material, 1942, p. 8. See also SP 252, op. cit., p. 138.

⁵¹ Mitsuo Maehara, Hoichiro Noguchi, and Hajime Kobayashi, Tai Toa Kyo-Ei-Ken No Min-Zoku (Nations of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere) (Tokyo: Rokumeikan, 1942), Vol. II, pp. 110-113.

⁵² CAJMYA, IMT 467, "Draft of a plan for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere" (Dai Toa Kyoei-ken kensetsu gen'an-soko), prepared by the Soryo-kusen Kenkyu-jo (Total War Research Institute). Japanese

were recognized as geo-strategic key points of the sphere.⁵³ Establishment of Manchukuo was cited as a manifestation that Japan had followed the rule of what Geopolitics called "circular-body of a powerful state," as Manchukuo, Korea and the Japanese islands indeed made a "circular-body," but it had a defect in eastern Siberia, as the latter was not included.⁵⁴

The Japanese geopoliticians apparently realized that the greater outer arc of the Malay Archipelago including East Indies would offer enormous geographical defense advantages for the defense of the nucleus sphere of the GEACPS. During the war, such thinking was translated into action; by August 1942, the entire Archipelago had fallen under Japanese domination. Singapore was renamed Shonanto 新南島 and served as its defense center.⁵⁵

text and translation, Jan. 27, 1942. (IPS Doc. no. 2402), Reel WT60, p. 13. This refers also to IMTFE, Exhibit No. 1336 (Doc. no. 2402B), although their English translations are not identical; M. A. Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), p. 97ff. And also The Japan Yearbook 1943-44 (Tokyo: The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, 1944), p. 297ff.

⁵³ INT 467, loc. cit.

⁵⁴ Kozo Iwata, Chiseigaku (Geopolitics), Asai-shin Koza (Asai-New Lecture) 38 (Tokyo: Asai shimbunsha, 1942), p. 196 and its map #11.

⁵⁵ G. E. Percy, R. H. Fifield and Associates, World Political Geography (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1948), pp. 416 and 418; Tokuji Tamura (ed.), Dai Toa Kyo-Ei-Ken Kensetsu no Kisoriron (Basic Theories for Construction of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere) (Kyoto: Ritsumeikan Shuppanbu, 1943), p. 382.

Oceania,⁵⁶ which was also called the South Seas, was the vast areas of islands and island groups extending largely beyond the Malay Archipelago. The Japanese spokesmen occasionally suggested that the white races should cede all of their possessions in Oceania to the Yellow races. In his speech to the Diet on February 24, 1941, Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, after specifying the area as "1,200 miles north and south, and 1,000 miles east and west," described the region as self-sufficient and capable of supporting about 700 million people.⁵⁷

As in the case of the Malay Archipelago, the islands of Oceania, too, were important as a natural outer defense line for the inner East Asian Sphere. This was recognized by the Japanese route of expansion in the South Seas which involved "the strategy of island hopping." Many of these islands provided excellent bases for the Japanese navy and air force.⁵⁸

⁵⁶It includes Micronesia (U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Guam, Nauru and Gilbert Islands); Polynesia (French Oceania; the Niua Cook, and Tokelan Islands of New Zealand; Ellice Island, Tonga, Samoa, Hawaii); and Melanesia (New Caledonia, Solomon Islands, and Fiji Islands, New Hebrides) with New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago. Leon E. Seltzer (ed.), The Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer of the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 1364.

⁵⁷Quoted in Jaya Deva, Japan's Kampf (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1942), p. 154.

⁵⁸Pearcy, Fifield and Assoc., op. cit., p. 429.

The Japanese officials had given various, though not contradictory, reasons for their policy of expansion toward the South Seas which were geographically and culturally more remote from Japan than continental East Asia. One of the reasons given was "to check the possible spread of the European conflict to the Orient."⁵⁹ But in reality, the southward expansion was stimulated by the good opportunity offered by the European war. Another reason was that the South Seas area was Japan's living space, as the population density per kilometer in Oceania was quoted to be only 1.2 in contrast with 73.5 in Europe, 41.9 in Asia, and 7.2 for North America.⁶⁰ The islands of Oceania were, however, utilized for strategic purposes rather than for economic or immigration purposes.

As if space was the vehicle of power, if not power itself, Japan in about six months after the Pearl Harbor attack, overran all the lands and seas between the Arakan Yomas and the Solomon Islands, a land area of about one and a half million square miles with a population of about 150 millions.⁶¹ These areas, with the territorial gains made during three-quarters of a century, corresponded to the

⁵⁹ Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere (Tokyo, Japan: The Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, 1941), p. 49.

⁶⁰ Ibid., quoted in p. 75.

⁶¹ W. Gordon East and O. H. K. Spate (ed.), The Changing Map of Asia (3rd ed.: London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1958), p. 415.

territories generally desired for the GEACPS. Only a large part of China remained unoccupied while the southward expansion was being launched; it appeared as though Japan followed the advice of Haushofer who did what he could to prevent Sino-Japanese conflict and to urge a southward movement.⁶²

In the plan of the Total War Research Institute, these were the areas to be consolidated in the structure of the GEACPS through the period of the present war and the period of post war management, which together were to run nearly 20 years.⁶³ Even though the actual strategy was based on plans different from that of the Institute, the rapidity of Japanese expansion was almost incredible.

It appears that the easiness of early victories had turned the Japanese from rationality- what Haushofer called the geopolitical rule of jūjutsu- and led them to go further and further. The time and resources which could be devoted to consolidate the already acquired positions were spent in the attempts to move against the British in India and in extending the defense perimeter to Attu and Kiska in the Aleutian Islands, thus offering a threat to Alaska, to Midway in the Central Pacific and to the Gilberts, New Guinea thereby threatening Australia and New Zealand. These

⁶²Edmond A. Walsh, Total War: A Footnote to History (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1948), pp. 349-359.

⁶³IMF 467, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

extended areas, once taken, had to be defended even at the expense of further military resources of Japan.⁶⁴

Political and economic integration within this wide defense perimeter were hardly carried out, not only because of the immediate requirements of the war but also because of the lack of beforehand agreement with regard to each country. The official statement made in Tokyo often excluded the Philippine Islands,⁶⁵ whereas the Netherlands East Indies was marked for inclusion within the Sphere. On occasion, the Coprosperity Sphere was described as stopping short not only of the Philippines and Burma but also of Australia, New Zealand and British India. Geographic distance and the difficulty of defending these remote areas were the reasons for excluding them from the Sphere.⁶⁶

Another reason for the use of the "exclusion rule" was the difficulty involved in conquest. The areas belonging to Nationalist China, France and the Netherlands were regarded as areas which the Japanese could take at one

⁶⁴H. M. Vinacke, Far Eastern Politics in the Post-war Period (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1956), p. 27.

⁶⁵According to Hindmarsh in 1936, Japan's plans for expansion occasionally included acquisition of the Philippines. It was extremely doubtful if possession of these islands would justify the risk involved in antagonizing the United States. In Japan political control in Philippines was very rarely discussed even as a remote possibility. Albert E. Hindmarsh, The Basis of Japanese Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 228.

⁶⁶M. A. Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 69, 67 and 79.

swallow and easily retain. However, the situation was quite different with respect to the Philippines, the strong hold of Japan's strongest enemy and also with respect to India, Burma, Australia and New Zealand which were within the sphere of influence of Great Britain, Japan's second strongest opponent. Japan hoped to hold these countries as a price for a diplomatic bargain in the future.⁶⁷

According to the testimony of Tojo, it was decided to incorporate Burma and the Philippines into the GEACPS only after the war with the U. S. had begun, but not before. Also Australia had never been thought of, and India had not been seriously considered.⁶⁸ But there are ample indications that the officials intimately connected with Tojo considered one or the other or both from time to time. The disparity of opinion was so great that some Japanese considered India even as Russia's sphere of influence, and later as Germany's.⁶⁹

IV. EVALUATION

Sentiments against colonialism and against the West for that matter, though often mixed, were widespread among Asians. This provided the Japanese with a priceless asset

⁶⁷F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 357-367, *passim*.

⁶⁸Kondoshoten shuppanbu (comp.), Sabakareru Seki no Rekishi (A History of Judged Century) (Tokyo: Kondo Shoten, 1953), pp. 100-101.

⁶⁹Elsbree, op. cit., p. 16.

and a unique opportunity. But they fumbled it with their own actions and with their own faulty conception of the national movements in Asia. The idea of Japanese superiority was implicit in their estimates of various facets of the GEACPS. Nothing would or could be discussed on equal terms as their notion of guidance was that of leading children by hand. Indeed, Japan had unsuccessfully attempted to foster "Asianization" through "Japanization."

Subtle schemes were used as euphemisms for Japan's hegemony in East Asia. Japan surrendered its extraterritorial rights in Manchukuo and China, and demanded that the Western powers likewise abolish the "superior-inferior" relationship of their treaty system. In the occupied areas Japan replaced the unequal treaty system with her system of "inequality of states," under which each member of the GEACPS was assigned to different functions and status according to its ability and needs. But to natives in the Sphere there was no practical difference between the two systems in point of reference to their effect.

Hence these Asians were disappointed to find that Japanese promises far outstripped performance; her military trampled on the spirit of the Pacific Charter, the promises of GEACPS. By their greed and atrocities Japanese soldiers alienated the sympathy of these Asiatic nations, and made the realization of the GEACPS impossible.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSIONS AND CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE

I. CONCLUSIONS

Japanese ideas of creating the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere reflect geopolitical concepts of territorial imperialism which were reinforced by traditional Japanese influence toward expansionism.

Many concepts developed by German geopoliticians found a ready response among the numerous Japanese exponents of the GEACPS because, not only were they applicable to the GEACPS, but they also conformed with Japanese ideology of expansion. There were, of course, other reasons. In Japan, where education has been considerably influenced by Germany, there was much ideological sympathy for Germany. Both states had respect for authoritarian traditions, military achievements and expansive nationalism. Also, Japanese military officials were influenced by the military teachings of Moltke and Ludendorft.¹

¹For German influence on the Japanese army, see Shonosuke Yamamoto, Nihon o Horoboshita mono- Gunbu Tokusaika to sono Hodo no Katei (The Destroyer of Japan- Dictation of the Military Authority and the Process of its Collapse) (Tokyo: Shokoshoin, 1949), pp. 307 ff.

One of the main reasons for the popularity of German geopolitik on the part of the Japanese was due largely to the role played by the dean of German geopolitik, Haushofer, who had used Japan and the Indo-Pacific area as a model; he had also eulogized the Japanese ideology of expansion as geopolitical "instinct." There appears to be little evidence, however, that his ideas and advice had real and direct influence on the actual policies enacted,² except in the Japanese-German rapprochement of 1935, the Axis treaty of 1940, and the Japanese policy of "defend the North and march South." In Japan no one was able to monopolize the process of policy-making, since in Japanese politics decisions were reached through consultations. What has interested this writer, however, is the fact that many of

²This lack of influence may be partly because, as Haushofer admitted, Geopolitik was a theory of dynamic force, political technique and art based on the changing needs and "werden" of Japanese empire. Geopolitik was not conceived as "science without premise" (Voraussetzungslosigkeit). For more information on the subjective character of geopolitik, see Soichiro Sato, Hausuhofo no Taiheiyō Chiseigaku Kaisetsu (Commentary of Haushofer's Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans) (Tokyo: Taiheiyō kyokai, 1944), pp. 4-8, and 10-12; Kawakami Kenzo, Nachisu no Chiri Kensetsu (Geographical Construction of Nazi), ARS, 1941, p. 70; CAJMF, SP 255, Outline of the Guiding Principles of Japanese Diplomacy (Nihon Kōyū no Gaiko Shido Genri Kōryō), December 1936, Reel SP146, pp. 5-6; Masamichi Rōyama, Toa to Sekai- Shin Jitsujō hen Ronsaku (East Asia and World- Theoretical Guide to New Order) (Tokyo: Daizosha, 1941), pp. 366-369; Karl Haushofer, Taiheiyō Chiseigaku (Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans, 1938), trans. by Taiheiyō Kyokai (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1942), p. 543; Kōji Ihizuka, Chirigaku Hihan- Shakaigaku no Ichibumon to shiten (Chirigaku (Criticism on Geography- Geography as a branch of Social Sciences) (Tokyo: Teikoku shoin, 1948), pp. 170-178 and p. 185.

those, who have conducted research or formulated the policy-documents behind the scene regarding the GEACPS, were so familiar with many concepts developed by Haushofer and his associates that it would be most difficult to deny that German geopolitik had exerted some influence on the concept-formation of the GEACPS.³

The geopolitical concepts borrowed from Germany and also from other Western powers, such as Lebensraum, Autarky, Japanese Monroe Doctrine and the Yamato People's (instead of White Man's) Burden, were reiterated by Japanese propagandists to the outside world, as if they represented scientific arguments in the best Western tradition. Japanese planners of the GEACPS assumed the attitude of Haushofer that it was "inhuman to disregard the inadequate distribution of living space."

Hence their geopolitical formula for redistribution of Lebensraum can well be compared with the Marxist counterpart for the redistribution of the means of production, even though Marx-Leninists are, unlike geopoliticians, theoretically opposed to the recognition of any influence on the life of states by their geographical environment

³ Referring to the close relations between Haushofer and Japanese scientists and military men, E. W. Schnitzer points out that the even term "Greater East Asia" was borrowed from Germany. See his monograph entitled, German Geopolitics Revived: A Survey of Geopolitical Writing in Germany Today, RM-1212, March 19, 1954, pp. 5-6.

such as space or location.⁴

The geopolitical concepts that were reinforced by the traditional concepts or the traditional concepts that were reinforced by the geopolitical concepts were the organismic (biological) theory of state and pan-regionalism. The organismic theory was a major theory of not only German geopolitik but also the Japanese GEACPS. The concept of organic totality or "groupism" also coincides with the familist and hierarchical assumptions in Japan's traditional political theory. It provided the rationale for inequality among the GEACPS members, subjugation of the members to Japan, and for the denial in general of political liberalism, economic competition, social atomism and cultural freedom.

Pan-regionalism was an old ideology of expansion both in Germany and in Japan; it was also a component of geopolitics in both countries. Pan-Asianism was a reaction to the imposition of Western ideals and practices on Asia.

⁴Geopolitik of the "have-not" nations brand was viewed by Johannes Mattern as "the nationalistic counterpart of Marxian international "dialectic materialism." See his Geopolitik, Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press), 1942, pp. 11-12. But the Marx-Leninist theory could not accept geopolitical determinism without contradicting the economic interpretation of the development of states. Moreover, to geopoliticians the life of societies is conditioned by natural environment such as geographic location, not by the "mode of production" nor by the "monopolistic stage of capitalism." For Marx's economic interpretation of the growth of states, see his A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, trans. from the 2nd German ed. by N. I. Stone (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Company, 1904), pp. 10-13.

It was also tied with the idea of racial solidarity under Japan, the self-assumed leading nation.

Two other sources of Japan's traditional ideology of expansion reflect some affinity to geopolitical thinking. Mythological concept of Hakko Ichiu (Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof), which expressed a Japan-centric cosmo, had become an element of Japanese geopolitics.

Nationalism was naturally the dynamic force behind the ideology of Japanese expansion. When Japan was weak, her nationalism was expressed- though partly- in the movement to overcome Japan's defense weakness vis-a-vis the nearby great land mass on the one hand and the wide ocean around her lengthy coastline on the other. After she became strong, it was expressed in the movement to expand her influence over Asia.

Two questions arise: (1) Do these afore-mentioned ideas manifest inherent weakness in the structure of the GEACPS? (2) Why did the job of constructing the GEACPS turn out to be a complete failure?

The systems of Bloc Economy and Grossraumwirtschaft were sublimated in the synthetic economic structure of the GEACPS as the selfish profit elements were supposedly replaced by those of Oriental moralism and harmonism. However, in practice Japan alone could decide the economic need as well as ability of each country and designate what it was best adapted to produce and to relieve that which it lacked from other members of GEACPS. Hence the economic

theories of comparative advantage and division of labor were applied in the GEACPS but the inseparable tie of the part to the whole of the GEACPS directed by Japan not only guaranteed Japan's economic hegemony in East Asia but also effectively subjugated the members of GEACPS to Japan.

The geopolitical principle that an over-populated nation must expand has no limits in practice. And it is a physical impossibility for any nation to possess all that would be required for its national self-sufficiency and empire. Japan's needs for colonies and territories as a new power in modern imperialism could be a cause, but not a justification of territorial imperialism. In fact, much of Japan's continuous expansion was not dictated by objective geography but caused by the policy-maker's subjective interpretation of her natural environment. One's territorial domain should not be viewed as having "snow-balling" effect. Even if the pan-regional economic system could benefit East Asia as a whole by eliminating intra-bloc economic barriers, the remaining question is, how equitably and by whom was the benefit to be distributed among the partners?

In theory, most member states of the GEACPS were politically independent with the exception that the "politically weaker" states were "temporarily" ruled by Japan as her territories. But alleged independence could be a sham, since all members had to adjust their policies with the economic and political "requirements" of the whole,

and with the Japanese principles of "combinationism," "totalism," and "inequalitarianism." The desire of Asians to be independent was such that they seemed to prefer self-government to "good" government. Used intelligently, Japan could have gained undying gratitude from Asians. However, Japan was not able to solve the dilemma resulting from the consideration of the future, and the war-time necessity to exploit fully the economic resources of Asia.

Japan went into the Greater East Asia War against the West under the battlecry of Asia's liberation from European colonialism, and the establishment of the GEACPS. This appeal was a sound one in Asia, but despite her utilization of the rising tide of nationalism and anti-Westernism, Japan almost imitated the traditional colonialism, in her implementation of the political, military and economic aspects of the GEACPS. Thus she turned the rising nationalism of the Asian states against her.

Had Japanese leaders sided with the conservative trend of political thought in the Western world, and played the role of the legitimate heir to Europe's decaying power in Asia, Japan might have escaped the total defeat.⁵ Instead, by violently opposing the European powers which she imitated, Japan undermined the very foundation of her own colonial

⁵Sidney Shiwamura, ex-reporter of The Asia Shinbun expressed similar views through several personal interviews the writer had had with him in New York City, Summer, 1958.

rule outside the home-islands. Thus, the attempt to realize the concept of the GEACPS cost Japan her long-held colonies such as Formosa, Korea, South Sakhalin, Manchuria and New China- although the latter two were theoretically independent. Yet in defeat Japan contributed to the end of the colonial era and the rapid rise of independent Asia; without the Japan-initiated war the hold of the European powers might have remained for decades.

The countries Japan tried to influence with these delusions and ideas of the Coprosperity Sphere responded much less than Japan had expected, but more than the outsiders seemed to believe. These Asians learned a lesson from the Japanese propaganda. To those who had been subjected to the colonialism of the West, the cry of "Asia for the Asiatics" made a better appeal than that of "Asia for the Whites" would make. Some of the techniques Japan resorted to in her counter-propaganda charges were effective. One might attribute the marked development in the nationalist movements after the war, at least partly, to Japanese policies and the propaganda in the GEACPS.

Nevertheless, the plan for joining nearly one billion people into the GEACPS had been a failure, as much due to the decline of Japanese military fortunes, as due to the lack of support from the natives. The necessity for fighting a hemisphere war while attempting to establish the GEACPS had been an impossible handicap for the Japanese.

Other handicaps were the internal dissensions between the army and the navy, between the Foreign Ministry and the Greater East Asia Ministry, and also between extreme expansionists and moderate expansionists.

No great power except the United States has succeeded to maintain the world's largest naval force and the land force at the same time. The British Empire, which once had 27% of the world's total area and 25% of its total population, managed to become the world greatest sea power only because she concentrated on the construction of the navy at the expense of her army. Nevertheless, the duality of Japanese military policy- maritime as well as continental- led her militarists to attempt the impossible task of making Japan both a great sea and land power. This task was beyond Japan's means in view of the narrowness of Japanese domain and the poverty of natural resources, both of which were also important elements conditioning the geopolitical character of Japan.⁶

Despite all the mistakes committed in actually carrying out the policies and all the inconsistencies in the assumptions behind policies, it cannot be denied that many exponents of the regional or geopolitical ideas upheld Japan's New Order because they believed that it would serve

⁶ Hikomatsu Kamikawa, "Nihon Gaiko heno Puroregomena" (Prolegomena to Japanese Diplomacy), Kokusai Seiji (International Politics), Summer 1957, p. 3.

a purpose above that of military dominance or material gains. Consistency between public and classified documents on the subject seems to indicate Japanese sincerity and seriousness about their design. The Japanese theorists and policy-makers showed wide differences on questions of execution of many of the policies, but they hardly doubted the fundamental rightness of the purpose behind these policies.

As a consequence of Japan's defeat, a half billion Asians were liberated from the enslavement of Japanese imperialism, and Japan was "democratized." The war not only destroyed the Far East as an "autonomous Power Zone" in international relations but also undermined the very foundation of anti-Communism in Asia. Elimination of Japan hastened a Communist power to fill the vacuum she left behind, and thereby drew the United States and the Soviet Union into closer contact. Hence, with its forces stationed in Japan, the United States occupies geostratigically an advanced position vis-a-vis the eastern part of the Soviet Union.⁷

II. CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE

A number of the pre-war and war-time exponents of the "Greater Asianism" express the view today that the policies

⁷W. Gordon East and O. H. K. Spate (ed.), The Changing Map of Asia (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1958), pp. 45-46.

of the GEACPS should have been gradually executed by peaceful means after having fostered among its members mutual ties, and that the concept itself had never been a mistaken idea. It is interesting to note today that a pan-Asian and pan-neutral "alliance" is being advocated in Japan by those who had belonged to the pan-Asian "geopolitical" organizations. The afore-mentioned Yatsugi, Komaki, Royama, and Kamikawa still maintain inward predilection for geopolitical principles and are bound to exert some influence on the emerging role of Japan in the post-war pan-Asian movements--be it economic, political or psychological.

Dr. Hikomatsu Kamikawa, the winner of the Japan Academy Prize for his three volume work on Current History of Diplomacy, is Director of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu-sho 日本国際問題研究所), which is the Japanese counterpart of the British Royal Institute of International Affairs, and also Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Japan Association of International Relations (Nihon Kokusai Seijigakukai 日本国際政治学会). His geopolitical interpretation of the rise and fall of the Japanese empire is still accepted by certain intellectuals, but of more importance is the attention given it today by his many critics. Hence in any case his geopolitical theory, which is neo-Haushoferian, deserves the attention of Western scholars. Kazuo Yatsugi, who instituted in 1953 Kokusei Kenkyu-kai 国政研究会

(Research Association on National Politics) and publishes as its organ Shin Sei ~~新~~ 政 (New Politics), is reportedly active in his efforts to bring rapprochement between Japan and South Korea. Dr. Saneshige Komaki who has recently retired from the Presidency of Shiga University plans to carry on works on geopolitics. Dr. Masamichi Royama, formerly President of Ochanomizu Women's College and presently a professor at International Christian University, Tokyo, is one of Japan's reputable political scientists.

Reemergence of Asianism in Japan. There has been a reemergence of the basic tenet of Japan's pre-war Asianism.⁸ The new Asian schools once again shout the old chants⁹ but without using old geopolitical jargon.

The new pan-Asian nationalism and anti-colonialism draw their support from the extreme left and right. These defiant principles express the attitude of a minority but they hold a potent appeal because of their affinity to neutralism, which for many Japanese is a sine qua non for Japan in order to assume a position of major importance in Asia and world affairs;¹⁰ and for them neutralism is also

⁸See Nippon Oyobi Nipponjin, January, 1958, pp. 36-39, and pp. 48-55.

⁹Stuart Griffin, "Ultrationalism in Japan," Eastern World (London, January 1961), p. 19.

¹⁰I. I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Post-War Trends (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 394-397.

a means to secure "true" independence.¹¹ Today, this ideal of pan-Asianism enables most Japanese to overlook the Communist element in Red China¹² and tend to neutralize Japan's traditional antipathy for Korea.

To one of these organizations, the Pacific War was a success since, thanks to Japan's self-sacrifice in the war, various countries of Asia were "finally able to throw off the Western yoke."¹³ A number of these organizations still advocate the traditional pan-Asian principles especially those of Ishiwara's East Asia League. Kyowa To 協和会 (Harmony Party) and Kyukoku Seinen Remei 救国青年聯盟 (National Salvation Youth League) advocate a union of the Asian peoples on a basis of complete equality as advocated by Gen. Ishiwara. They also sloganize "independence rather than Communism," and "autonomous neutrality."¹⁴

Of all the right-wing organizations in post-war Japan, those descending from the East Asian League do not promote rearmaments. The only exception is Jiei Domei 自衛同盟 (Self-defense League), which combines neutrality with self-defense in support of Japan's growing armed force.¹⁵

¹¹Keibi Keisatsu Kenkyu Dai (ed.), Yuoku Undo (The Right Wing Movement) (Tokyo, 1955), p. 184 in *Ibid.*, p. 363.

¹²Delmer M. Brown, "Recent Japanese Political and Historical Materials," American Political Science Review, Vol. IVIII (1949), pp. 270-271.

¹³Fuji Yo Okore (Be in Rage, Mt. Fuji) (Tokyo: Junkoku Seinen Tai, 1957), p. 90.

¹⁴Morris, op. cit., pp. 178 and 74. ¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 223.

"Asia for the Asiatics" and "Asian must not fight Asian" are, once again, popular slogans among those that belonged to the pre-war pan-Asian organizations. The "geopolitikal" Lebensraum and especially the blatant expansionist ambitions of pre-war days are discredited more than ever before, and are being replaced by "the achievement of independence through Asian solidarity."

These revived pan-Asian nationalist groups today have negligible political influence, but their potentiality should not be overlooked in view of the fact the conservative government in Japan continues in the tradition of the past often utilizing nationalist sentiment to restore Japan's traditional patterns. According to Professor Ivan Morris "Japan is more likely to swing to some form of extreme rightist politics than to Communism," if a foreign threat or a serious economic crisis should occur.¹⁶

"Open" Regionalism. It can be argued that the GEACPS was the earliest organized enunciation of the current theme of national liberation and economic development in terms of total regional planning. This involved complementing of "native" primary goods with manufactured goods from abroad, plant export, technical aids, research organizations, and

¹⁶ Ivan Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Post-war Trends (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 414 et passim.

also the political, economic, military, cultural relations between the developed nation and the underdeveloped.

Japan, once again, proposes to develop the underdeveloped areas of Southeast Asia by injecting into them her capital, technology, and heavy industrial plant in return for industrial and edible raw materials. From Yoshida to Ikeda, the Japanese government has pledged to promote economic cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. Prime Minister Ikeda, upon returning from the tour of South and Southeast Asia in 1961, said it was Japan's "duty" to provide economic and technical aid, "even if we have to borrow money from foreign countries to do so."¹⁷ The United States appears to have accepted the concept of Asian economic development under the economic-technological leadership of Japan. The need to strengthen the economies of Southeast Asia in the face of Communist aggression required Japanese assistance. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers therefore permitted the Japanese to rebuild their heavy industries in order to export capital goods to the rest of Asia.¹⁸ Japan's favorable balance of trade with Southeast Asia has compensated for unfavorable balances of trade with other

¹⁷Quoted from The Washington Post, December 5, 1961, p. A 10. See also Ajiya Mondai, August, 1957, pp. 92-93, pp. 79-80 and August, 1958, pp. 46-47.

¹⁸Franz H. Michael, and George E. Taylor, The Far East in the Modern World (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1958), pp. 664-665.

areas. But she will be unable to increase the volume of her trade, unless the economy of the various Asian nations is further developed. This accounts for her efforts to assist the area's economic development.¹⁹ With rather extravagant enthusiasm about the complementarity of the economies of Japan and Southeast Asia and Oceania, the Japanese argue nowadays that they need the raw materials and resources of the region and would pay for them with exports of manufactured goods, which the region will need in ever larger quantities.²⁰

Indeed, Japan's past experience in achieving the rapid modernization of her economy and her technical experiences developed upon an Asian basis, can be put to good use in the other countries of Asia. Also, her numerous trained experts in various fields of economic life can make a large contribution to the economic development of this region.²¹

The Japanese delegate at the Conference of Ministers of the Colombo Plan held in October 1955 in Singapore is

¹⁹Takeshi Yanozaki, "Economic Rehabilitation of Japan and the Economy of Asia," Japan's Problems (Tokyo) Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 9, 1954, p. 106 and pp. 111-113.

²⁰Saburo Okita, "South and Southeast Asia and Japanese Economy," Japan Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 1 (October-December 1954), pp. 8 ff.

²¹Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Postwar Economy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955), p. 13.

quoted as saying:

During the 1930's, we experienced a period of bloc economy which eventually led the world to misery and destruction. In contrast with such a narrow type of regionalism, recent development of regionalism has much wider context as seen in the case of Western Europe. In other words, countries in the region may foster closer links among themselves, in parallel with the cooperation with the countries outside. Such a type of regionalism might be called the 'open regionalism' in contrast with the 'closed regionalism' of the past, and the Colombo Plan is surely the most suitable set-up for promoting and fostering such a type of 'open regionalism.'²²

An editorial in the Economist, referring to this new type of regionalism, labeled it as "Peaceful Co-Prosperity."²³

Japan's Role in "Peaceful" Co-Prosperity. There have been several proposals for establishment of different types of an Asian Common Market. The Asian Productivity Organization which presently includes the Philippines, Thailand, Japan, Pakistan and Nationalist China, is seriously considering the establishment of a Common Market Area covering Asian nations of the Orient and Southeast Asia. It would be organized along lines similar to the European Inner-Six or the Outer-Seven.²⁴ Very recently in Manila the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East unanimously approved a resolution submitted by the Philippines

²²Ibid., p. 15.

²³See "Peaceful Co-Prosperity," The Economist (London: March 16, 1957), pp. 891-892.

²⁴The New Korea, October 26, 1962, p. 4.

calling for the creation of an Asian Common Market for economic cooperation and integration among Asian countries.²⁵

It should be noted that the basic condition of a regional cooperative structure is geographic propinquity, as in the case of the European Common Market. The Asian area stretching from Japan to Pakistan was viewed by Yamamoto as too extensive; hence he suggested the establishment of three "little Asias": (1) Pakistan, India, Burma and Ceylon; (2) Red China, North Korea and a eastern Siberia; and (3) Japan, South Korea, Formosa and the Philippines. As for the solution of political rivalries within each group, Yamamoto would have the Asian rivals follow the example of political understanding reached between France and West Germany.²⁶

Professor Royama, who was instrumental in the development of "geopolitical" theories of the GEACPS, believes

²⁵"Asian Common Market," The Korea Times, March 19, 1963, an editorial p. 2.

²⁶Minoru Yamamoto, "Chiiki Keizai-Kiko no Mondai" (Problems in the Structure of Regional Economic Cooperation) in Japan ECAFE Kyokai (ed.), Ajiya Keizai Hatten no Kiso Riron (Basic Theories for the development of Asian Economy) (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1959), pp. 749-752. Yet, the United Arab Republic's Minister for supplies and Food, and Pakistan's Commerce Minister has proposed a Afro-Asian Common Market. It would correct the West-oriented economic relations and foster trade relations between the Afro-Asian nations. See Dawn (Pakistan), November 30, 1962, editorial page. An Indian member of the Legislative Council suggested the establishment of a Mid-South Asian Commonwealth, a Common Market of six sub-Himalayan Countries, such as India Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Nepal, and Afghanistan. He feels their coordination in the economic field would "open new vistas" for the solution of political rivalries in the area. See Letter written by A. J. Faridi to the Editor, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Vol. 87, No. 12 (September 20, 1962).

today that Japan must "set an example in post-war Asia, which is caught in the ideological struggle between the Communist and "free" world, of a nation that can emerge as a democratically unified nation by avoiding internal ideological dissension." Japan's success in this endeavor would provide as much "spiritual" inspiration to Asia as did Japan's victory over Russia in 1904-1905.²⁷

If Asia is to act together there must be some sort of a regional organization, and if this is to be effective and strong, either Japan, India or China must be able to secure leadership without imperialism. There are many obstacles Japan has to surmount. First of all, the fear and distrust created by the GEACPS must be removed since they continue to poison Japan's relations with her neighbors. Peaceful commercial means seems to be an effective approach to live down this reputation in East Asia.²⁸

There appears to be a long way to go, however, before Japan can reach the place of West Germany which with France, its traditional enemy, has joined the European Common Market as well as NATO. Even if any form of an Asian Common Market is successfully organized with Japan as a leading member, the prevailing conditions in Asia do not bid too well for

²⁷Masamichi Royama, "Asia Keizai Hatten no Kokusai Seijiteki Igi," (International Political Significance of the Development of Asian Economy) in *Ibid.*, pp. 680-682.

²⁸See "Peaceful Co-Prosperity" an editorial, The Economist, March 16, 1957, p. 691.

its success. The existing gulf between the primarily agricultural Asian countries and industrial Japan would interfere with the international division of labor and production in which the Asian countries have had little experience. Since the formation of a common market of various countries is generally viewed as a means for securing greater collaboration among its members and eventually political integration, it will, indeed, be a long way before Asiatic Asia can reach such political maturity.

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
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APPENDIX A*

Organismic Circularity of Expansion



*For detail see Chapter VII of this manuscript.
It may not be a mistake to regard Osaka as a geostrategic center of Japan's first stage expansion, Formosa that of the second stage, and Singapore that of the third stage.

A hand-drawn map titled "Axis of Japanese Expansion" showing the progression of Japanese influence from 1875 to 1945. The map includes labels for Manchouli (1930), MANCHUKUO (1930), SHANSHU I. (1905), KASHA I. (1945), CHINA (1937), RYUKYU (1894), VIK (1841), PEI (1875), NATIONAL DEFENCE BASE LINE, KASHA I. (1895), PHILIPPINES (1934), JALUIT I., MARSHALL, CAROLINE, (JAPANESE MANDATES) (1914), and MANIARAS. A dashed line represents the "National Defence Base Line".

*See Tatsuo Kawai, The Goal of Japanese Expansion (Hatten Nippon no Mokuhyo) (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1938, p. 120, and also Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans, trans. Taiheiyō Kyōkai (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1942), p. 238 ff.